

006107117017

# GREEK PREPOSITIONS

ADAMS




*Presented to the*  
LIBRARY of the  
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO  
*by*  
Mrs. H. J. Cody


H. J. Cody

Univ. Coll. Toronto.

1885.







THE


# GREEK PREPOSITIONS,

STUDIED FROM THEIR ORIGINAL MEANINGS  
AS DESIGNATIONS OF SPACE.

BY  
F. A. ADAMS, PH. D.

It is of more importance to us to learn how the Greeks spoke than to  
know what they said.—JELF.

NEW YORK:  
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,  
1, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET,  
1885.



COPYRIGHT, 1885,  
BY D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.

## INTRODUCTION.

---

WHATEVER theory we adopt of the origin of language, it is agreed by all scholars that its words are derived largely from notions of things in space. This book presents the results of a study of the Greek Prepositions from the stand-point of that admission.

No class of words in the Greek is more important than the Prepositions ; and none are more imperfectly understood ; yet these are the words that, beyond all others, bear on their face the suggestions of space. But the clew is soon lost that conducts from these primary uses into the wide realm of thought, of reasoning, of will, of passion, and life. And yet such a clew there must be, connecting by real, though subtle analogies, the primary meanings with all the meanings which follow.

But learners of the Greek find no harder thing, after passing the rudiments, than to fix in mind the meanings of verbs compounded with prepositions. The difficulty is natural, and on the whole creditable to the intellect of the embarrassed student. He has nothing but his memory to aid him ; neither the Dic-

tionary nor the Grammar give instruction here—they give only authority. The learner is left with few incitements to his power of discrimination and logical deduction. The definitions in the Lexicons burden his memory; they do not instruct him to find his way. Even Treatises on the Greek Prepositions do not evince any systematic endeavor to interpret the prepositions through a logical deduction from their primary meanings as designations of space. The learner under these conditions naturally becomes indifferent; for what he cannot do intelligently, he becomes, after a time, willing not to do at all; and, perhaps, in the end, he adds one to the number of those who complain that they have spent much time on the Greek with little profit.

To show that the picture here outlined is not too highly colored, let a college graduate, who has done well in his Greek, take, for example, the verb *λείπειν*; and, prefixing to it successively the prepositions *ἀπό*, *διὰ*, *ἐκ*, *ἐν*, *ἐπὶ*, *κατὰ*, *παρὰ*, *ὑπὸ*, let him form English sentences that, if written in Greek, would require the use of these prepositions respectively compounded with the verb. His certain failure is the result of many former defeats, where his natural inquisitiveness has not been encouraged and rewarded.

When he finds the verb *μένειν* compounded with *ἀνὰ*, with *διὰ*, *ἐν* and *κατὰ*, with *περὶ* and *ὑπὸ*, he finds himself in a like difficulty. The adjectives *δῆλος*, *ἔκδηλος*, *ἔνδηλος*, *κατάδηλος*, all contain the

notion *clear*, with differences which forbid the use of one for another. What are these differences? And through what lines of thought does the learner come to see these differences, so that the knowledge of them shall no longer depend on a burdened memory, but shall be a natural possession of his instructed intelligence? The present work is an endeavor to clear somewhat this seeming jungle of the Greek Prepositions—to show that it is not a jungle, but a garden, whose alleys and paths have become overgrown through neglect, and lost to view. Or—to speak without a figure—the object of this work is contained by implication in the following Thesis:

The Greek Prepositions, suggestive primarily of notions of space, show through all their uses such analogy to the primary meanings as affords aids indispensable to a satisfactory understanding of the language.

The *motive* and *object* of the work, thus stated, naturally lead to the question of its *method*. It begins by analyzing the notions of space, and the notions that accompany these in nature; it then seeks for the *analogues* of these in human experience. Thus the whole field of human life, of thought, passion, and purpose, is laid open, and the Prepositions enter it in their own right.

The store-house of facts used in the present study is the language of the Greek Literature—the Greek Language at its best. As the work is Psychological,

not Etymological, it does not discuss the origins of words. It is not the forms of the words, but the thought that underlies them, that is here the object of search ; not the changing fortunes through which a written word has passed till it comes to the form in which we have it in our hands ; but what the word means now that is in our hands, and how it comes to mean what we know it does mean. As the prepositions primarily denote relations of space, we have in these notions, and others which these carry with them, a point of departure—not a working hypothesis awaiting its justification, but a basis of facts settled by common consent ; *ἀνά* primarily means *up*, and *κατά* *down* ; *ἐπί* means primarily *on* or *upon*, and *ὑπό* means *under* ; and so of the rest. In beginning at this point we begin where the learner must begin ; and where he must stay till he learns to love the Greek, if he ever comes to love it at all.

As the ideas of space and the notions these carry with them were always present, it is reasonable to believe that they were operative in the formation of language from the first ; that they served as landmarks pointing out the paths along which human speech should move. For reasons already suggested, the present work does not enter this wide and attractive field. It is written with the humbler aim of aiding the students who are learning to read Greek, and the teachers whose work is to instruct them.

This work makes no claim to be a complete

treatise on the Greek Preposition. The author has restricted himself to the presentation of the subject in a single line of observation—omitting whatever was not pertinent to his special object.

In this view he trustfully commends it to the hospitable reception that will be readily accorded to a thoughtful endeavor on new ground.



## CONTENTS.

---

### CHAPTER I.

#### OF SPACE, AND ITS SILENT TEACHINGS.

	SECTION
Words of space applied to ideas of <i>time</i> . . . . .	1
Applied to description, and to moral conduct . . . . .	2
This extension springs from an instinct in humanity . . . . .	3
Language limited and poor; imagination must supply its defects . . . . .	4
The proper starting-point in treating the Prepositions . . . . .	5
The mode of study; deductive and inductive . . . . .	6

### CHAPTER II.

#### *āvā* AND *katā*. UP AND DOWN.

The notion <i>up</i> ; its attendant notions, <i>First</i> , <i>Second</i> , <i>Third</i> , <i>Fourth</i> . . . . .	7
The notion <i>down</i> ; its attendant notions, <i>First</i> , <i>Second</i> , <i>Third</i> , <i>Fourth</i> . . . . .	7
These attendant notions not the result of study, but given in nature . . . . .	8

### CHAPTER III.

#### *āvā* AND *katā*. PRIMARILY ADVERBIAL.

Preposition and Adverb—their difference . . . . .	9
' <i>Avā</i> , <i>up</i> , and <i>katā</i> , <i>down</i> , primarily Adverbial . . . . .	10
<i>Katā</i> with the Genitive and with the Accusative, illustrated . . . . .	11
Language limited compared with thought . . . . .	12

## CHAPTER IV.

## ἀνὰ AND κατὰ. MEANINGS DERIVED FROM ANALOGY.

	SECTION
Analogue of κατὰ in motion along the ground; in speech; in judgment . . . . .	13-17
Ἄνα τὰς πόλεις, κατὰ τὰς πόλεις . . . . .	18
Ἄνα and κατὰ with numerals . . . . .	19
Ἄνα κράτος, κατὰ κράτος . . . . .	20, 21
Ἄν όμιλον, καθ' όμιλον . . . . .	22, 23

## CHAPTER V.

## ἀνὰ AND κατὰ IN COMPOSITION.

Ἄνάγεσθαι, κατάγεσθαι . . . . .	24
Ἄνάβασις, κατάβασις; ἀνιέναι, καθιέναι . . . . .	25
Ἄνακαλεῖν, κατακαλεῖν . . . . .	26
Ἄνέχειν, κατέχειν; ἀναπάνειν, καταπάνειν . . . . .	27
Ἄναμένειν, καταμένειν . . . . .	27, 28, 29
Ἄναδέχεσθαι, καταδέχεσθαι, καταγιγνώσκειν . . . . .	30, 31
Ἄναγνάμπτειν, ἀναπέλθειν, ἀναχώρεῖν, ἀνατιθέναι, marks of upward motion in each (Sec. 7) . . . . .	32
Ἄνανεύειν, κατανεύειν; ἀνασπᾶν, to pull down . . . . .	33
Ἄναδεῖν, third mark of upward motion (7) . . . . .	34
Κατάρχειν, apparent contradiction reconciled . . . . .	35, 36
Δὲῖν, to lack, καταδὲῖν . . . . .	37
Δεικνύναι, ἀναδεικνύναι, καταδεικνύναι . . . . .	38
Μανθάνειν, ἀναμανθάνειν, καταμανθάνειν . . . . .	39
Ἄναζητεῖν, ἀναλύειν . . . . .	40, 41
Καθορᾶν . . . . .	42
Καταφαίνεσθαι, ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καταφανῆς . . . . .	43, 44
Ἄναμιγνύναι, καταμιγνύναι . . . . .	45
Κτείνειν, κατακτείνειν, ἀποκτείνειν . . . . .	46
Θυήσκειν, καταθυήσκειν . . . . .	47
Ἄνα and κατὰ, leading to the same result by different paths . . . . .	48

## CHAPTER VI.

## ἐπὶ, ON, UPON.

	SECTION
Primary suggestion; gravitation . . . . .	49
Transference of direction, change of power . . . . .	50
Two forms of power suggested in ἐπὶ; impact; pressure . . . . .	51
Sphere of ἐπὶ enlarged by change of direction . . . . .	52, 53
Ἐπὶ with the Genitive; with the Dative . . . . .	54, 55
Ἐπὶ with expressions of time . . . . .	56
General suggestion of power in ἐπὶ . . . . .	57
Object of ἐπὶ pictured as lifeless, not necessarily lifeless in fact .	58

## CHAPTER VII.

## ὑπὸ, UNDER; ACCESSORY NOTIONS.

Correlatives of ὑπὸ in space . . . . .	59
Implications through gravitation . . . . .	60, 61
Correlative of gravitation . . . . .	62
Cases following ὑπὸ . . . . .	63
Position under ὑπὸ . . . . .	64
Motion toward, ending in position under . . . . .	65
Motion from, beginning with position under. . . . .	66
Dynamic suggestions . . . . .	67
Applications of the correlatives ὑπὸ and ἐπὶ . . . . .	68, 69
Ἐπάγειν, ὑπάγειν, ὑπελαύνειν. . . . .	70, 71
Μένειν, ὑπομένειν, ἐπιμένειν . . . . .	72
Ἐπιτιθέναι, ἐπέρχεσθαι, ἐπιέναι, ἐπιπίπτειν, ὑποφέρειν, ὑποδέχεσθαι, ὑποφεύγειν . . . . .	73
Ὑγεῖσθαι, ἔξηγ-, ὑφηγ- . . . . .	74, 75, 76

## CHAPTER VIII.

## πρὸς, TO, TOWARDS, NEAR TO, FACE TO FACE.

Πρὸς, primarily suggestive of human relations . . . . .	77, 78
Suggestion of reciprocity in πρὸς . . . . .	79, 80

	SECTION
<i>'Επ'</i> ἀρετὴν, <i>πρὸς</i> ἀρετὴν, compared . . . . .	81
The object of <i>πρὸς</i> becomes to the imagination active . . . . .	82-88
<i>'Επὶ τὴν</i> 'Ελλάδα, <i>πρὸς τοὺς παιᾶς</i> . . . . .	89
Il. 18:317 . . . . .	90
<i>'Η δὸς ἐπ'</i> εὐδαιμονίαν; <i>πρὸς</i> εὐδαιμονίαν . . . . .	91
Πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα, ἐπὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα . . . . .	92
<i>'Επὶ τοὺς πολεμίους</i> , <i>πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους</i> . . . . .	93
Discriminations of <i>ἐπὶ</i> and <i>πρὸς</i> further illustrated . . . . .	94-103

## CHAPTER IX.

## ἐπὶ AND πρὸς IN COMPOSITION.

<i>'Επέχειν</i> , <i>προσέχειν</i> , illustrated, and tested . . . . .	104
Applications of the above . . . . .	105
<i>'Επερωτᾶν</i> , <i>προσερωτᾶν</i> , <i>μιμνήσκειν</i> , <i>ἐπιμ-</i> . . . . .	106, 107
<i>'Επὶ</i> looking forward to what is yet to come . . . . .	108
<i>'Επὶ</i> sometimes doing for the Greek mind what the pronoun <i>this</i> does for the English mind . . . . .	109
Λανθάνεσθαι, <i>ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι</i> . . . . .	110, 111, 112
Νεύειν, <i>ἐπινεύειν</i> , <i>κατανεύειν</i> . . . . .	113
<i>'Αιτεῖν</i> , <i>ἐπαιτεῖν</i> , <i>προσαιτεῖν</i> . . . . .	114
Ακούειν, <i>ἐπακούειν</i> , <i>προσακούειν</i> . . . . .	115
Πέτομαι, <i>ἐπιπέτομαι</i> , <i>ἰάχειν</i> , <i>ἐπιάχειν</i> . . . . .	116
Δεῖν, to bind, <i>ἐπιδεῖν</i> , <i>προσδεῖν</i> . . . . .	117
<i>'Ευφημέιν</i> , <i>ἐπευφημέιν</i> ; <i>λέγειν</i> , <i>ἐπιλέγειν</i> . . . . .	118, 119
<i>Σκέπτεσθαι</i> , <i>ἐπισκέπτεσθαι</i> . . . . .	120
Πείθεσθαι, <i>ἐπιπείθεσθαι</i> ; <i>οἰδόναι</i> , <i>ἐπιδούναι</i> . . . . .	121
Γνάμπτειν, <i>ἐπιγνάμπτειν</i> , <i>ἀναγνάμπτειν</i> ; <i>ἔρεσθαι</i> , <i>ἐπέρεσθαι</i> . . . . .	122
<i>Στρέφειν</i> , <i>ἐπιστρέφειν</i> ; <i>δινέῖν</i> , <i>ἐπιδινεῖν</i> . . . . .	123
<i>'Επιτυγχάνειν</i> , <i>κατατυγχάνειν</i> , <i>προστυγχάνειν</i> . . . . .	124
Δεικνύναι, <i>ἐπιδεικνύναι</i> . . . . .	125
<i>Ἐφίέναι</i> , <i>προσφίέναι</i> ; <i>ἐπάγειν</i> , <i>προσάγειν</i> . . . . .	126
<i>'Επιτάσσειν</i> , <i>προστάσσειν</i> . . . . .	127

## CHAPTER X.

## παρά.

	SECTION
With Genitive, Dative, Accusative . . . . .	128
Implied superiority in its object . . . . .	129
Παρά, meaning <i>against</i> , explained in contrast with κατά . . . . .	130

## CHAPTER XI.

## παρά IN COMPOSITION.

Literal application . . . . .	131, 132
Σκευή, σκευάζειν, παρασκ-, κατασκ- . . . . .	133
Used in morals . . . . .	134
Παρατέίνειν . . . . .	135, 136
Παραγιγνώσκειν . . . . .	137
Ἄινειν, ἐπαινεῖν, παραινεῖν . . . . .	138

## CHAPTER XII.

## ἀπὸ AND ἐκ. OFF FROM, OUT FROM.

The notions <i>off from</i> and <i>out from</i> , compared and illustrated from the Greek . . . . .	139, 140
Continued illustrations . . . . .	141-143
Ἄπὸ and ἐκ discriminated in tracing descent . . . . .	144

## CHAPTER XIII.

## ἀπὸ AND ἐκ IN COMPOSITION.

Ἄποπίπτειν, ἐκπίπτειν . . . . .	145
Ἄποδιδόναι, ἐκδιδόναι . . . . .	146
Ἄφικνεῖσθαι, ἐξικνεῖσθαι . . . . .	147
Πειρᾶσθαι, ἀποπειρᾶσθαι . . . . .	148
Ἐκπειρᾶσθαι, ἀποτρέπεσθαι, ἐκτρέπεσθαι . . . . .	149
Ἄποδεικνύναι, ἐκδεικνύναι . . . . .	150
Θνήσκειν, ἀποθνήσκειν, ἐκθνήσκειν . . . . .	151

	SECTION
<i>Αποκτένειν, κατακτένειν</i> . . . . .	152
<i>Τελεῖν, ἀποτελεῖν, ἐκτελεῖν</i> . . . . .	153, 154
<i>Ἐκφεύγειν, ἀποφεύγειν</i> . . . . .	155
<i>Ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ἀφηγεῖσθαι</i> . . . . .	156, 157
<i>Ἀποφαίνειν, ἐκφαίνειν</i> . . . . .	158
<i>Ἀποδιδόναι, ἐπιδιδόναι</i> . . . . .	159, 160, 161
<i>Ἀποτελεῖν, ἐπιτελεῖν</i> . . . . .	162
<i>Ἀπαιτεῖν, ἐπαιτεῖν</i> . . . . .	163
Neither the Greek, nor the English, is a standard for the other	164
<i>Απὸ and ὑπὸ</i> . . . . .	165

## CHAPTER XIV.

*ἐις AND ἐν.*

<i>Ἐις, ἐν</i> ; these two prepositions linked with <i>ἐκ</i> by law of contrast	166
<i>Ἐις, into</i> ; its primitive and secondary uses . . . . .	167, 168
<i>Ἐις and ἐν</i> ; discrimination . . . . .	169
<i>Ἐισβολή, ἐμβολεύς, ἐν τῷ εὐωνύμῳ, ἐπὶ τὸν εὐωνύμον</i> . . . . .	170, 171
<i>Ἐμβάλλειν, ἐισβάλλειν; ἐμβολή, προσβολή</i> . . . . .	172
<i>Ἐισβάλλειν, ἐμβάλλειν, continued</i> . . . . .	173
<i>Ἐμβιβάζειν, εἰσβιβάζειν, their difference</i> . . . . .	174
<i>Ἐνδῆλος, ἔκδῆλος</i> . . . . .	175, 176, 177
<i>Ἐκφανής, ἐμφανής</i> . . . . .	178, 179, 180, 181
<i>Ἐκδεικνύναι, ἐνδεικνύναι</i> . . . . .	182
<i>Ἐγχειρεῖν and ἐπιχειρεῖν, compared deductively</i> . . . . .	183
The deduction confirmed by usage . . . . .	184
<i>Τυγχάνειν, ἐπιτυγχάνειν, ἐντυγχάνειν</i> . . . . .	185

## CHAPTER XV.

*περὶ AND ὑπέρ.*

Followed by the Genitive . . . . .	186
Followed by the Accusative . . . . .	187

	SECTION
Περὶ followed by the Dative; ὑπὲρ never; the reason . . . . .	188, 189
Discrimination resulting from original suggestion in space . . . . .	190, 191
Applied to a passage in Homer . . . . .	192

## CHAPTER XVI.

## περὶ AND ὑπὲρ IN COMPOSITION.

Intensive force . . . . .	193
Apparent contradictions . . . . .	194, 195
Περιμένειν, ἀναμένειν, καταμένειν . . . . .	196
Περιμένειν, changed to ἀναμ., used of the same act; the reason of the change . . . . .	197

## CHAPTER XVII.

## ARE PREPOSITIONS INTERCHANGEABLE? . . . . . 198-201

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## ἀμφί, ON BOTH SIDES OF, AROUND, ABOUT.

Its original meaning; compared with περὶ . . . . .	202
--	-----

## CHAPTER XIX.

## πρό, BEFORE, IN FRONT OF.

Its original service . . . . .	203, 204
Πρό and ὑπὲρ—their high service ethically . . . . .	205

## CHAPTER XX.

## σὺν AND μετά. WITH, AMONG.

The discrimination illustrated . . . . .	206-210
--	---------

## CHAPTER XXI.

## διὰ, THROUGH, ACROSS.

	SECTION
Its primary suggestion; wide field for the Genitive . . . . .	211
Illustration of its use with the Genitive . . . . .	212, 213
Why διὰ is not followed by the Dative . . . . .	214
Διὰ with the Accusative . . . . .	215
Criticism of the Lexicon on Il. 7:247 . . . . .	216
Illustrations of διὰ with the Accusative . . . . .	217, 218
Διὰ not always suggestive of the nearer and farther side: διαγγέλειν, προσαγγή, ἔξαγγη, παραγγή . . . . .	219
Δέχεσθαι with διὰ, ἀνὰ, κατά . . . . .	220
Ἀνακρίνειν, διαγιγνώσκειν, διαφεύγειν . . . . .	221
Διαχειρεῖν, ἐπιχειρεῖν, compared . . . . .	222

# THE GREEK PREPOSITIONS.

---

## CHAPTER I.

### OF SPACE, AND ITS SILENT TEACHINGS.

1. The preponderance in language of words of space gives them in usage rights which are not primarily their own. As sight is the chief of our senses, the things which are seen furnish the chief materials in the formation of language. The discourse may have passed quite away from the sphere of visible things, but the speaker, none the less, borrows his words from this old, exhaustless storehouse. We speak of a space of time, a circle of years, of the stream of time flowing past us, or bearing us along.

2. The language of space lends itself to morals: an upright man, and an upright tower; a straight story, and a straight stick, are phrases alike intelligible. When a preacher once said: "Laban was a crooked fellow, but, then, Jacob was not square in his dealings with him," he chose his words, not for their beauty, but for their special fitness to his thought.

3. By these frequent references in language to

space, and to objects in space, we need not think of space through any definition by a physicist, or a metaphysician, or in any labored way at all ; but as felt and realized, everywhere and always, by the uninstructed and the unthinking. Every person who grows from infancy to maturity comes silently into possession of feelings about space and its objects to which he may never give utterance—of which he may even be unconscious. These feelings seem to have no recognition, or very little, in the completed language. But, in the formation of that language they have a work to do ; they shaped the speech, and, if by wise and patient questioning we can find what these feelings were, we make a gain in the study of the language. It is not in poetry alone that “ more is meant than meets the ear.” As sometimes we may read between the lines of the printed page something that does not meet the eye, so we may find under a word meanings that seem alien, and sometimes contrary to its original import—as refracted light is changed by the medium through which it passes, and the ends it is made to serve.

4. Language does not, in strictness of speech, express thought, it only suggests. It is helpful, never adequate—except in the names of abstract numbers, and the terms of pure science. It requires in its single words that the student use imagination and reflection. Without these he may learn the Dictionary and the Grammar, but he will not understand.

As we have not the Greek feeling and instinct, we must endeavor by reflection, by questioning our results, and by repeated trials, to gain for ourselves something of the *feeling* which the Greeks had by birthright.

5. In studying the Prepositions in this spirit, we shall have no regard to alphabetical arrangement, nor to the number of cases which the prepositions respectively may govern. Nothing of this chance and secondary sort will furnish the opening by which to enter the field before us. We shall begin with the simplest and broadest notion in Space which Nature presents to human experience—the notion of *up* and *down*.

6. A note of explanation, as between the author and the student or the critic, may be due here to aid in a mutual understanding. In the derived meanings of prepositions they are not allowed to dictate by virtue of their suggestions in space. They point the way, and raise the question—the forecasting question, that is all. The answer in all cases comes from examining the usage as found in the authors.

Illustrative examples from Greek authors are often abridged, or altered, for economy; preserving, however, unimpaired, whatever is necessary to elucidate the case in hand.

---

## CHAPTER II.

*avà AND κατά. UP AND DOWN.*

7. THE notion of simple motion *upward* gathers to itself in human experience other notions, which accompany it by a necessity of nature. *First*, such motion has a fixed place of departure, namely, the surface of the earth. *Secondly*, the line of such motion is into the pathless air, following no prescribed track, and leaving no trace behind it. *Thirdly*, such motion is against a constant power in nature, therefore it requires force to produce it. *Fourthly*, it will stop of itself, at some undetermined point, and will return.

In like manner, simple motion *downward* suggests notions that go along with it. *First*, such motion has no fixed, or definite, point of beginning. *Secondly*, it is natural, requiring no force to effect it. *Thirdly*, it has a fixed place of ending. *Fourthly*, the downward moving body remains where it stops.

8. These notions are not fanciful, or theoretic. They do not come from the reading of books, or through study of any sort. They are given in the common experience of human life; and every boy big enough to throw a stone knows them as well as a philosopher. In many minds they may never have come into distinct consciousness; but they are, none the less, there, doing their work; and, beyond a

doubt, they have had a share in the formation of every language in the world.

Our present study is to see what share they have had in the formation of one small part of the Greek language.

---

### CHAPTER III.

#### *avà AND κατά. PRIMARILY ADVERBIAL.*

9. THE grammatical term Adverb, when applied to notions of space, is best explained by comparing it with the term Preposition. This last word—from *præ pono*—carries the suggestion that it is placed before another word—that other word being a substantive or pronoun. This phrase, preposition and noun, are attached to the verb, the leading word in the sentence, to complete its meaning in that place. But there is another term, Adverb, that by its form shows that it is the complement of the verb. What then is the difference? On what ground may the same word be in one place a Preposition, and in another place an Adverb? It is an Adverb when the noun needed to complete the sense is understood from the nature of the case without being spoken. When we say, *to drive on*, meaning *to drive forward*, we call *on* an adverb; but it may be made a preposition by pressing for its covert meaning; it means, *to drive on the ground*

*before you.* In the phrase to *look around*, we call *around* an adverb; but if we say *look around you*, it means the same, but we call *around* a preposition. These examples show how these two parts of speech trench on each other's ground, and by what an easy device one may sometimes be changed into the other. The naming in these cases is less important than the interpretation, for the last, if correct, will be sure to lead to the first.

10. As designations of motion simply *up* and *down*, *ἀνά* and *κατὰ* have only an adverbial force; and they are no more than this in many expressions of space where they are followed by a noun, and are called prepositions. In the phrase, Holding a wreath *up* on a golden staff, *ἀνά σκήπτρῳ* (Il. 1:15), the preposition is adverbial, the Dative case being the usual case to denote definite or fixed position. In the phrases, *ἀνά ρόον*, *up stream*; *κατὰ ρόον*, *down stream*; *ἀνά κλίμακα*, *up stairs*; *κατὰ κλίμακα*, *down stairs*, the nouns appear as objects respectively of *ἀνά* and *κατὰ*; but these words are still adverbial in force —the accusative case being the natural case to express the distance passed over.

11. In the expression, He sent the shaft, *κατὰ στῆθος*, *straight against the breast*, the character of the act helps us to the meaning as much as the preposition; *κατὰ* suggests a straight motion, as a stone dropped in the air falls straight, and the accusative is the usual case to mark the point where the action ter-

minates. So, to shoot an arrow, *κατà σκοπόν*, is to send it *straight against the mark*; it can not fail to hit, and a machine might do this. The fact of straight motion, terminated by the *mark*, exhausts all there is in the expression. But the phrase, to shoot an arrow, *κατà σκοποῦ*, does not mean *straight against the mark*; it means *to shoot at it with the design to hit it*. It may hit, or it may miss, and still be sent, *κατà σκοποῦ*. An engine can not do this, for it has no brains. He who shoots, *κατà σκοποῦ*, will make allowance for the fall of the arrow, that is, its deflexion by gravitation; and, for a side wind, if there be one. The Genitive here is *causative*, showing the action of the *mark on the shooter*, inciting to his endeavor. This makes the phrase perfectly clear. It is not, as the Lexicon says: *Τοξεύειν κατà σκοποῦ*, “*to shoot at*, because the arrow falls *down upon its mark*.” This is misleading. It would imply that the end of the arrow’s motion was the *mark*. This is not asserted. The end of the arrow’s motion was the *mark*, if it was lucky enough to hit it; if not, it was something else which it did hit. The phrase suggests not the end of the arrow’s motion, but the end of the shooter’s shooting, namely, *to hit the mark*. So, in the words *to pour water*, *κατà χειρός*, *upon the hands*, the pith of the phrase is not to show the way the water runs on the hands, but to show how the careful servant that had the water behaved to the guest. If the water had been running on the hands from a spout, *κατà χειρός* would not have been used.

We have been led unawares into positive statements about cases, and these statements may seem dogmatic. They are not dogmatic at all. We have simply accepted the hint of Nature, and following that hint we find we have in hand just the phrase that meets the case. The shaft sent *κατὰ στῆθος*, *straight to the breast*, goes no whit straighter than a stone goes when falling freely to the ground. The *στῆθος* is in the line of the shaft's motion through its whole course, just as the point finally struck by the stone falling freely is in the line of the stone's motion through its whole descent. We have here the direct object, and of course in the accusative case.

The phrase would be just the same if the object thus struck were not aimed at, or were not even seen.

But in aiming at a mark the object acts first on him who throws, inciting and directing his act; it is the point of departure, or cause or source of that incitement, and therefore must be in the genitive.

We should not encumber ourselves with the thought that in actual experience things thrown up are not commonly thrown straight up, and therefore can not come straight down. This is pertinent in treating of projectiles; but the natural imagination pictures *up* and *down* as perpendicular.

*He went on board*, *ἀνὰ νῆσος ἐβη*, not that *ἀνὰ* with the genitive means *on*; but, *he went up*, and the thing calling forth and determining the action was the ship.

12. If the students asks, Why dwell on discriminations in the thought that can not be expressed in translation? It would be a sufficient answer, if there were no other, to say: It is for this very reason they are presented and pressed on the attention. This is the way to escape from bondage to words; to learn how to treat them as our servants and helpers, not our masters. Thought is nimble, words are clumsy and slow; the student should patiently learn the best that these last can do as interpreters of the first.

---

## CHAPTER IV.

### 13. *ἄντα* AND *κατά*. MEANINGS DERIVED FROM ANALOGY.

As objects naturally fall by the law of gravitation, the actions of men, when performed according to their proper law, have an analogy to motion downward, and are often designated by the aid of the preposition *κατά*. The proper law for a judge is to decide *justly*, *κατὰ δίκαιον*. The proper law for a witness is to testify truly, that is, *κατ’ ἀληθεῖαν*. Cyrus saw that the Greeks were conquering *all before them*, *τὸ καθ’ ἄντούς*. The picture to the imagination is that of *falling on* the enemy. To a Greek phalanx charging the enemy in battle, the onward rush was as natural as the falling of a stone; hence, to picture this in

words, *κατὰ* is called on to do its part. Do not fail to see the picture—more than a picture—a picture in motion. Do not encumber your memory with the formula that *κατὰ* sometimes means *before*. This would hinder more than it would help. Take into your thought the whole phrase, in this and in all like cases; seize the picture it presents to the imagination; express this in the best English you can command, and your work is done.

A high authority translates *τὸ καθ' αὐτούς*, *the part over against them*; this has a show of careful literalness, but the life and motion are all gone, good for the posts of a gate-way, over against each other, but poor for a battle. So much comes from misdirected nicety, from looking at each word by itself, and trying to make it do duty all alone.

Demosthenes says: *ζῶμεν τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτόν*, *let us live in our own proper way*; the way of Marathon, and Salamis, and the noble times of the past, when each man did his duty. Here is a picture of motion along the path of a nation's life and history.

14. Do not be startled if you find yourself using *up* where the Greek has *κατά*, as in this: there is no way over the mountain but *κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδόν*, *by that road, along that road, or up that road*, for the road was up hill over the mountain. But because that was the natural way, the Greeks made *κατὰ* serve the turn, drawing it over from its original meaning *downward*, to serve a sense quite its opposite. See

Anab. 4 : 2, 8, Hearing the trumpet εἰθὺς ἴεντο ἄνω κατὰ τὴν φανερὰν ὁδόν, *they moved swiftly up along the open road*; the road led up hill, κατὰ points to the fact that that was the natural road for travel. See also 4 : 6, 11, where κατὰ points to a road that led upward. So, τοξεύειν κατὰ τινός does not mean to *shoot from above*, but to *shoot with the aim to hit*, in whatever direction that may be; κατὰ here points to the end in the actor's purpose, just as primarily it points to the end of motion in space.

15. As κατὰ is used to denote the natural way of a thing, so it is used of the natural place or sphere of one's activity (Hdt.). The Egyptians are a singular people; the women cultivate the fields, *the men within doors weave*, οἱ ἄνδρες κατ' ὀίκους ὑφαίνουσιν. War is carried on *by land, by sea*, κατὰ γῆν, κατὰ θάλατταν; *the men of our times*, οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωποι, that is, the people whom we meet, come upon in our daily life.

16. We will now place ἄντα and κατά side by side. We read (Il. 1 : 53), that for nine days arrows of Apollo were sent *into the army*, ἄντα στράτον. Each of these arrows cut its own path in the air, made its own flight, and found its own place to stop. These are marks of upward motion—hence ἄντα.

Under this experience of the divine displeasure, the Greeks offer sacrifice; Agamemnon orders them to make a lustration; *and they toiled at this throughout the army*, οἱ τὰ πένοντο κατὰ στράτον (Il. 1 : 312-

318). This cleansing was the predetermined end of the command ; there was no spot in the army that was not embraced in the command. It has an analogy to downward motion, as the shooting has an analogy to upward motion. To exchange the prepositions would destroy the picture in either case.

Hounds pursued the game *through the woods*,  $\chi\hat{\omega}\rho\sigma\dot{\nu}$   $\dot{\alpha}\nu'$   $\dot{\nu}\lambda\hat{\eta}\epsilon\nu\tau\alpha$  ; they do not know their path, but find or make it as they go—like a body thrown upward.

The horse-tamer compels the wild horses to go *along the road*,  $\kappa\alpha\theta'$   $\dot{\alpha}\delta\dot{\nu}\nu$ . The road is the known way ;—the path of a body freely falling is known : it is straight downward.

*To stand up to a fight*,  $\hat{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$   $\dot{\alpha}\nu\dot{\alpha}$   $\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\nu$ ,— $\dot{\alpha}\nu\dot{\alpha}$  is here doing its proper work ; nothing is more uncertain in its end than a fight, or more sure to call forth at each moment of its progress the whole power of the actor.

When Darius first made war against the Greeks (Hdt. 6 : 48), he sent messengers *into Greece*,  $\dot{\alpha}\nu\dot{\alpha}$   $\tau\dot{\eta}\nu$  'Ελλάδα, to demand earth and water. It was a new country ; they explored it as they went, and did not know the end of their journey till they came to it—like motion upward, tending to some undetermined point of stopping ; hence the preposition  $\dot{\alpha}\nu\dot{\alpha}$ . But when Xerxes, at a later day (Hdt. 7 : 1), was preparing for his great invasion, he sent to his subject cities,  $\kappa\alpha\tau\dot{\alpha}$   $\pi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\iota\dot{\sigma}$ , for their contribution of men and supplies. These cities were known, and the demand was

in accordance with former usage. The same father of history tells us that, when a King of Sparta dies, the magistrates send messengers *through Laconia*—their own country, well known, the journey completely determined beforehand, like the path of a falling stone; therefore *κατὰ Λακονίκην*.

17. From the above cases we may discriminate between the phrases *ἀνὰ τὰς πόλεις* and *κατὰ τὰς πόλεις*. The first suits the action of a traveler or explorer, to whom the cities are not known beforehand, and who does not find the end of his journey till he comes to it. Such action is like upward motion—the end is not known beforehand. The second, *κατὰ τὰς πόλεις*, implies a knowledge of the cities before they are visited; this is analogous to downward motion, having its end predetermined. A stranger traveling *through all the rest of Greece*, *ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα* (Hdt. 6:86, 1). Here are three things, in this stranger's journey, like upward motion; he did not know his road, but found it as he went; he did not know how far he should go, nor where he should stop. Again (Hdt. 5:102), the fugitives were scattered, *ἀνὰ τὰς πόλεις*, each one going where he pleased; like immigrants coming into a new country to seek new homes, each for himself. But—

“ When wild war's deadly blast is blown,  
And gentle peace returning,”

then the soldiers return *to their homes*, *κατ' οἴκους*, each one knows where he is going to stop.

18. If we have taken our steps wisely thus far, we can now walk a little by our own light; and say that, when William the Conqueror sent his officers among the cities of England to find out their resources, and so make up the Doomsday book, they went *ἀνὰ τὰς πόλεις*; but when afterwards the tax-gatherers went *through the cities*, with all the resources catalogued, they went *κατὰ τὰς πόλεις*.

In order to be very plain, let us suppose a case from the drudgery of modern life. A messenger, with printed notices in his hands of a popular entertainment, is instructed to leave one at each house in the town. There are many houses in the town—not so many notices; what does he do? He distributes them *as far as they will go*, that is, *ἀνὰ τὰς οἰκίας*. But on a subsequent day, with more notices than there are houses, he can be ordered to distribute them, *κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας*. In the first case the end of the distribution was not known beforehand, but was found by coming to it—therefore *ἀνὰ*; in the second instance the end was determined beforehand—therefore *κατὰ*.

These little words, *ἀνὰ* and *κατὰ*, can lend themselves to describe the joys and sorrows of childhood. When, on a glad anniversary, all are in expectation of gifts, and there are not enough of these to go round, they can be distributed only *ἀνὰ τὸν πᾶνδας*; a wiser love would have provided for a distribution *κατὰ τὸν πᾶνδας*, and then all would have rejoiced together.

19. Both ἀνὰ and κατὰ are used with numerals, but with a difference. 'Ανὰ is used when the numeral denotes a group made up for that occasion only; κατὰ, when the numeral denotes a well-known group, as a dozen, a score—the group being thought of as a large unit. Luke 9:14, make them sit down *by fifties*, ἀνὰ πεντήκοντα, because the number fifty was a group made up for that occasion only; the limit of the group was realized by counting—no one knew where he belonged till he had been counted. But in the Anab. we find groups of fifty formed under different circumstances, and for a different end. They were wanted for daily service, were officered and named, and were handled like large units. These acted κατὰ πεντηκοστῦ. Once being made up by counting, ἀνὰ πεντήκοντα, they were afterwards handled by their technical name, πεντηκοστῦ.

We may say *καθ' ἐν*, but not ἀνὰ ἐν, for in thinking of one the end is not approached from the beginning, but is contained in it; and so the Greek language contains *καθ' ἐν*, but not ἀνὰ ἐν.

20. The phrases ἀνὰ κράτος and κατὰ κράτος are both used; and we are told by some authorities that they may be used interchangeably, because *up* and *down* carry our thought over the same line. This is mere groping; it neglects to note what is peculiar to these motions respectively, and leads to grave errors in translation. Free motion *upward* diminishes in speed till the last ounce of the impulse that sent the

object is exhausted, and the motion ceases. Precisely analogous to this is motion along the ground, as running, when the utmost effort is put forth at each moment, without regard to the future. The natural end of such running is the exhaustion of the runner, as the natural end of a stone's motion thrown upward is the exhaustion of the force that sent it. This is not properly using the strength, but wasting it. To run *κατὰ κράτος* is to run *according to the strength*, to run as the runner can hold out. In a race of a hundred yards one may start *ἀνὰ κράτος*, but if he do this in running a mile, he will surely be beaten, unless his competitors are as foolish as himself. The rowers in a boat-race husband their strength, knowing that they have a hard pull before them ; they row *κατὰ κράτος* ; but if they prosper, and approach the end with plenty of reserved strength, they may wish to show off, and finish with a spurt—this last is *ἀνὰ κράτος*.

21. Let us now bring this distinction into the light of a Greek narrative. On the day of the battle of Cynaxa (Anab. 1:8) a messenger arrived, *riding at full speed, his horse bathed in sweat, ἐλαύνων ἀνὰ κράτος, ιδρούντι τῷ ἵππῳ*. We cannot miss the meaning of *ἀνὰ κράτος* here ; the rider did not spare his horse. Let us go on a little further in the story. The Greeks broke the Persian array in front of them—*τὸ καθ' ἀυτόν*, were thrown out of line by rapid running, recovered themselves, and then

—έντανθα—they began to pursue *κατὰ κράτος*, calling out to each other *not to run fast*, μὴ θεῖν δρόμῳ, but to keep their ranks. Here it is equally plain what *κατὰ κράτος* means. They were to advance so as to keep their line, and so as they could hold out. Suppose now that these prepositions were interchanged; look at the picture; the messenger coming along *κατὰ κράτος*, at a steady pace, such as his horse could keep up all day; and the Greeks, once before thrown into disorder by rapid running, repeating their mistake, as if they could not learn anything from their own experience!

In another place, the barbarians, assaulted in their strong hold, make their escape, fleeing ἀνὰ *κράτος*, in disorder, each one for himself, and at his quickest, as is the way of barbarians when retreating.

Let us look at another picture. Thucidides informs us that, after the disaster at Syracuse, the Athenians were greatly depressed, fearing that the enemy would next bring the war into their territory *with all their power*, *κατὰ κράτος*. A wise nation going to war does not hurry. It plans, and combines, and keeps the end ever in view—just as the emphatic point of downward motion is its end. He who acts ἀνὰ *κράτος* starts off at the top of his strength, without regard to what comes after.

22. *Καθ' ὅμιλον, ἀν' ὅμιλον*, among, into, through the crowd.

We have in Homer a story of a man who went

*καθ' ὅμιλον*, and of another man who, on the same day, and into the same crowd, went *ἀν' ὅμιλον*; and we are to examine, and see if the actions differed, so as to invite and require the use of these prepositions respectively (Il. III). The Trojans and the Greeks made a truce, with the condition that Menelaus and Paris should fight as champions for the two sides respectively; and thus decide the whole war.

Before the truce, however, on the same day, Paris had come forward alone and challenged the bravest of the Greeks to fight with him. Menelaus came forth to meet him; this took away his courage, and he slunk back again into the crowd of Trojans, *αὐτις καθ' ὅμιλον ἔδν Τρώων*. Reproached for his cowardice he rallied for the fight; the truce was made, and the combatants met. Paris was worsted, was on the point of being dragged away as a captive, when Aphrodite rescued him, and carried him unseen to his home; and Menelaus, supposing him to be among the Trojans, went here and there *among the crowd* to find him, *ἀν' ὅμιλον ἐφοίτα ἐι ποι ἐσαθρίσειν* (Il. 3:36, 449).

23. Now let us compare these two actions, and see what the preposition does in each case toward completing the picture.

Paris goes, *first*, back to his own place, among the Trojans (he had been out of his usual place). He goes back as a stone, lifted out of its place, and left free, goes back; *secondly*, he went spontaneously, as

a stone falls ; *thirdly*, he went to stay, and would have stayed if he could, as a stone lies where it falls. We have then, in Paris's action, three marks of downward motion ; and the Greek mind by instinct took the preposition whose primary meaning was *down*. Let us now look at the action of Menelaus. *First*, he went away from his natural place—he went from the Greeian army, where he belonged, to the Trojan ; *secondly*, he did not know how far he should go—he was to go till he could find Paris ; *thirdly*, he was going to return. All these are characteristics of upward motion (see 7, 8).

---

## CHAPTER V.

### ἀνὰ AND κατὰ IN COMPOSITION.

24. A ship sailing from a fixed place, the coast, forth into the pathless sea, has an analogy to an object sent up from the fixed surface of the earth into the pathless air ; this invites the employment of the preposition *ἀνά*, and the action of the ship is denoted by the word *ἀνάγεσθαι*.

By a like analogy, to sail from the pathless sea to the fixed land is expressed by *κατάγεσθαι*. The Greeian reader or hearer may never have seen a ship, or stood by the sea-side ; but he has a model of thought,

in his experience from boyhood, when he threw stones into the air, that prepares him to understand *ἀνάγεσθαι* and *κατάγεσθαι* without dictionary or study, and with a picturesqueness for which the English has no equivalent—not for want of words, but for lack of the quick imagination to interpret them. Language is so poor in its resources that nimble thought borrows the words *up* and *down*, and makes them suggest motion along the surface of the earth; but there is an analogy that justifies the boldness.

25. When the Ten Thousand Greeks took service under Cyrus, the Younger, the expedition was called an *ἀνάβασις*, not because they went into a higher country, but they went from their known home to a region unknown. Their return home was, by a like analogy, called *κατάβασις*. Thuc. 6:16, To the Olympic games *I sent seven chariots, ἐπτὰ ὕρματα καθῆκα*; the end of the sending was fixed and known, like the end of free downward motion. It was the city where, on the appointed day, the races were to take place; the place of the games, and the roads leading to it all well known. The races were subsequent, separated from the sending by intervening time, and are not embraced in the verb *καθῆκα*.

*'Ανιέναι, to release, from the bonds of sleep (Il. 2:34), εὗτ' ἀν σε μελίφρων ὑπνος ἀνήη, when honeyed sleep shall release thee.* The man released—let up—from sleep goes forth of his own free will. Also, to send forth to the uncertain chances of battle (Il. 20:118),

ἀνῆκε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, *Phœbus Apollo hath sent him forth.* Note the uncertain issue of the action in both cases.

26. *Kaίειν*, to burn, *ἀνακαίειν*, to begin to burn, to kindle. In motion upward there is one fixed point, and only one—the beginning. So, in a fire, there is one thing fixed—the beginning; beyond this all is uncertain, whether it will die out or become a conflagration; *κατακαίειν*, to burn up, consume; the picture, to the Greek, was to burn till the burning came to an end, for want of fuel; the English expression suggests that the fuel has all gone up in flame.

27. *Ἀνέχειν*, to hold up, as *τὰς χεῖρας*, the hands, *τὸ φῶς*, the light; *ἀνέχεσθαι*, mid, to hold one's self up, as against something that would overpower, or crush—hence to *sustain, bear, endure* (Anab. 1 : 7, 4), *ἀν δὲ ταῦτα ἀνάσχησθε, if you can endure this*—the noise of their shouting, that is, if you can hold yourselves up against it; *κατέχειν*, to hold down, *hold fast, detain*; (Il. 15 : 186), *if he shall keep me back against my will, εἴ μ' ἀκέοντα καθήξει*; (Il. 11 : 702), *These (the horses) the king detained, ἄναξ τοὺς ἵππους κασχεθε = κατεσχε.* But *ἀνέχειν* has a meaning to restrain, to *check* (Il. 23 : 426), *ἄνεχ' ἵππους, check the horses* (Hdt. 1 : 42); *πολλαχῆ ἄνισχον ἐμεωντόν, I often checked myself*; how can *ἀνὰ* and *κατὰ*, so wide asunder, lend themselves to meanings so near alike? *κατέχειν* means to *hold back* from acting at all; *ἀνέχειν*, to check an action already going on. When

a thing, or a creature, is quite at rest, its natural state is *down*, *κατὰ* (men and stones are here alike); and to keep it from acting is to *keep* it where it is—that is, *down*, *κατέχειν*. But when a creature acts, whether man or beast, his acting becomes, for the time, his natural state, and anything contrary or opposed to this finds expression in *ἀνὰ*, the opposite of *κατά*.

28. *Παύεσθαι*, *to pause*; *ἀναπαύεσθαι* implies that the suspended action will be resumed when the cause that interrupted it shall be removed; as a falling stone, if stopped, will fall again if the power that stopped it is withdrawn. Homer says (Il. 17:550), winter *suspends* the works of men, *ἀνέπαυσε*; the works will go on again when spring returns. If the stopping is final the verb is *καταπαύειν*.

29. *Μένειν*, *to remain*, *ἀναμένειν*, *to remain* for a time, that is, till some transient ground for remaining is taken away—*to await*, *wait for*, as *to wait for the day*, *ἀναμένειν ίχω*; *ἀνὰ* suggests transiency, because the power that holds up a thing from falling is naturally thought of as transient; *καταμένειν*, *to remain* permanently (Cyri. Insit. 1:4). His mother went away, but Cyrus remained (*κατέμενε*) and was educated there.

30. *Δέχεσθαι*, *to receive*; *ἀναδέχεσθαι*, *to catch*, *arrest* something on its flight—as arrows upon a shield, blows upon the body: *καταδέχεσθαι*, *to receive* permanently, as principles in the soul; banished citizens to their homes;—these are received to remain, as

stones are received on the ground to remain—but blows received on the shield, or on the body, do not stay. Il. 5:619, the shield *caught* many a javelin, ἀνεδέξατο. We may say, then, that when a company of ball-players *adopt* rules for their playing, the verb is καταδέχεσθαι—these rules are to be permanent; but when in practice one of them catches the ball in its flight, the verb is ἀναδέχεσθαι;—the ball does not remain up.

31. *To know, γνωσκειν; καταγνωσκειν*, to know what one has a special interest in knowing. The act καταγ always implies some standard of judgment already in the mind; and the result of the act is always to place the object in a class. This is like downward motion, tending to a preappointed end. 'Αναγνωσκειν (1) does not mean, as the Lexicon says, *to know well, know certainly*; (2) it does not denote a moral judgment, which καταγ often does; (3) it suggests difficulty of knowing, and in this fact it has an analogy with upward motion; (4) the knowledge it predicates is pictured as springing from the shrewdness and wit of the knower. The student who faithfully studies the famous 47th Prop. in Euclid, and so knows it, has not a knowledge expressed by ἀναγ.

32. As motion *up, ἀνà*, is contrary to nature, that is, to the natural power of gravitation, and requires force to effect it, actions which compel things, or persons, contrary to their natural state, or bent, are described by aid of this preposition. *The spear's point*

*was bent back*, ἀνεγνάμφθη αἰχμή (Il. 3 : 348). *Unrolling the book*, ἀναπτύξας τὸ βίβλιον (Hdt. 1 : 125). 'Αναπτύσσειν τὸ κέρας, to wheel back the wing (Anab. 1 : 10, 9). The natural state of the spear is to be straight; that of the book, to be rolled up; that of the wing of an army, to be in line. 'Αναπείθειν, to persuade one against his natural bent; those who could not be persuaded by arguments (λόγοις) were won over by money, ἀνεπείθοντο χρήμασιν (Cyri. Inst. 7 : 5). Xerxes was at first indisposed to make war against Greece, but Mardonius won him over, ἀνέπεισε (Hdt. 7 : 6). 'Αναχωρέιν, to go back. Going back is opposed to the natural instinct, whether bodily or mental. Men and beasts alike are constituted to go forward. To make them go back requires force, as truly as it does to stop a falling stone, or lift it from the ground;—hence ἀνά.

*I take back*, ἀνατίθεμαι, what I said before (Mem. 1 : 2, 44); a man's natural bent is to stand to what he has said.

33. Νεύειν, to nod; Hector's crest nodded this way and that, as he stood before his wife (Il. 6 : 470); κατανεύειν, to nod and thereby confirm, ending all debate (Il. 1 : 514, 527, 558).

'Ανανεύειν, to nod upward, i. e., in refusal (Il. 6 : 311). We moderns do not indicate *refused* by an upward or backward motion of the head; perhaps the Greeks did not, but used ἀνὰ in its derived sense—of resistance, opposition—which on second thought,

you will observe, amounts to the same thing, for relaxing the will lets the head fall forward—arousing it in opposition throws the head back (see Sec. 7, 3). In this way we may understand the phrase in Xen. Convin., ch. 3, *μάλα σεμνῶς ἀνασπάσας τὸ πρόσωπον*, *pulling a long face*;—ἀνà suggests the constraint used to draw the features into the desired expression, though that was very different from drawing the face up.

34. 'Αναδεῖν, to bind up, as twigs into a fagot, or bundle; flowers into a wreath, or chaplet. What is there in such an action analogous to something in upward motion? The force that overcomes resistance: ἀνà carries this suggestion, just as *up* does, fortunately, in the English phrase *to bind up*, *bind up tight*, the preposition *up* serves the same purpose. The band used in *binding up* the hair of women is called *ἀναδέσμη*. Crowning the victors with garlands, *στεφάνοις ἀναδῶν νικῶντας*—as if the garlands were fillets for binding the hair. Καταδεῖν, to bind fast to something fixed. Od. 14:345, *ἐμὲ κατέδησαν ἐνσέλμῳ ἐνὶ νηὶ*, *they bound me fast in the well-benched ship*. A thing *ἀναδούμενον* may be moved; not so a thing *καταδούμενον*.

35. The compound *κατάρχειν* invites attention. It seems to combine incompatible notions. How can *ἀρχεῖν*, which means *to begin*, join to itself *κατà*, which suggests finality? *Κατάρχειν* means to begin an action which has been completed in thought before

it is begun in act ; as to begin a battle that has been planned beforehand ; to begin a public sacrifice, or celebration, that is to proceed by a prescribed order. The beginning of an action that has not been thought out before is not expressed by *κατάρχειν*. Cyri. Inst. 1 : 4, 4, Cyrus, when a youth, would *select out*, *ἐξηρχεῖν*, those exercises in which he knew himself to be deficient, and *lead*, *κατηρχεῖν*, his associates through the exercises—leaping on the horse, throwing the dart, etc. The course of exercises was all in his mind when he began—hence *κατά*.

Mem. 2 : 3, 11, If you wished to win over one of the men of mark, so that, when he had an entertainment, he should invite you, how would you act ? *I would begin*, *κατάρχοιμι*, by inviting him, when I had an entertainment. The end was in view from the beginning—hence *κατά*. Socrates *began a song*, *ἥρχεν ὡδῆς*, there was no forethought called for, only memory ; therefore the simple verb is used. Afterwards he *began* his argument anew, *κατηρχεῖ* ; his argument was directed at every step to reach the forethought conclusion.

36. Whenever the end is mentally seen from the beginning, then the beginning is naturally expressed by *κατάρχειν*, whether it be beginning of a campaign in war, or of a dinner with its prescribed courses ; or of a public celebration, or a school examination, or a day's work planned by the master, on the farm, or in the shop.

37. *Δέιν*, to want, to lack; *καταδέιν*, to come short of a fixed standard (Hdt. 2:134). He left a pyramid much smaller than his father's, *it lacked twenty feet*, εἴκοσι ποδῶν καταδέουσαν—κατὰ points to the pyramid of Cheops—the greatest; and, hence, the accepted standard, to which other pyramids were to be compared.

38. *'Αναδεικνύναι*, to show by lifting up, or by some equivalent token, as the opening of gates or doors, that all may see—raising a concerted signal, making proclamation: *καταδεικνύναι*, to discover and make known some important truth or art, prized by all as a possession (Hdt. 4:42). “Necos was the first who made known, *καταδεῖξας*, that Libya, Africa, was surrounded by water, except . . .” So Columbus was the first who showed, *καταδεῖξας*, that there was a new world west of the Atlantic. In ancient times, “the Carians were the first to show how, *καταδεῖξαντες*, to bind crests upon their helmets” (Hdt. 1:171). In modern times, Professor Morse was the first who showed how, *καταδεῖξας*, to send word across the continent in a moment of time.

39. *Μανθάνειν*, to learn by inquiry; ἀναμ, to search into to see what a thing contains. The Lex., to learn again, to inquire closely, is in error. The word means neither the one nor the other of these. When one examines an ore, without prepossession, and finds successively the minerals it contains, his finding is expressed by ἀναμανθάνειν; but if, starting

with the belief or hope that the ore contains gold, he searches and finds that, his finding is expressed by *καταμανθάνειν*.

Cyrus, fond of learning, was ever inquiring of those about him how things were, *δει τοὺς παρόντας ἀνηρώτα*—his questions had no settled aim—therefore *ἀνά* (Inst. 1 : 4).

Helen says (Od. 4 : 250), I recognized him and questioned him, *ἀνηρώτων*. She questioned to find out everything she could—therefore *ἀνά*; the things which she found were not in her mind till she found them.

I learned, *κατέμαθον*, that he had poured poison into your drink (Cyri. Inst). His learning answered the one great question in his mind—it was matter of life and death for his grandfather, therefore *κατά*.

The spies having learned, about the army, *καταμαθόντες*; this was the very object they were sent for; it brings the inquiry to an end, as the striking upon the ground by a falling stone brings its motion to an end.

Recognizing him, they kill him, *καταμαθόντες κτανέοντιν* (Hdt.) The recognition brings the search to an end; their purpose was to kill him when they should recognize him.

When one travels aimlessly in a foreign land, he learns many things—this is *μανθάνειν*. Another traveler, going with prepared questions, finds the answers to these questions; this is *καταμανθάνειν*.

40. *To search*, ζητēν ; ἀναζητēν, to examine a thing to see what one can find in it. Socrates (Apol. ch. 2) says that his accusers charged him with *searching into everything under the earth*, τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντά ἀνεξητηκώς. What is the force of *avà* in this sentence? It cannot denote *upward* in space, for searching ὑπὸ γῆς denotes motion downward not upward. 'Avà has here its derived meaning, suggestive of indefiniteness in the result, as when a stone is thrown upward, it cannot be known beforehand how far it will go, so ἀναζητēν, to search without an idea of what you may find.

If the student be willing for the sake of science to accept a very lowly illustration of ἀναζητēν, let him look at the early scavenger bending over a heap of rubbish, hook in hand ; or, rising to the dignity of history (see Hdt. 1 : 137), If the matter were *searched to the bottom*, ἀναζητeόμενa, one of these things would be discovered. 'Avà in the above cases quite drops its primary suggestion of space, and serves the important dynamic idea which is affiliated with it.

41. 'Avαλύειν, to set free, as (Od. 12 : 200) ἐμέ δ' ἐκ δεσμῶν ἀνέλυσαν, and they set me free from my bonds ; the result of this act was that he who had been bound was now free to go as his own will prompts—the will is as free as air. But to *let loose* the dogs upon the game is not ἀναλύειν, for dogs have not free will. *To undo* the web, ἀναλύειν, the act leaves the threads free and floating. *To dissolve* a

body into its unknown elements, and so find what those elements are; or—to take a live example—to analyze dynamite, and find what it is made of. *Καταλύειν*, to separate the known parts of a thing, and so destroy the thing, as a bridge, the frame of a house, a government.

42. The verb *καθορᾶν* is sometimes said to mean the same as the simple verb *όρᾶν*, and it is said sometimes to mean *to see clearly*; these statements are misleading. It means *to see what you are looking for*—what you have a special interest in seeing. If one loses a jewel, and searches for it, he may see a hundred other things, and ever so clearly; thus far his seeing is expressed by the simple verb *όρᾶν*;—but, when he sees what he was looking for, it is *καθορᾶν*.<sup>1</sup>

Xerxes, looking towards the shore, surveyed his land forces and his ships (Hdt. 8:44). *Looking towards*, *καθορᾶν*—it was in order to see, and thereby determine the great question before him, that he ordered the survey.

The looking was indeed down, from the tower, but this is not the emphatic thing in the action.

*Κῦρος καθορᾷ τὸν βασιλέα, καὶ ἦτο ἐπ' ἀντόν,*

---

<sup>1</sup> Even where the seeing is *clear*, the indispensable condition justifying the use of *κατὰ* is that the seeing answers an important question. In Romans 1:20, *καθορᾶται*, the invisible things of Him are *clearly seen*, the seeing answers the most important of all possible questions.

*Cyrus sees the king and rushed upon him* (Anab. 1:9). He was looking for the king; the moment he saw him, the action of looking for him ceased and gave place to another. Here the looking or seeing was not *down*, but κατà is called for none the less—the seeing ended a question already in the seer's mind.

When those in front came upon the height and *saw the sea*, a great shout arose; *κατειδον τὴν θάλατταν* (Anab. 4:7, 21). Well might a shout arise at this long-wished sight. Observe that a little before, when the guide promises to lead them to a place where they would *see the sea*, he uses the simple verb, *όψονται τὴν θάλατταν*—he had no longing for the sight—and so he did not need *καθορᾶν* to express his thought.

They sent out scouts, to the right and left, and on the hills, that, if anywhere *they should see anything*, *in any direction, they should signal it*; *εἰ πού τι ποθεν καθορῶν σημάνοιεν*; they went for the sole purpose of seeing, therefore *κατά*.

It may be said that the looking in this case would be a looking down, and that this is all that *κατà* means. This is quite a mistake. Even if the looking were *down*, that is not an essential point in the act; it was *what they should see* and not how they should be looking when they saw it, that was to determine their future action. But it was by no means certain that their looking would be *down*. If, when half way up

the heights, they had seen the enemy on ground above them, the action would be *καθορᾶν*, just as much as if they had climbed to ground above the enemy, and from there looked down upon them. See (14) *κατὰ ταύτην ὁδόν*.

43. The Adjective *καταφανῆς* is sometimes said to mean *clearly in sight*. This is misleading. If a thing is *καταφανῆς*, it is in the mind—thought of, desired, or feared—before it is seen. The clearness is sufficient—and need be no more than sufficient—to determine the identity of what is seen with what was in the mind before. Anab. 1:6, 1, The tracks of horses *appeared*, *ἔφαίνετο*; the sight was unlooked for, therefore the simple verb is used. If they had been looking for signs of the enemy, the verb would have been *καταφαίνεται*.

Further on in the narrative (1:8, 8), as the battle drew on, the gleam of spears was visible, here and there, through the cloud of dust: *visible*, *καταφανεῖς*. They were not in fact clearly seen, but they were just what the Greeks were looking for—they were seen clearly enough to settle the question that was in all minds. The glimpse of the spears showed that the battle was upon them.

44. A meteor *appears*, *φαίνεται*; a comet foretold and expected appears, *καταφαίνεται*.

The day dawns—begins to appear—*ἀναφαίνεται*.

45. Od. 4:41, They threw before the horses spelt, and therewith *mixed* white barley, *ἀνέμιξαν*; a chance

mixture, fulfilling no predetermined end, a little more or less of either ingredient does not matter—therefore *āvá*. Anab. 7:2, 3, After a time they *mixed* with the people in the cities, and made their home there—*κατεμίγνυντο*. The mixing was final, securing the end of peaceful living together.

Horses *mingling* in a race, *ἀναμιγνύμενοι* (Soph. El. 715). Not a purposed mingling, but coming about by chance, each horse doing his best—hence *āvá*.

Il. 24:529, *To whomsoever Zeus giveth a mingled lot, φ ούν κ' ἀμπλξας (καταμίξας) δοίη Ζεὺς*; the divine allotments were all measured, placed, and fixed in purpose before they passed into fact—hence *καταμίξας*.

The *mingled* blossoms in the field are *ἀναμιγνύμενοι*; they come by chance, and each grows as it can; but the same blossoms in the gardener's bed, placed for harmonious effect, are *καταμιγνύμενοι*. Stones of all colors lying in a box, *ἀναμιγνύμενοι*; the same stones cut and set in a Mosaic, *καταμιγνύμενοι*; they realize a picture that was complete in the artist's mind before he put his hand to the work.

46. *Κτείνειν* is from a root that means *to strike*, to cut by striking—hence *to kill*; *κατακτείνειν*, *to strike down, to strike dead, to kill*, as in deadly conflict, usually implying deadly purpose—not by accident, nor in execution of the law. When death comes by accident, the end reached is not the end sought.

In Anab. 4:85, 25, *πᾶιδα ἄκων κατακτανόν*, the natural suggestion that the death was designed is forestalled by the word *ἄκων*. When death comes by sentence of the law, the end sought is not the death but the vindication of the law—and the verb is *κτείνειν*, sometimes *ἀποκτείνειν*; but this last carries a special suggestion, which will be treated of in its place. Il. 6:409, Soon the Achaians will slay thee, *κατακτανέοντιν*. The killing would be in deadly conflict—it would be the end sought.

But see Il. 15:587, Like a wild beast that hath done some evil thing, *having slain a dog or a herdsman, κύνα κτείνας ἢ βούκολον*. The killing was not in pursuit of an intelligent purpose—it was from blind instinct.

Od. 16:106, *Κατακτάμενος, slain in my own halls*; the death was purposed—it was the end sought in the act—therefore *κατακτάμενος*.

Od. 12:375, 'Οι βοάς ἔκταμεν ἵμεῖς, *we had slain his kine*. The killing was not the end sought, it was the means to the end—the booty—therefore we have the simple verb.

Anab. 1:9, 6, Cyrus had a fight with a bear—he suffered much, but at last he *killed* him, *κατέκανε*; he meant to kill the bear, and did what he meant. It follows, therefore, if this view be correct, that no irrational creature can do the act expressed by *κατακτείνειν*, for no such creature can form an intelligent

purpose—a purpose limited and complete in thought before it is begun in act.<sup>1</sup>

A single passage (Herod. 2:75) seems at first view to conflict with this position; but it is, in fact, confirmatory of it. The story is that the Ibises do not let the winged serpents pass by them and come into the land, but kill them, *κατακτείνειν*. The Ibis was regarded as divine; it was therefore raised above the brute condition, and made capable of forming an intelligent purpose—therefore, of doing the act, *κατακτείνειν* here is attributed to it.

47. *Θνήσκειν*, to die; *καταθνήσκειν*, to die at the hands of one who purposes to kill—the outward act fulfilling a purpose formed beforehand; to die not by disease, nor by accident, nor by old age, nor by sentence of the law. Il. 22:355, Hector *dying*, *καταθνήσκων*, by the hands of Achilles, who meant to kill him.

Il. 21:106, Achilles to Lykaon, a suppliant, *die thou also*, *θάνε καὶ σύ*;—*κάτθανε καὶ Πάτροκλος*,

<sup>1</sup> Such, at least, seems to have been the Greek opinion, so far as I have been able to gather it in reading. Perhaps the reading has been defective; but I have preferred not to wait for an impossible leisure, but note the point as possibly marking one of the hiding-places of Greek thought.

In any case, the opinion here ventured invites no reference to modern Biology; nor does it impair the honors of those rare creatures of ancient story—companions of man—inspired or trained—

“Who bear a memory and a mind,  
Raised far above the law of kind.”

*Patroklos also died.* Observe how vapid would be the phrase if *κατὰ* were omitted here. It would mean only that Patroklos died, as all men die, perhaps in his bed. Note also how the imperative, *θάνε*, asks no help from *κατὰ*; the lifted arm told the purpose (Il. 21:106, 107).

Il. 7:89, There is the tomb of a champion who *died* in the days of old, whom glorious Hector *slew*; —*died*, *κατατεθνηώτος*; *slew*, *κατέκτανε*; *κατὰ* points to the deadly conflict which made the fallen hero worthy of a monumental tomb.

48. 'Ανὰ and *κατὰ* may serve to express the same general idea through different pictures to the imagination. Xen. Cyr. 1:1, *Δημοκρατίαι κατελύθησαν*, *democracies have been overthrown*; *ολιγαρχίαι ἀνήρησται*, *oligarchies have been overthrown*;—the first suggests the idea of a structure demolished; the second, of a thing taken up and borne away; the idea of destruction is virtually in both.

---

## CHAPTER VI.

*ἐπι*, ON, UPON.

49. EVERYTHING is *on*, or *upon*, something by force of gravitation. When the object *upon* which a thing comes, or *on* which it rests, is named, we have a noun in hand, which requires a preposition to introduce it,

and show its relation to the words before it. This preposition is ἐπὶ. The object *on*, or *upon* which motion is arrested, is put in the Accusative. To fall *on the ground*, ἐπὶ τὸ δάπεδον, to seat one's self *upon a throne*, ἐπὶ θρόνον. The picture to the thought is that of power passing from the subject of the verb to the object of the preposition. The primary power in space is that of gravitation; its direction is perpendicular; and impact, or pressure is its unvarying concomitant.

50. But not much of human power is spent in a perpendicular direction. Men usually employ their strength in movements along the surface of the earth, and not in motions *up* and *down*. We must therefore be ready to shift this path of power, if we would find ἐπὶ fruitful with human uses, and from perpendicular make it horizontal, whenever we find the lines of action run in that direction.

51. Before doing this, however, we will note the accompanying notions which ἐπὶ always carries with it. First, the object which falls *upon* another exerts power upon it by impact—that is, by the accumulated force of gravitation suddenly arrested. Secondly, the object that rests *upon* another continues to exert power upon it by the continued force of gravitation—in other words, by its own weight.

These are not ingenious statements, thought out to help a theory; they simply state the facts. No effort is put forth, no step is taken in the physical

world where the power of gravitation does not go along with it, aiding, guiding, or obstructing and defeating;—and *ἐπὶ* is one of the witnesses in the Greek language of this constant, inevitable power. Our study is, first, to note the facts; and, then, to draw all fair deductions from them.

52. If now we shift the direction of power, as we proposed to do, and, instead of *up* and *down*, make it horizontal—along the level earth where living creatures with man have their home—we do not thereby dismiss *ἐπὶ*, the old witness of gravitation, but we take it with us into this new field, and allot to it a wider, and more varied service.

53. The power, ever at work or ready for work, is not here the power of gravitation; but, in the dumb creatures, it is the animal instincts and habits; in man it is the whole range of the passions and aspirations, the hopes and fears that rule his life. But in both spheres, brute and rational, *ἐπὶ* carries the suggestion of power of some sort, physical or mental; and the object of the preposition is in the Accusative. They came *to the river*, *ἐπὶ τὸν πόταμον*, to cross it; they came *to the city*, *ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν*, to take it, or enter it.

54. If the movement be a journey from a distant place, carrying the suggestion of the purpose and hope to reach, rather than of the realization, then that distant object is in the Genitive: to sail *for Greece*, *ἐπ' Ἑλλάδος*; *for home*, *ἐπ' ὁίκου*; *he began*

*to lead them into line of battle, ὑφηγεῖτο ἐπὶ φάλαγγος*—ἐπὶ with the Genitive, with a view to bring them into.

The genitive here is causative, suggesting to the imagination the thing which incites to the endeavor.

55. Rest, or position *on*, if fixed, or definite, is expressed by the Dative—the flesh *on* *spits*, ἐπὶ σχιζῆς: standing *on the car*, ἐπὶ τῷ δίφρῳ; if the position is indefinite, somewhere upon, movably, or transiently upon, ἐπὶ is followed by the Genitive;—sitting on the shore, ἐπὶ ἀκτῆς; the men carry the burdens *on their heads*, ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλέων; the enemy are *on the mountains*, ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρων; *he danced on the table*, ἐπὶ τραπέζης ὀρχήσατο.<sup>1</sup>

56. Time somewhere within which a thing happens is expressed by the Genitive—ἐπὶ Λέοντος βασιλεύοντος, *some time in the reign of Leo*.

57. Bearing in mind that whatever comes against a thing horizontally, as well as what comes down on it by gravitation, exerts power upon it, we are prepared to see how first, and last, and all through, ἐπὶ is the index of power passing from the subject to the object;

<sup>1</sup> The Genitive here helps to locate by suggesting some near, better known thing; it is as the point of departure from the known to the unknown; as in Geometry we determine the position of a point from its relation to other points whose position is known; as in old English *Jock of the mill* may discriminate from *Jock of the hill*.

In the above examples the shore (*ἀκτῆς*) is known; the persons spoken of are located by referring to this known locality; so of the mountains, the table.

as, he was sent *ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν*, *to his province*, to rule it; to go *ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα*, *to their arms*, to take them; he went *ἐπὶ τὴν θύραν*, *to the door*, to open, or shut it; they went *ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον*, *to their dinner*, to eat it; they went *ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους*, *against the enemy*, to assault them.

58. The object of *ἐπὶ*, commonly pictured as lifeless, may be in fact not lifeless, or passive; but any activity it may have will be derived from the nature of the case, and will not be suggested by the phrase where it is introduced by *ἐπὶ*.

The treatment of *ἐπὶ* is here suspended, to be resumed in a comparison of it with prepositions which follow.

---

## CHAPTER VII.

### *ὑπὸ*, UNDER; ACCESSORY NOTIONS.

59. THE notion expressed by *under*, *ὑπὸ*, takes along with it other notions which accompany it by a necessity of nature and experience. First, of all it carries the suggestion of its correlative *on*, or *over*, *ἐπὶ*, or *ὑπὲρ*. Nothing can be *under* which has not something *on*, *upon*, or *over* it.

60. Secondly, this correlation of *under* with *on*, or *over*, naturally suggests a comparison; that which is *under* is thought of as inferior to that which is *on*,

or *over* it. Thirdly, that which is *under* is in a degree withdrawn from the light. As light comes from above, that which is *under* something must of necessity receive a less degree of light than that which is *over* or *upon* it. It follows from this that *ὑπὸ* readily lends itself to express the notions of retirement, concealment, deceit.

61. That which is *under* is naturally thought of as passive to the pressure of that which is *upon* it—sometimes subdued, crushed, destroyed by it; as, for example: the blossom *under* the stone that is laid *upon* it; the snail trodden *under* the foot of the ox.

62. But that which is *under* has some power of resistance—and this may become to the imagination the leading feature of the picture; as, Milo the athlete stood *under* the weight of the full-grown ox. Here the power of life countervails the downward pressure of gravitation. But lifeless things may give the same suggestion—as, for example: the post *under* the corner of the house supported the wall above it.

63. We will next look at the cases which *ὑπὸ* governs; these are just as many as the ways in which the position *under* can be presented to our thought—and these are three.

64. *First*, the position *under*, *ὑπὸ*, may be suggested without regard to the coming into that position, or the leaving of it. Il. 2:307, We were offering hecatombs *beneath a plane tree*, *ὑπὸ πλατανίστω*; *under the wall*, i. e., near the wall, *ὑπὸ τείχει* (Il.

21 : 277). These pictures, and those like them, naturally take the dative case after *ὑπὸ*, as the case expressive of position. Sometimes the verb implies motion, but the act looks forward to the position and rest that shall follow; Il. 14 : 24, *He shall place a footstool for the feet—literally, under the feet, ὑπὸ ποσὶν.*

The dative after *ὑπὸ* sometimes expresses the author, instrument, or agent; Od. 3 : 304, *δέδμητο δὲ λαὸς ὑπὸ αὐτῷ, and the people were subdued under him.* Il. 15 : 637, *ἐφόβηθεν ὑφ' Ἐκτορὶ, they were put in fear by Hector.* Il. 11 : 121, *Themselves also were filled with fear before the Argives, ὑπ' Ἀργείοισι.*

65. *Secondly*, the position *under*, *ὑπὸ*, may be the end of a motion in space; as, *ὑπὸ σπέος ἥλασε μῆλα, he drove his flocks into the cave.* This form of expression takes the accusative case after *ὑπό*.

As the dative after *ὑπὸ* is sometimes used with verbs of motion, so the accusative after *ὑπὸ* sometimes denotes position merely. Il. 2 : 603, *Ἀρκαδίαν ὑπὸ Κυλλήνης ὅρος αἰπύ, Arcadia along under rugged Cyllene.* In such instances the objects are usually large, inviting the mind to traverse space in thinking, e. g., the earth, the air, the light.

66. The third and last form of connecting things by the preposition *ὑπὸ*, is where the object of *ὑπὸ* is the starting point of the motion (Od. 9 : 141), a spring of clear water flowed *out from a cave*, *ὑπὸ σπείους.* This form calls for the genitive case. Il. 9 : 248, to

rescue the sons of the Achaians *from the war-din of the Trojans*, ὑπὸ Τρώων ὄρυμαγδῶν; ὑπὸ, *from under*.

Motion into or under is followed by the genitive in the phrase ἐγὼ τὸν μοχλόν ὑπὸ σποδοῦ ἡλασα πολλῆς, *I thrust the stake into the burning embers*; the *σποδός*, *embers*, is not pictured as a unit, but as a loose mass, affected by the stake only at the point where the stake was thrust in—it is a partitive genitive. So (Od. 11 : 52), he had not been buried beneath the wide-wayed earth, ὑπὸ, *any where beneath*—six feet of it was space enough.

67. 'Τπὸ with the genitive suggests primarily the prevalence of its object over some one else, as if that other were prostrate under it. But it is used in general to mark the agent of an action after passive verbs. While primarily picturing, as it were, to the eye, the victories and subjugations of war, its wide embrace serves for actions the most kindly and beneficent. Mem. 2 : 2, 3, Whom can we find more greatly benefited by any than are children *by parents*? ὑπὸ γονέων;

68. These two prepositions, being correlative, invite to some extent a treatment side by side, that each may be seen in the light of the other: ἐφιέναι χεῖρας τινὶ, *to lay hands on one* (Od. 20 : 39); ὑφιέναι θρῆνν ποσίν, *to place a footstool under one's feet* (Il. 14 : 240).

Wine *drives* even the wise man to sing, ἐφέηκε

(Od. 14 : 464). *To each dam he put its young to suck,* ὑπ' ἐμβρυον ἥκεν ἐκάστη (Od. 9 : 309). *He hath sent woes upon the Argives,* ἐφῆκεν (Il. 1 : 445). Submitting the body to pains, ὑφεῖσα (Eur. Med. 24). Observe in the above example the suggestion of power in ἐπὶ, and of subordination in ὑπὸ.

69. *Ἄρχειν*, *to be first in doing a thing*; as to lead is characteristic of a ruler, the word comes naturally to mean *to rule*; *ἐπάρχειν*, *to rule over—exercise authority upon a particular district*; *χώρας ἐπάρχω πολλῆς*, *I rule over a large country* (Xen. Cyr. 4 : 6, 2); *ὑπάρχειν*, *to be first in an act thought of as the cause or incentive to other acts—like a foundation*. Socrates (Mem. 2 : 3) is urging two alienated brothers to love each other; *it is a great provision for friendship*, *πρὸς φιλίαν μέγα ὑπάρχει*, *to be sprung from the same parents*.

This word is very appropriate in the criminations and recriminations of those engaged in war—each side charging the other with beginning the quarrel. The word suggests the foundation in man's fortune and life—that on which the structure of character rests.

It is used in expressing acts of kindness, where he who *begins by doing kind actions*, *ὑπάρχει εὖ ποιῶν*, receives the like in return. Anab. 2 : 3, 23, If any one *will begin with showing us kindness*, *ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιῶν ὑπάρξῃ*, we will not be outdone by him, at least to the extent of our power, in making kind returns.

But evil for evil is more common in history. Hdt. 1:5, I shall point out the *one who began aggressions against the Greeks*, *τὸν ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἑλληνας*. Hdt. 4:1, Darius wished to be revenged on the Scythians, who, in days gone by, had invaded Media and so *began the quarrel*, *ὑπήρξαν ἀδικίης*. In like manner the French and the Chinese, in this year of grace, 1884, are each charging the other with *beginning the wrong*, *ὑπάρξαι ἀδικίας*.

70. *Ἐπάγειν, ὑπάγειν* (Hdt. 2:108), The multitude whom he brought upon the land, *ἐπηγάγετο*; to bring war on a people, *ἐπάγειν πόλεμον*; to bring on woe, *πῆμα, servitude, δουλείαν, ὑπάγειν ζυγὸν ὕππους, to lead horses under the yoke*. The end to be reached is to have the horse *under* the yoke, i. e., harnessed to the chariot—the leading is preparatory, and subordinate—important only as a necessary condition to that end. This is analogous to *ὑπὸ σπέος ἥλασε μῆλα*, where the end to be gained is to have the flock in the cave—the driving is a necessary condition to that end. In Xen. Venat. 4:4, we find *ἄγειν τὰς κύνας, to take the dogs out for exercise*; the act is its own end; but when the same act is subordinate to a further end, namely, to find the game, we find *ὑπαγεῖν τὰς κύνας* (4:5); but further, when they find the haunt of the boar, they *set the dogs forward* to rouse him, *ἐπάγειν τὰς κύνας*. The compound *ὑπάγειν* is also used to present a picture analogous to the water running out from the can, *ὑπὸ σπείους; ὑπαγεῖ, away from before*

me! literally, away from *under* me! For, to a living creature, motion forward against what is before him is as natural as striking on what is under it is to a falling stone. 'Επὶ and ὑπὸ play their parts in this horizontal direction, as they did primarily in the perpendicular; motion against something is ἐπὶ, and that which obstructs it is ὑπὸ. Il. 5:885, He assailed me with the might of a god, but my swift feet bore me *out of his reach*, ὑπήνεικαν, literally, *bore from under*. Anab. 3:4, 48, τοῖς μὲν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπάγειν παρεκαλεύετο, He called on those before him to *move on*, ὑπάγειν, i. e., to make room for those pressing on behind them.

71. The English preposition *under* does not bear transference to this horizontal direction. We can say “stand from under”; this suggests perpendicular motion; but, if we change the line of motion in the threatening object to horizontal, the Greek could say, as before, ὑπάγετε, but the English preposition *under* will no longer serve.

Matt. 13:44, He goeth and selleth all that he hath, and buyeth that field; *he goeth*, ὑπάγει; the emphatic point is the buying—the *going* is merely preparatory; it helps the picture, but is not essential to the thought—in grammatical form the two verbs are co-ordinate, but in thought there is a clear subordination. More commonly the subordinate action is expressed by the participle. Anab. 1:8, 15, Xenophon *riding up*, so as to join Cyrus, asked him if he

would give any orders; *riding up*, ὑπελάσας. To translate this *riding up* *gently*, or *slowly*, does not commend itself—it does not suit the business of the hour. To say that ὑπὸ here points to the fact of Xenophon's subordination in rank to Cyrus is needless—that goes without saying; it is inept moreover, there being nothing in the story at this moment to call for a reference to that fact. It seems to denote simply the subordination of Xenophon's act at the time to the act of Cyrus—as a question for instruction is necessarily subordinate to the answer expected.

72. Μένειν, to remain, abide, wait; ὑπομένειν, to remain under, to bear, sustain, endure; the actor is stationary, and acts as in resistance to a downward pressure. Od. 1:410, οὐδ' ὑπέμεινεν γνώμεναι, he did not wait for us to know him—did not bear the pressure of our inquires. Plato Epis, *I bore bitter reproaches, διαβολὰς δυσχερεῖς ὑπέμεινον.* Epis. Heb., If ye endure chastening, ὑπομένετε.

Ἐπιμένειν, to remain on. Cyr. Inst. 1:4, The horse stumbled upon his knees, and nearly threw Cyrus over his head, yet he held on, ἐπέμεινεν. When connected with rational acts ἐπὶ suggests the ground or basis of the act, and points forward to the result. The rain *continued falling*, ἔμενε πίπτων; Peter *continued knocking*, ἐπέμενε κρούων; Peter had a motive and an object. The dog *continued barking*, ἔμενε; the creditor *continued dunning* his debtors, ἐπέμενε. Od. 17:275-277, Either do thou

go, while I am left behind; or do thou *remain*,  $\epsilon\pi\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\sigma$ , and I will go;  $\epsilon\pi\grave{\imath}$  points to the purpose of the action, which was in the minds of both.

Od. 11:351, Let the stranger be patient, much as he desires to return, and *wait*,  $\epsilon\pi\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\sigma$ , until the morrow, till I shall have filled the full measure of the gift. The waiting is for an object in the mind of the speaker—namely, to make up the full measure of the gift. Had the waiting been a halt upon a march to be resumed as a matter of course on the morrow, the verb would not be  $\epsilon\pi\mu$ , but  $\grave{\alpha}\nu\alpha\mu$  (see Sec. 7).

So, Il. 6:340, *Wait*,  $\epsilon\pi\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\sigma$ , till I put on my armor;  $\epsilon\pi\grave{\imath}$  looks forward to the object to be gained by waiting—namely, the putting on of the armor; it is a note beforehand showing that there is an object to be gained by waiting. It is therefore in the thought a connective, and would have no right to be, but for the phrase that follows. The preposition and the following phrase are in fact correlatives. That we cannot suggest this play of thought in a neat English phrase is true here, as in countless other examples. But let us not refuse to learn the Greek because we cannot always translate it exactly into English.

73. If the conqueror *puts the yoke upon the conquered*,  $\epsilon\pi\tau\iota\theta\epsilon\nu\sigma$ , the conquered *bear it*,  $\nu\pi\sigma\phi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\nu\sigma$ ; if in battle one side *mores upon the other*,  $\epsilon\pi\iota\epsilon\nu\sigma$ ,  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\sigma\sigma$ ,  $\epsilon\pi\pi\pi\pi\epsilon\nu\sigma$ , the other side hold the relation  $\nu\pi\acute{o}$ , *under*. If they *accept* the assault, we say

ὑποδέχονται; if they flee from under it, ὑποφεύγουσιν.

The study of ἐπὶ is suspended here to be resumed in a comparison of it with the preposition πρός.

74. The compound ἐξηγεῖσθαι (see by anticipation Prep. ἐκ) suggests that the leading has its source in the subject of the verb; ὑφηγεῖσθαι presents the leader as subordinate to some other person, or power, or to some ulterior object of his own; he leads as the colonel under instructions leads his regiment into battle; he leads as the hare leads the hounds; as the fugitive leads his pursuer; as the pioneers, marking out and clearing the road, lead the army.

Thuc. 1:78, If you are determined to have war, we will do our best to avenge ourselves on you, in the way in which you set us an example, ὑφίγησθε: the threat of retaliation places the leading of the enemy under a law, or condition—namely, that as they did so it would be done to them. Their leading is no longer free—it is not ἐξηγεῖσθαι, but is under the shadow of this threat, which would tend to temper and restrain it; it is ὑφηγεῖσθαι.

To draw them up in order for battle, ὑφηγεῖσθαι (Anab. 6:5, 25)—ὑπὸ recognizes a subordination; it was an act preparatory to the inevitable battle before them—like the leading out, ὑπάγειν, of the dogs preparatory to a hunt.

Compare with this Hdt. 1:151, They resolved in common assembly to follow the Ionians, whatever

way *they should lead*, ἐξηγέωνται; here the Ionians act from their own arbitrary choice; the other party accept their action and conform their own to it.

Anab. 2:1, 18, ὁ δὲ Κλέαρχος ταῦτα ὑφηγεῖτο, now in this Clearchus was covertly trying to lead, Φαλίνος δέ ὑποστρέψας, but Phalinos evading, dexterously shunning—ὑπὸ, away from under.

Xen. Equest., The colt is trained to go before his trainer, keeping the road. To go before is ἵγεῖσθαι, but here the colt's action is under control of his trainer; hence the verb is ὑφηγεῖσθαι.

75. It is not implied that he who leads, ὑφηγεῖται, is necessarily the inferior of the two. Soph. El. 1502, ὑφηγοῦ, lead the way, go first; this is said by Aegisthus to Orestes, in whose power he was, and at whose hands he was soon to meet his death. It simply proposes that Orestes lead the way in retiring from the present scene—an act preparatory, and hence subordinate to the act which was soon to follow—his swift coming death.

So the gods *lead* men, ὑφηγοῦνται, by suggestions drawn from objects and creatures around them (Xen. Cyri., Bk. 3); man's reason and will are here pictured as the great actors; no one is convinced against his reason, or made good against his will.

76. Crito 16, Let us then rest our discussion, Crito, and proceed to act in this way, *since in this way God is leading us*, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται. The divine leading was through suggestions to the

reason, and the free will, which must at last, as sovereign, decide the question of life and death. It is just because that Socrates in this stress made the sovereign choice to die that he is a monument for remembrance and cheer, through the ages, for all tried and tempted souls.

---

## CHAPTER VIII.

### *πρὸς, TO, TOWARDS, NEAR TO, FACE TO FACE.*

77. FEW things are more wearisome than to read about *πρὸς* in the Lexicon. There are endless examples, but no interpretation—no clew to guide the inquirer. It is said to mean *motion to* or *motion from*, or *rest in a place*, and many things besides. The only resourcee is in guessing, and trying, till one's common sense tells him he has guessed right.

78. We shall prosper best in this study, if we regard *πρὸς* as introducing us at once into human relations. The prepositions *ἀνά*, *κατά*, *ἐπ*, and *ἐπί*, in their primary meanings, may have a pretty wide range of use without any reference to human beings. Not so *πρὸς*, if our view is right. It presents, primarily, the picture of one person facing another. It is the servitor of communion between man and man—the usher that introduces one soul to another; whence is

rendered possible the family, society, the state.<sup>1</sup> From this first meaning *πρὸς* comes naturally to mean *near to*, this being the relation in space of persons who meet face to face.

79. When man meets his fellow man it is primarily for converse, and implies a reciprocal action on the part of the person met; *πρὸς* is the preposition that connects the action with its personal object in this form of human intercourse. 'Επὶ presents its living object as if it were lifeless; *πρὸς*, never—and often it makes alive to the imagination what is, in itself, lifeless; this ἐπὶ never does. To say *πρὸς Τρῶας μάχεσθαι* implies that the Trojans fight back; to shoot *πρὸς τεῖχος* implies that the wall has something to do—namely, to repulse the shafts thrown against it; the wall is in fact the defensive armor of the city—it was built to do the work of defense.

80. Πρὸς *στῆθος βάλλειν*, to *shoot against the breast*, implies that the *στῆθος* makes, or may make, some sort of response to the stroke of the dart. Both shield and breastplate are there to aid in giving that response. But, you may ask, might not one say in this case *ἐπὶ στῆθος βάλλειν*? Certainly he could, if

---

<sup>1</sup> As the relations of persons very greatly surpass in interest the relations of things, it has seemed truer, as well as easier, to think of *πρὸς* from the start as subserving these higher relations. A different supposition would not affect any important fact in the study—and therefore invites no discussion here. For the derived meanings, *besides, in addition to*, see Sec. 103.

he were pretty dull—just as a painter, if dull, may put two objects into a picture and not harmonize them. Πρὸς harmonizes the picture, it is a note beforehand, showing that the act is to have its issue in some quality residing in the object of the preposition; or, to put it briefly, ἐπὶ στῆθος βάλλειν would be quite proper, if you kill the man before you shoot at him.

81. To attain *to virtue*, ἐπ' ἀρετὴν, if you are thinking especially of the manly endeavor it costs; but if you are thinking chiefly of the happiness it brings, πρὸς ἀρετὴν (Xen. Conviv., ch. 4). The discouraged soldiers (Anab. 3 : 1) had no spirit to go *to their arms*, ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα; no spirit to go *on guard*, πρὸς τὰς φυλακάς. In going *to their arms* they went to do something, namely, to take their arms; in going *on guard* they did not go primarily to do anything; they were to wait and watch till others should act, i. e., the enemy, and call forth the watcher's action in response—hence πρός. To expose one *to the cold*, πρὸς ψῦχος; it is the cold that acts on the man.

82. Not only is something of reciprocity uniformly suggested by πρὸς, but in many cases the chief action in a phrase is suggested to the imagination not in the subject of the verb, but in the object of this preposition. It is hard for thee *to kick against the pricks*, πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν. Here it is not the one who kicks, but the thing kicked that, for the imagination, does the chief work. In the realm of mechanics ac-

tion and reaction are equal, but in the realm of feeling they may be very different.

83. In the story of Ulysses in the cave (Od. IX), the Cyclops, grasping two of the visitors, swung them high and *dashed them on the ground*, *ποτὶ (πρὸς) γαίῃ κόπτε*. Here the action, to the imagination, passes quite over from the subject of the verb to the object of *πρὸς*—*from* what the two visitors did to the floor to what the floor of the cave did to them—*ἐκ δ’ ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ρέε*.

84. Hector (Il. 6 : 454) bewails the coming fate of Andromache, that in her captivity she would weave, *πρὸς ἄλλης*, *at the command of another woman*; that is, standing before her face and receiving commands;—it was not the weaving, but the domineering command that was in the husband’s thought. Anab. 5 : 7, 1, Xenophon says: “I hear that some one is accusing me of deceiving you: therefore hear me *by the Gods*, *πρὸς τῶν θεῶν*”—*πρὸς*, an appeal to the Gods as if standing face to face before them, who will respond to his words with vengeance if he does not speak the truth. Il. 6 : 524, 5, I hear bitter reproaches *from the Trojans*, *πρὸς Τρώων*, they reproach me to my face. If the reproaches came to his ears through a third party the Preposition would not be *πρὸς*.

85. In the narrative from Od. IX we read that Neptune shattered the ship, *dashing it against the rocks*, *πρὸς πέτρησι βαλών*. The ship met the rocks

to its own hurt, therefore *πρὸς*. They leaned their chariots *against the walls*, *πρὸς ἐνώπια*—leaned them that they might be supported—the walls reacted and held what was leaned against them.

86. They fight *against each other*, *πρὸς ἀλλήλους*; for *ἐπὶ* forbids the reciprocation which *ἀλλήλους* always carries with it. There is one phrase, however, *ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι κέχυντο*, *they were heaped on one another*, where *ἀλλήλοισι*, always reciprocal in its suggestion, is the object of *ἐπὶ*, which never lends itself to the idea of reciprocation. What shall we say? This, namely: that the Greek and the English translation each describes a common fact by a short phrase, impossible to be taken literally (for those at the bottom were not heaped upon others), but so suggestive roughly of the fact that its inaccuracy is pardoned for its brevity's sake.

87. The nymph Calypso (Od. V. 149) went to *Ulysses*, *ἐπ' Ὀδυσῆα*—she went to do a work—to dismiss him: therefore *ἐπὶ*; had she gone for converse, the preposition would have been *πρὸς*.

88. Near the above passage (v. 157) we read that *Ulysses gazed fixedly on the unplanted sea*, *πόντον ἐπ' ἀτρύγετον δερκέσκετο*. He was hopeless, for he did not even wipe his tears away—did not even look around in hope of seeing some ship that might take him on board. Had he been hopeful enough for that, the preposition would have been *πρὸς*, suiting the word to the mental state.

89. But, it may be asked, did the Greeks think of all this? Probably they thought nothing about it, but spoke from habit—just as a well educated person uses, in English, the words *shall* and *will*, correctly from habit, while a foreigner learning English must reflect. Just as little did Xenophon need to bethink him of the distinction between *ἐπὶ* and *πρὸς*, when he used them both, each in its place (*Anab.* 3 : 4). *Think*, soldiers, you are on your way now *for Greece*, *to your children and your wives*, *ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, πρὸς τοὺς παιδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας*. The preposition *πρὸς* here is alive with the picture of the soldier's return to his home—meeting those who meet him at his door.

90. Achilles bewailed his friend, the slain Patroklos, placing his hands *upon his breast*, *ἐπὶ στήθεσσιν*; if he had laid his hands upon the breast to find if the heart was still beating, the preposition would have been *πρὸς* (*Il.* 18 : 317).

91. *The way to happiness*, *ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπ' εὐδαιμονίᾳν*, also *πρὸς εὐδαιμονίᾳν*; but the former, where happiness is found at the end of a course of labor, or search; the latter, where it comes of itself, to one who refuses to take pains about it (*Mem. II.* 1).

92. Xenophon directs the horse-buyer to examine first the feet of the horse he would buy; and then to go to the rest of the body, *πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα*. He had nothing to do to the horse, but rather something to receive—namely, an impression good, or bad, as he

looked and examined. If Xenophon had been instructing the groom in his duties, and had told him, when he had finished one part to go to the rest of the body, he would have said *ἐπὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα*. Observe, in every case, *ἐπὶ* denotes some form of power—if only the power involved in a steadfast gaze—passing from the agent to the object; *πρὸς* suggests some form of reciprocal action, or a susceptibility for it, passing from the object to the agent.

93. To go against the enemy, *ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμοὺς*; also *πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους*—but, the former, when the enemy are at a distance, are at rest, or are retreating—that is, are pictured as *passive* to the attack; the latter, when the assailants have come so near to the enemy as to stimulate them to face about and fight back (Cyr. Inst. 1:4).

94. When (Il. VI) Hector met Andromache at the Scean gate, the nurse held the child *on her breast*, *ἐπὶ κόλπῳ*; a burden, a charge resting *on* the nurse; but when afterward the father—

“Stretched his fond arms to clasp the lovely boy,  
The babe clung crying to his nurse’s breast,” *πρὸς κόλπον*,  
for shelter, safety, solace, *from* the nurse.

95. Lest thou dash thy foot *against a stone* (Matt. 4:6). The thoughtful student will now be able to determine whether it is *ἐπὶ λίθον*, or *πρὸς λίθον*, by asking himself, which was specially affected by the blow—the foot, or the stone? Which did the principal act?

Great stones which were rolled off the precipice, fell upon the rocks, and were dashed in fragments. *Upon the rocks*, is it  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\rho\alpha\varsigma$ , or  $\pi\rho\circ\varsigma\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\rho\alpha\varsigma$ ? (Anab. 4 : 2, 3).

If thou shall not watch I will come *on thee*,  $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\epsilon$  (Rev. 3 : 3)—the object is to inflict punishment, hence  $\epsilon\pi\iota$ . But in the same chapter we read : I stand at the door, and knock ; if any man hear my voice, and open the door, *I will come in to him*,  $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\nu\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\pi\pi\rho\circ\varsigma\alpha\upsilon\tau\circ\varsigma\alpha\nu$ . The object is communion ; the visitor and the receiver are sharers in a common joy (Rev. 3 : 3, 20).

96. How shall I say : “ I am going to the fire ” ? You may say  $\epsilon\iota\mu\iota\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\circ\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$ , or  $\epsilon\iota\mu\iota\pi\rho\circ\varsigma\tau\circ\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$ , according to what your object is in going ; if you go to warm yourself, it will be  $\pi\rho\circ\varsigma\tau\circ\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$  ; if you go to stir the fire, it will be  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\circ\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$ .

97. When a fire breaks out in a city, great numbers come together—in two classes—firemen and spectators ; the one class come  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\circ\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$ , the other  $\pi\rho\circ\varsigma\tau\circ\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$ —though neither class come either to warm themselves or to stir the fire ;—but one class come to act upon the fire, the other to receive an impression from it.

98. If at breakfast you break your egg by striking your knife *on* the egg, the Greek preposition for *on* is  $\epsilon\pi\iota$  ; if you break it by striking the egg *on* the edge of your glass, the Greek preposition is  $\pi\rho\circ\varsigma$ . You tread *on* a flower,  $\epsilon\pi\iota$  ; you tread *on* a nail,  $\pi\rho\circ\varsigma$ . These examples are not arbitrary dictations ; they

are direct deductions, and are confirmed by all the usage.

Anab. 1 : 8, *They struck with the shields upon the spears, τὰς ἀσπίσι πρὸς τὰ δόρατα ἐδούπησαν*; they did not wish to do anything to the spears, but to call forth a sound from them, to frighten the enemies' horses. A little farther on we read, Cyrus saw the king (*καθορᾶ*) and *rushed upon him, ἵετο ἐπ' αὐτόν*. It need not be said that *πρὸς* could not be used to describe this action.

If one strikes upon a bell with a hammer to mark it, or to break it, the word for *upon* is *ἐπὶ*; if he strikes upon it to call forth its tone, the word for *upon* is *πρὸς*.

99. In New Testament (Matt. 7 : 24), of the house built *upon the rock*, *ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν*, we read “the winds blew and beat *upon that house*,” *προσέπεσον τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἐκείνῃ*—the point being to mark what resistance the house made to the assault;—therefore *πρὸς*, not *ἐπὶ*.

100. Xen. Oecon. 7 : 23, God, methinks, has prepared the nature of woman *for works and cures* within doors, *ἐπὶ ἔργα καὶ ἐπιμελήματα*; for he made her with a body and spirit less strong *against cold and heat*, *πρὸς ρύγη καὶ θάλπη*;—*ἐπὶ* introduces things to be done; *πρὸς*, things to be endured. The object of *ἐπὶ* is the passive recipient of the action; the object of *πρὸς* is the door of the action.

101. They encamped *on the sea-shore, near the*

*harbor, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγριαλὸν πρὸς τῷ λιμένι; ἐπὶ with gen. indefinitely upon—somewhere on, πρὸς with dat. near.*

Note here how each of the prepositions has its own special meaning, which cannot be expressed by the other. 'Επὶ is primarily the servitor of gravitation ;—it pictures downward motion arrested. Secondly, therefore, it serves all motions that are natural in their place, and thus have an analogy to downward motion. Now, an army marching toward the sea is stopped at the shore as surely as a falling stone is stopped by the earth on which it strikes. Πρὸς could not carry this suggestion ; nor could ἐπὶ serve the turn of πρός. The thing which moves *on*, ἐπὶ, does not stop till it strikes ; it cannot denote merely *near to*. In the expression : “Behold I stand at the door, ἐπὶ τὴν θύραν, and knock,” the preposition and noun, along with the verb, does not of itself give the picture of impact, but it is pregnant with that notion, and the notion is made explicit by the added words *καὶ κρούω*.

102. In the implied converse of two persons, suggested by πρὸς, we observe that there is no impact, nor contact ;—the parties introduced by πρὸς are only *near to each other* ; hence this preposition comes to express the idea of nearness ; πρὸς τῇ γῇ ναυμαχεῖν, the ships fought *near the land* (Thue. 7 : 34). When, however, Xenophon says (Hell. 4 : 8, 1), *αἱ πρὸς θαλάττῃ πόλεις*, he does not mean cities near the sea, but *on the sea* : why then did he not use ἐπὶ ? Be-

cause the cities did not act on the sea, but received from the sea their supplies—the reciprocal action is the leading idea.

103. We observe again that, in the implied converse suggested by *πρὸς*, the parties are thought of as on equal terms. They are in the relation, then, that prepares them to be counted, or added ;—not fractions only, but all things in the world must be brought to a common denominator before they can be counted or added. The preposition *πρός*, therefore, carries in its own right the meaning *besides*, *in addition to* ;—an idea which no other preposition properly has or can have, not even *ἐπὶ*, whatever the Lexicons may say. That which is *on* (*ἐπὶ*) something is not in the same plane with it *in thought*, any more than it is *in space*. See note at page 130.

---

## CHAPTER IX.

### ἐπὶ AND πρὸς IN COMPOSITION.

104. 'Επέχει τί τινι, to hold something upon something—as, *the hand on the sword-hilt*, *τὴν χεῖρα κώπη*. He holds it there to draw the sword, therefore *ἐπὶ* ; but if, with the sword drawn, he holds his fingers *to* the edge to test its keenness, the preposition for *to* would be *πρός*. The holding may be in the way of restraint ; this will put the second object in the Geni-

tive, *ἐπέχειν τὸν δρόμον*, *to cease from running*, literally, *to hold on*, that is, on the ground where you are. Let us now pass to *προσέχειν*.

The Persians besieged Barea nine months, mining underground, as well as fighting above. A wise man discovered their secret work in this way: *He laid a brazen shield on the ground*, *προσέσχε ἀσπίδα πρὸς τὸ δάπεδον* (Hdt. 4: 200), and applied his ear; wherever there was digging going on underneath, he would perceive it by the murmur of the shield. Here is no suggestion of power from the man to the ground, but rather the other way—he waited for something to come from the ground through the shield to him; therefore *προσέχειν*, not *ἐπέχειν*.

105. We can apply the hand to the door *to open it*, we can apply the ear to the door *to listen*; in the one case the verb is *ἐπέχειν*, in the other, it is *προσέχειν*. The physician puts his hand upon an artery to stop the circulation, *ἐπέχει τὴν χεῖρα*; or, *to feel the pulse*, *προσέχει τὴν χεῖρα*.

106. Hdt. 1: 53, Croesus sent gifts to the shrine, and *thereupon asked for* a response, *ἐπειρώτα*—*ἐπὶ* points to the ground on which he asked—namely, the gifts he had sent.

107. Socrates being asked, *ἐρωτώμενος*, said, etc., and *being asked further*, *προσερώμενος*, he replied (Mem. 1: 3, 9). *If I shall need any more instruction*, *ἵνε τε προσδέομαι*, my grandfather will teach me [*in it*], *ἐπιδιδάξει* (Xen. Cyri. 1: 3), *ἐπὶ* refers to the

need, as the basis or ground of having more instruction.

Zeus *bethought him*, *μνήσατο*, of Aegisthus, whom Orestes slew; and *thinking of him*, *ἐπιμνησθεὶς*, he said . . .: when the verb is used the second time, it takes on *ἐπὶ*; this shows what it was in Aegisthus that Zeus was thinking of—namely, how he had been slain. When the verb was used the first time, that fact had not been mentioned, therefore *ἐπὶ* would have been unintelligible; to omit it in the second instance would render the phrase vapid—it would show that the poet had lost himself, and could not follow up his own thought.

108. 'Επὶ sometimes looks forward to a phrase immediately following that justifies and requires its use. Xen. Conviv. 4:4, All states *inquire of the gods what they must do*, *ἐπερωτῶσι τοὺς θεοὺς τί χρὴ ποιεῖν*; *ἐπὶ* points forward to *τί χρὴ ποιεῖν* as determining the matter on which they inquire. This will be made clear if we change the form of the sentence without altering the sense, thus: we do not know what we must do; *let us inquire of the gods*, *ἐπερωτῶμεν τοὺς θεούς*. Here the *ἐπὶ* plainly looks back to the ignorance expressed in the words just before, as the basis of the inquiry; just as plainly does it look forward in the phrase in its first form. Again (Xen. Mem. 1:5), *Let us consider, whether he helped them any towards this by discoursing as follows*, *ἐπισκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι προνοβίβαζε λέγων ἐις ταύτην τοιάδε*;

ἐπὶ points forward to the matter they were to consider.

109. Again (Xen. Mem. 2 : 1, 7), Since you know the proper rank of each of these classes, *have you ever considered* this, *ἥδη ποτ’ ἐπεσκέψω, εἰς ποτέραν*, etc., into which of these classes you might fitly place yourself? 'Επὶ points forward to the thought in the following phrase; just as the word *this* in the translation looks forward to the phrase which follows, and serves, therefore, in thought, to connect the two parts of the sentence; ἐπὶ does for the Greek mind just what *this* does less neatly for the English mind. Does any one think that this is forced and fanciful—a queer sort of equation—to make a preposition just equal to a pronoun, so that sometimes one may be substituted for the other? If one thinks so, he is more particular than the Greeks themselves, for they did this very thing. Read again (Mem. 1 : 2, 10), *Βούλει οὖν καὶ τοῦτο σκεψώμεθα, πότεροι*. Then, if you will, let us consider this, whether, etc. Here we have the equation before us, drawn from the same page: *σκέψασθαι τοῦτο; πότεροι = ἐπισκέψασθαι εἰς ποτέραν*.

Heb. 12 : 15, *ἐπὶσκοποῦντες μή τις ὑστερῶν . . . , looking* (ἐπὶ) *to it*. This is the exact form of the thought in the Greek, ἐπὶ looks forward to what is in the next phrase.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> It does not follow that “looking to it” is the best possible translation, for the bit of phrase *to it* has lost east a little—has become too colloquial for the seriousness and dignity of this place. Not every

So in Il. 2:198, *ὅν ἐφέντοι βοῶντα, ἐπὶ* looks to the action expressed by *βοῶντα* as its basis. He did not go about aimless till by chance he met some one brawling; but he heard a brawling first, and then went for it; *ἐπὶ* fixes the perspective of the picture.

Cyri. Inst. 1:3, *'Ἐπελέλησθε παντάπασι, σύ τε ὅτι βασιλεὺς ἦσθα, ὅτε ἄλλοι ὅτι σὺ ἀρχων.* *You had forgotten yourselves altogether—thou, that thou wast king, and they, that thou wast their ruler.* *'Ἐπὶ* in the verb looks forward to what is stated afterwards—namely, their difference of rank. This they ought not to have forgotten; the fact of self-forgetfulness was not general, but limited to one particular thing, and *ἐπὶ* points to that.

110. Socrates says, in opening his defense: I know not, Athenians, how you were affected by my accusers; but, for my part, I almost *forgot my position here*, *ἐπελαθόμην*, *ἐπὶ* points to the fact that Socrates was there to answer for his life. That fact was in all

---

translation that is the most literal is therefore the best. The most literal may have gathered associations by use that unfit it for the service required—like a messenger stained and soiled by hard travel, and so unfit for presentation. We cannot counterweigh a Greek word or phrase by an English word or phrase, and call that translation, because it is literal. The Greek must first be dissolved in the alembic of thought, and that thought then cast into the best form which the English allows. So, in the instance above, of *ἐπισκοποῦντες*, the common version, *looking diligently*, may be thought the best possible, unless the revisors' *looking carefully* be thought better, though the Greek does not properly mean either dilligently or carefully.

minds, and that made the forgetfulness of it noteworthy. To say in translating, *almost forgot myself* is inadequate;<sup>1</sup> to say *scarcely recognized myself* is worse, for it amounts only to saying, “they did not draw a true picture of me”;—and it misses entirely the characteristic humor and pathos.

111. Cyri. Inst. 1:4, And Cyrus learned readily all that had been taught him (about rough ground); but when he saw the deer he rushed forward, *ἐπιλαθόμενος πάντα*, *forgetting everything about it*; *ἐπὶ* refers to the cautions he had received about rough ground; it does for the Greek mind just what is done for the English mind by the added words *about it*. One is the English way, the other the Greek way of doing the same thing (Od. 19:13). I have laid up the weapons, lest when heated with wine you quarrel, and shame the feast, for iron itself *draws a man thereto*, *ἔφελκεται*.

112. When Kebriones, the charioteer of Hector, fell, struck by a stone from Patroclus (Il. 16:775), he lay stretched at his length, *all his skill forgotten*, *λελασμένος ἵπποσυνάων*; it was the forgetfulness of death—his work done, all ties sundered, all side issues brought to an end—hence the simple verb. But in

---

<sup>1</sup> The English mind may be satisfied to say *forgot myself* (so trained by habit is it at supplying deficiencies); and perhaps this is the best we can do in English; but the Greek does more—it supplies by *ἐπὶ* the limitation which the English phrase leaves the reader to supply without saying it.

Lucian's Dial., "Aphrodite and Eros," Helios is complained of as ἐπιλελησμένον τῆς ἵππασίας, *forgetting his duty as charioteer*; it was a forgetting of something he was bound to remember—hence ἐπὶ pointing to the particular thing in which he forgot himself.

113. 'Επὶ may suggest what is gracious and assuring. Il. 1:528, The son of Kronos spake, and *nodded* his dark brow, ἐπένευσε; he nodded in confirmation of his word that had just been given. Observe, that this was the famous nod where all Olympus was shaken—token of irreversible decree, whose proper word is *κατανεύειν*. Why then not *κατανεύειν* here? Because that went without saying; it had been said and settled that the nod, when given, should be of that sort. If then we may throw off *κατὰ*, why not throw off ἐπὶ, using the simple ἐνευσε? Because that would leave the word afloat, and all it signified. 'Επὶ knits the act into the web of the story, showing its relation with what goes before. An ancient critic has said that Homer was sometimes drowsy, and nodded. However that may be, he certainly was not drowsy here; he said just what he meant.

The gay woman who came to Hercules in his doubts (Mem. 2:1, 22), as she approached him, *κατασκοπεῖσθαι θαμὰ ἑαυτήν*, *often survey'd herself*—κατὰ denoting the perfect repose she felt when looking at herself; ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεᾶται, and she often looked also to see if any other was ob-

serving her; *ἐπὶ* looks forward to the following phrase, as expressing the thing she was looking for.

114. *To ask, beg, aἰτεῖν*; to demand, that is, to ask on the basis of some ground or reason that justifies the asking, *ἐπαιτεῖν*. Oed. Tyr. 14:16, *ῶν ἐπαιτεῖς*, *ἐπὶ* refers to the ground of the demand—the king's extreme need. Il. 23:593, *εἴ κεν ἄλλο μεῖζον ἐπαιτήσειας*. If you should even ask another, greater thing—*ἐπὶ*, to satisfy your just claims. *Προσαιτεῖν*, *to ask in addition* (Anab. 1:3, 21). *The soldiers asked for an increase of pay.*<sup>1</sup>

115. *Ἐπακούειν*, *to hear*, not *about* something, which would be *ἀκούειν περὶ τίνος*, nor from some one, which would be *ἀκούειν ἀπὸ, ἐκ, παρά τίνος*; but to hear, on the ground of some fact with which the hearing has a natural connection. Hdt. 2:70, The crocodile hearing the noise (of the squealing pig) makes for the noise, but coming across the bait he swallows it down, and they haul him in; *hearing*

<sup>1</sup> In Liddel and Scott's Lexicon there is attributed to each of these compounds (*ἐπαιτήσειας* misprinted *ἀπαιτήσειας*) a meaning that belongs to the other; as if they had crossed tracks, and each was doing duty in the other's field. The passages referred to in illustration disprove the definition offered. Il. 23:593, Xen. Viet. 4:39, In no case does *πρὸς* denote "for a purpose"; in no case does *ἐπὶ* denote simply "more, besides." If ever so rendered, it is a cheap device of translation, as a resource in meeting an acknowledged difficulty, but is not an accurate picture of the thought. In Il. 23:593, *ἐπὶ* means *for your satisfaction*; but this phrase is too heavy to be admitted in translation; we must think it without saying it.

ἐπακούσας—why ἐπὶ? Because the hearing was in a natural relation with another fact stated just before; namely, that they belabored the pig, and made him squeal. Xen. Hist. Græc. 3:4, 1, *προσακούσας δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, and hearing this also besides*—in addition to other things mentioned before.

116. And, even as he spake, *forth flew*, ἐπέπτατο, on the right a bird of mighty wing, and the host of the Achaians *shouted thereat*, ἐπίλαχον (Il. 13:821-822). Why not ἐπτάτο? Because the flying forth of the eagle was thought of as in response to—based upon—what had gone before. Why not λαχον? Because the shout was called forth by the omen, as if based upon it.

117. Ἐπιδεῖν, to bind upon—not, however, to a fixed object, which would require κατὰ; but, for example, *to bind crests on the helmets*, ἐπὶ τὰ κράνεα λόφους ἐπιδεῖν (Hdt. 1:171).

Προσδεῖν, to bind loosely, leaving distance between the objects connected, as the bait to the fishing-pole by the intervening line; the flail to its staff, by the slack, flexible thong (Hdt.).

118. The priest made his prayer to the king; then all the Achaians *shouted approval*, ἐπενφίμησαν (Il. 1:22)—the preposition points to what it was that called forth the shout—a shout, and at the same time a seconding of the prayer; it knits the phrases, otherwise disjointed, into an organic unity of thought.

119. *To say*, λέγειν; ἐπιλέγειν, to say on the basis

of some fact that invites the saying. Cyrus would send a gift to a friend, instructing the bearer to *say in explanation*, ἐπιλέγειν (Anab. 1:9). Also (Cyri. Instit. 1:3), ἐπιλέγων τὰ ἐκάστω, *saying to each one—ἐπὶ, in explanation.*

120. Socrates says to Glaucon (Mem. 3:6, 5): “You have doubtless *examined*, ἐσκεψαί, the public resources, in order that,” etc. Indeed, said Glaucon, *I have not examined them in that light*, οὐκ ἐπέσκεψαί—ἐπὶ refers to the particular limitation Socrates had set to the examination by the phrase “in order that,” etc.

121. “Ως φάτο· Πάτροκλος δὲ φίλῳ ἐπεπείθεθ  
ἔταιρῳ. *Thus he spoke; and Patroclus obeyed his dear friend's word;* more fully, obeyed his dear friend *in it—in the matter—ἐπὶ* referring to what had been said. New Testament, What man is there of you, whom, if his son ask bread, *will he give him a stone, λίθον ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; will give him, ἐπὶ, for his asking.*

122. Il. 1:569, Zeus uttered his threat, and Hera feared, *bending her heart to his will, ἐπιγνάμψασα φίλον κῆρ.* Compare ἀναγνάμπτειν (Sec. 28).

Anab. 7:4, 9, And Seuthes asked, ήρετο: “would you even be willing to die for this one?” Then, after an answer had been given, we read ἐπίγρετο ὁ Σεύθης, *Seuthes asked thereupon.* This would usually be translated, *Seuthes asked further, as if ἐπὶ here denoted simply the addition of a second question;*

this is not the thought—the thought is that the second question is made on the basis of the answer to the first. 'Επὶ never suggests the addition of things which are co-ordinate—that is the office of πρὸς. It may be excusable to translate ἐπήρετο by *asked further*, but that is not strict; it is a concession for the sake of a smoother phrase.

123. Menelaus in fight with Paris (Il. 3:369), *springing upon* him (ἐπαιξας), caught him by his horse-hair crest, and *turning around* (ἐπιστρέψας), began to drag him in among the well-greaved Achaians. In the first participle ἐπὶ looks to the object of the action (Eng. upon); in the second it means more distantly the same; we translate it *turning round*; literally it means *turning upon*, i. e., turning toward, so as to face those to whom he was about to drag his victim. Farther on in the same story, when the helmet strap had broken and the helmet was free in his hand, Menelaus, ἐπιδινήσας, *swinging it around for a throw*, slung it away among the Achaians. Let us drop the ἐπὶ, and find the simple δινεῖν in another place. Od. 9:384, when Odysseus and his party had to do with the Cyclops Polyphemus, he says (Odys. 9:382): My companions, taking up the burning stake thrust it into his eye, and I, standing above, *turned it about*, ἐδίνεον: here the verb denotes the main action, and is simple. But look forward in the same story (v. 538), when the Cyclops took up a huge stone, *swinging it around*, ἐπιδινήσας; ἐπὶ for the throw.

124. We read in Herodotus that a smith, in digging a well many feet below the ground, *came upon a coffin*,  $\epsilon\pi\acute{e}t\nu\chi\epsilon\; \sigma\omega\hat{\rho}$ . Had he found water, that would have called for the verb  $\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}t\nu\chi\epsilon\nu$ , for elsewhere Herodotus tells us of a physician, who, after trying many medicines on his patient, at last *hit on* the right thing, and effected a cure,  $\kappa\acute{a}t\acute{e}t\nu\chi\epsilon\nu$ . *I came upon by chance*,  $\epsilon\pi\acute{e}t\nu\chi\omega\nu$ ; something *happened to me*,  $\pi\acute{r}\omega\acute{e}t\nu\chi\epsilon\nu$ .

125.  $\Delta\acute{e}i\kappa\nu\acute{n}\omega\nu$ , *to show, point out* an object;  $\epsilon\pi\acute{e}\delta\acute{e}i\kappa\nu\acute{n}\omega\nu$ , *to exhibit*, i. e., having the object already in view, to proceed and point out its qualities—as to explain a machine, an invention. Such a showing is an  $\epsilon\pi\acute{e}\delta\acute{e}i\kappa\nu\acute{s}$ . It shows what there is *in* or belonging to a thing.

126.  $\acute{E}\phi\acute{e}v\omega\nu$ , *to send upon, or against, or on the basis of some fact that justifies the sending.* The simple verb  $i\acute{e}v\omega\nu$  takes two objects—an accusative and a dative. Il. 18:182,  $\tau\acute{i}s\; \gamma\acute{a}\rho\; \sigma\epsilon\; \theta\acute{e}\omega\nu\; \epsilon\mu\acute{o}\iota\; \ddot{\alpha}\gamma\acute{y}\epsilon\lambda\omega\nu\; \dot{\iota}\acute{h}\kappa\epsilon\nu$ , *Who of the gods sent you as messenger to me?* Therefore  $\epsilon\pi\acute{i}\iota$ , compounded with  $i\acute{e}v\omega\nu$ , has something else to do than govern the dative case of a person. Let us see (Il. 24:117),  $\acute{e}\gamma\acute{\omega}\; \Pi\acute{r}\acute{a}m\omega\; \acute{e}\phi\acute{h}\sigma\omega$ , *I will send Iris to Priam*,  $\epsilon\pi\acute{i}\iota$ , *on this matter*—the matter being the condition of the slain Hector's body, and the restoration of it to his friends. The matter to which  $\epsilon\pi\acute{i}\iota$  refers is found in what precedes it; and connects the actor in his precedent state with the action which follows.

Προσιέναι, to allow to come, to admit (Anab. 4: 55), *They did not admit to the fire, ὅν προσιέσαν πρὸς τὸ πῦρ*, those who came late. They came as to a privilege, not to do something, but to receive—hence πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, not ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ. To let or send dogs upon the game, ἐφιέναι, for their instinct determines their action, as gravity determines the motion of a stone; to send one forth to battle, ἀνέναι, for free will acts, and chance has scope, as in the throwing up of a stone.

Cyri. Inst. 1:3, “Having the honor to introduce, προσάγειν, petitioners to the king,” to receive something from the king, not to do anything to him.

Ἐπάγειν, to bring upon, implying force; Vesp. 370, ἐπαγεῖ γνάθον, *lay your jaws to it*, that is, to the food, to crush it. But to bring one jaw to the other in shutting the mouth, προσάγειν, because the action is reciprocal; each jaw as it acts on the other is at the same time acted on by it. Hdt. 2:68, *The crocodile moves the upper jaw to the lower, τὴν ἄνω γνάθον προσάγει τῇ κάτῳ.*

Anab. 3:4, Xenophon *riding up* to Chirisophus, προσελάσας; the two were equals, and met for discussion; but see Sec. 71, where ὑπελάσας suggests subordination.

### 127. Ἐπιτάσσειν, προστάσσειν.

The definitions of these words in the Lexicon seem very near alike—indeed, they are both used to express the idea of *injunction, command*. The proper

discrimination will be best made in the light of the original suggestions of the two prepositions respectively. 'Επὶ presents its object as passive, making no response to the action (See. 45); if the action, therefore, be that of giving a command, ἐπιτάσσειν will imply that the person receiving the command does not pause to consider whether he shall obey or not—he obeys, of course; προστάσσειν, on the contrary, implies that the person receiving the command responds by a free choice whether to obey or disobey. If a command is disobeyed, the word to express the giving of it is naturally προστάσσειν, in order to harmonize by anticipation the word with the completed thought. See this distinction illustrated in Hdt. 1:114, 115, where both compounds are used in describing how the boys played at choosing a king; where in the little mimic kingdom *to give a command* in the faith that it will be readily accepted and obeyed is προστάσσειν; but if one is recusant the command takes towards him a sharper tone—it is ἐπιτάσσειν. See also Xen. Oec. 7:7, When God has enjoined, ἐπέταξεν, the harder, out-door life on men, and has allotted, προσέταξεν, the easier, in-door life to women; as if the former—the hard service—would be avoided, if it might be; while the latter, from its milder conditions, invites and obtains the response of a willing acceptance.

---

## CHAPTER X.

παρά.

128. Παρά, *by, beside*, is used with the Gen., the Dat., or the Acc. With the Genitive, meaning from beside, drawing his sword, *παρὰ μηροῦ*, *from his side*, literally, from beside his thigh; with the Dat., denoting situation beside—they were playing, *παρὰ ρηγμῖνι θαλάσσης*, beside the sea-shore; with the Acc., denoting to the side of; they seated themselves *beside Menelaus*, *παρὰ Μενέλαον*.

129. We shall best grasp the meaning of this preposition if we think of its use in the sphere of living beings, whose natural movement is forward, and who have a right side, and a left. Two persons walking *beside each other* make the situation that invites the use of this preposition; Gorgias 472, C, Let us compare our views *together*, *παρὰ ἀλλήλους*, and see whether. The picture is that of two persons moving forward side by side, to reach, if possible, a common conclusion.

He went, *παρὰ βασιλέα*, *to the king*, so as to be by him, subject to his orders: he came *from the king*, *παρὰ βασιλέως*, bearing his orders, responsible to him; he lives, *παρὰ Σωφρονίσκῳ*, *with Sophronis*. It does not admit the idea of hostility like *ἐπὶ*; nor that of mutual converse between equals, like *πρός*. The parties are unequal, and the object of the preposition is naturally the superior of the two, as it should be,

for it is fitting that the superior should abide in his place, and the inferior should go and come; even Sophroniscus, the householder, has in that fact a mark of superiority over him who transiently is found at his house. The suggestion of superiority does not come from the preposition, but resides in the nature of the things or persons introduced. Sometimes the object of *παρὰ* is the inferior of the two things introduced. Men *compared with other creatures*, *παρὰ ἄλλα ζῶα*, are as gods compared with men. The primitive way of comparing things with each other is by placing them side by side. This mode of comparison is suggested in *Illdt.* 3 : 160. No one surpassed Zopyrus *in the estimation of Darius*, *παρὰ Δαρείῳ κριτῆ*, i. e., standing beside Darius as judge. This does not mean, as the Lexicon implies, that the judge is acting officially; but only as every man is a judge of his fellow man when he forms and holds an opinion about him. This essential relation of the parties or things underlies all the uses; and shows with what modifications the so-called English equivalents must be taken.

130. The word *against*, admitted in the Lexicon as a translation of *παρὰ*, should be strictly guarded; *παρὰ* does not mean *against* in the sense of hostility, but as *aside from* the normal rule of action—the opposite of *κατὰ*: *according to the truce*, *κατὰ τὰς σπόνδας*; *παρὰ τὰς σπόνδας*, *contrary to the truce*, where the actor, forsaking the proper line of conduct, is like a car off the track.

## CHAPTER XI.

## παρὰ IN COMPOSITION.

131. THERE was beside the Euphrates a narrow *passage* (*πάροδος*) between the river and the ditch. This passage Cyrus and his army *passed through*, *παρῆλθε* (Anab. 1 : 7, 16, 17).

Hdt. 8 : 15, The Greeks at Thermopylae *exhorted one another not to let the barbarians pass by them into Greece*, *παρεκαλεύοντο ὅκως μὴ παρίσοντι ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τοὺς βαρβάρους*.

132. Socrates says to his judges (Apol. 1), If, Athenians, you shall hear me, in my defence, using the very same manner of address I have been wont to use with the multitude, I pray you to indulge me, *and let it pass*, *παρίσθαι*. Anab. 5 : 7, 10, *παρίμι*, *I resign*—let the command *go by* me to another. Hdt. 2 : 96, *These rafts are dragged along up the stream by those on shore*, *τὰντα τὰ πλόια ἀνὰ τὸν πόταμον παρέλκεται ἐκ γῆς*—*παρὰ*, along beside the shore.

133. *Σκευή* denotes the equipments needed in carrying on a business, whether in a shop, a kitchen, a ship, or a camp; *σκευάζειν* is to furnish or make such equipment; *κατασκευάζειν* is to furnish what is essential and permanent—to organize completely. An army *κατασκευαστός* is one, all the parts of which are armed, equipped, officered, and trained, ready for service. This forms the *κατασκευή*. But, if an army

is to take the field, more is necessary; stores of provisions, wagons, and beasts of burden, guides, scouts, foragers, etc. These are to go *along*, *παρά*, as the army moves. This all forms the *παρασκευή*; and an army thus furnished is *παρασκευαστός*. The *κατασκευή* is essential to the complete army, ship, house, or shop, and is permanent; the *παρασκευή* is changeable and temporary.

Now, when all the work of the bridges *had been completed*, *κατεσκεύαστο*, the army *equipped for its march*, *παρεσκευασμένος*, set forth. The work on the bridge was for permanent use; the equipment was only for its present march; hence *κατεσκ...* *παρεσκ.*

134. These words lend themselves to moral uses; and there is a beautiful illustration of the distinction noted above in Mem. 1:3. Xenophon tells us that Socrates, when tempted to this vice, and that, was *prepared*, *παρεσκευασμένος*, to resist; the loving disciple then wishes to say more; he groups all the vices together, and says that his master was *κατεσκευασμένος* against them all. The *παρασκευή* had become a *κατασκευή*; the good resolutions which a less stable soul might summon, as to an exigency, to meet each temptation as it came, had become habit and a second nature—so serenely settled that temptations could not impress it; the temporary equipment had become a part of the man himself.

135. Xen. Oeon. 7:7, God has prepared (*παρεσκεύασεν*) the nature of woman for works within

doors; for he has constituted her (*κατεσκεύαστεν*) less able to endure cold and heat. That woman should work within doors is not a necessity, but a convenience; that she is less strong to bear hard labor, and cold, and heat, belongs to her nature, and cannot be changed.

*A wall extends along either bank of the river, παρὰ χεῖλος ἐκάτερον τοῦ ποταμοῦ αἱμαστὴ παρατείνει* (Hdt. 1:180). Here the preposition is repeated. Along near the western shore of this sea the Caucasus runs; *τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐσπέρην φέροντα τῆς θαλάσσης ταύτης ὁ Καύκασος παρατείνει* (Hdt. 1:203). In this example *παρὰ* governs the Acc. *τὰ φέροντα*, denoting the country along which the mountain chain runs.

136. Sometimes the writer omits this object, leaving it to be supplied by the thought. Anab. 1:7, 15, The canal *had been extended* (*παρετέτατο*, stretched along) through the plain for twelve parasangs. Here the preposition is retained, although the writer has no occasion for naming the objects alongside of which, or by which, the canal ran.

137. Mem. 1:17, 1, No wonder that they *misjudged, παραγνῶνται*—judged aside from the truth, like men who lost their way.

138. The verb *αἰνέῖν* means *to praise*; *ἐπαινεῖν*, *to praise for something done*. Now, the same feeling that prompts to the praise of an action after it is done would lead to the encouragement of it while it is doing; *παραινεῖν*, therefore, means *to encourage*, to ap-

prove a proposed course of action (Xen. Anab. 5:7)—*παρὰ* places the one who approves by the side of the actor. Thus the discrimination in the meaning of these two verbs has its root in the prepositions respectively, as designations of space.

---

## CHAPTER XII.

### *ἀπὸ* AND *ἐκ.*

#### 139. *'Απὸ, off from; ἐκ, out from.*

These words alike denote separation; they are therefore followed by one case invariably—the Genitive. Where *ἀπὸ* is used, the things separated are in their nature independent of each other; the contiguity or nearness before the separation is merely temporary, or accidental, and, consequently, the thing separated loses nothing by the separation; it remains whole, and as good as before. *'Απὸ* takes good care that its subjects receive no detriment—they are still kept in mind. The book, the apple, the flower, taken *off from* (*ἀπὸ*) the table, is the same as before; not so with *ἐκ*; water poured from a bowl, *ἐκ φιάλης*, cannot be gathered up; coins dropped from a bowl, *ἀπὸ φιάλης*, may be gathered up again.

140. These examples suggest that the previous connection implied by *ἐκ* is more intimate than that

implied by ἀπὸ—as we might well suppose from the hints of space, since that which is *in* is more intimately connected than that which is merely *near* or *by*. The relation suggested by ἐκ with living things is often dynamic, or vital. To lead *by the hand*, ἐκ χειρός—the guiding power proceeding continually from the hand. II. 16 : 365, As when a cloud comes *from out the sacred air*, ἀιθέρος ἐκ δίνης—it comes into being where nothing was before.

141. My manner of life *from my youth*, ἐκ νεότητος, which from the first, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, know all the Jews (Acts 26 : 4). Why ἐκ in the first phrase, and ἀπὸ in the second? Ἐκ, because Paul's character—which he was now defending—was a continuous growth out of his youth, as a tree from its root; while ἀπὸ serves simply to fix a date—and this is done by the recollection of concurrent outward events.

142. Thuc. 2 : 15, This had been the way of living among the Athenians *from very early times*, ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα ἀρχαίου. The reign of Theseus introduced a great change. *From this ἐξ ἐκείνου*—growing out of this—they have ever since observed a yearly festival in commemoration of their completed union. Note here, as in the case above, the difference in the prepositions; ἀπὸ belongs to the mere skeleton of history—ἐξ makes us feel its pulse.

143. Mem. 2 : 7, 2, We neither obtain anything *out of the earth*, ἐκ τῆς γῆς, for our enemies control that; nor *from our houses*, ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν, for there

is a lack of people to rent them; the earth brings forth of herself, therefore *ἐκ*, the houses do not.<sup>1</sup>

*Leading from the arm, ἐκ τοῦ βραχίονος ἐπέλκουσα*; the connection was not broken.

144. Descent *from* fathers and near progenitors is expressed by *ἐκ*, as if the descendants so near had their life in their progenitors; but if the time be long, the tie grows weaker to the imagination, in tracing it upward, till at last it seems to break, and we find *ἀπό*; as if the far distant descendants had become quite sundered, and no longer were originated in their ancestors; *τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ θεῶν, τοὺς δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν γεγονότες*, some by far descent, *ἀπό*, others immediately from, *ἐξ*.

---

## CHAPTER XIII.

### ἀπό AND ἐκ IN COMPOSITION.

145. TREES fall, and so perish, *ἐκπίπτουσιν*; so kings falling from their power—from all that made

---

<sup>1</sup> In Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, 7th ed., there is a mistake in Art. 'EK, which it may not be improper to note here. Page 428, line 16: "With a part, to mark the point of time, *συνετάττετο ἐκ τῶν ἐπιπροσιόντων*, the army arranged itself *at*, i. e., *from the beginning of* their approach; Xen. An. 1: 8, 14." 'EK does not refer to time, but to the material of which the line was formed. The meaning is, the army formed its line out of those still marching up—i. e., the front halted, the rest, as they marched up, formed in line with them.

them kings; citizens banished, and so losing their rights; but an apple, ripe, and so falling, *ἀποπίπτει*, for its life in the tree is completed—the tree can do no more for it; nature testifies to this in the weakening of the tree's hold on the apple, till gravitation is the stronger, and the apple falls. But if a blossom falls from its stalk and perishes, or if green fruit is shaken off, thus losing the life it was at the time having in the tree, the verb is *ἐκπίπτειν*; the flower thereof *falleth*, *ἐξέπεσε* (Epis. Ja. 1:11).

146. *Αποδιδόναι*, to restore what was unjustly held, to *pay*—the act settles an existing claim, and leaves the parties free; *ἐκδιδόναι*, to give out without a previous consideration, as a housewife might put out cloth from her loom to be dressed; it is still hers, and must be returned. In the following sentence both these compounds occur. Whoever agrees with me will certainly *put out* (*ἐκδώσει*) his colt to be trained—first having come to an agreement how much he will have to pay (*ἀποδοῦναι*) when the work is done (Xen. Eqrest., ch. 2).

147. *To reach*, *ἰκνεῖσθαι*; *ἐξικνεῖσθαι*, to reach immediately, as with the hand, with a pole, a spear, an arrow from a bow; by the power of sight, by the power of thought; also to reach by natural growth, culture, or training. The emphasis throughout is on the origin, as if the force at the start were sufficient to achieve the end without stops for rest or reinforcement. The examples are frequent enough, from

Homer down; but they all lie in the line of thought here drawn. A single one is introduced here; as it bespeaks kindness to animals, is homely, and is against a fashion. Xenophon tells us (De Equest., ch. 5), “The colt’s tail should be let grow, that it may *reach as far as possible*, ὅπως ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξικνούμενος, to brush off what annoys him.” The word also means *to reach with speed*, as in flight, or in a race—the urgency allowing no time for rest, or thought for the places passed by. But on a journey or a march time and distance intervene, measured by the halting-places—the emphasis on the starting-point fades to the imagination; the interest passes over to the end of the action—ἐκ is dropped, and ἀπὸ lends itself to complete the verbal picture. Of this hard-worked verb, ἀφικνεῖσθαι, the student of the *Anabasis* will not fail to find examples more than enough.

Cyri. Inst. 7:1, *I will lead the war song, παιᾶνα ἐξάρξω, and do you follow, ὑμεῖς δε ἐφέπεισθε—ἐπὶ, thereupon; the leading was at the leader’s discretion—under no law but his own mind—therefore ἐξ.*

148. Πειρᾶσθαι, *to try*; ἀποπειρᾶσθαι, *to try with a desire that the person or thing tried may stand the trial—so as to be placed in a class by itself.* Croesus (Hdt. 1:46) *mule trial of the oracles*, ἀπεπειρᾶτο τῶν μαντηῶν, hoping to find one worthy of trust. Xerxes (Hdt. 8:67) asked each one, *trying him* (ἀποπειρώμενος), to find if he was in favor of engaging in a sea fight; he did this hoping that each one would

favor it. Pausanias *made trial of the Greeks*, ἀπειράτω, to see if any would volunteer (Hdt. 9:21). His hope was to find volunteers.

149. 'Εκπειρᾶσθαι, *to tempt*, to try with the desire that the thing or person tried may fail (Hdt. 2:135). *Are you tempting me to speak*; ἐκπειρᾶ λέγειν (Oed. Tyr. 360)—to speak to my own harm—are you trying to push me beyond my self-control. The aim and natural result with ἀποπειρᾶσθαι is to approve what is tried, and place it in a class by itself; the aim and result with ἐκπειρᾶσθαι is to defeat or destroy what is tried. With ἀποπειρᾶσθαι the rule and measure of the trial are prescribed; with ἐκπειρᾶσθαι nothing is settled beforehand; it may continue till every resource that was in the trier has been put forth in the trial. If you are challenged to break a stick, and answer the challenge by trying your strength upon it, the verb is ἐκπειρᾶν; if you try from a bundle of sticks to find those that will bear a cross strain of a certain number of pounds, the verb is ἀποπειρᾶν.

A lawyer, before bringing his case before the court, examines his witnesses, to find what they can say, ἀποπειρᾶται; his opponent, in the cross-examination, tries to break them down, ἐκπειρᾶται.

'Εκτρέπεσθαι, *to turn out*, as one would do to avoid something in his path (Hdt. 1:104), ἀποτρέπεσθαι, to turn aside as one would do to observe something not in his path.

150. Δεικνύειν, *to show, point out*, as one would

show a thing, or point out a person, to another; but if what is pointed out is known to no one else, the verb is naturally *ἐκδ*-; as to show feelings concealed before, to reveal hidden treasures. Oed. Col. 1021, If you have his children here, *show* them to me, *ἐκδ*-.

But if the children were in sight along with others, but not distinguished from the rest, and the command were: *point out his children to me*, the verb would be *ἀποδ*-.

So, if the thing or person pointed out stands apart as something notable, and important, the verb is *ἀποδεικνύναι*. They *show* an ancient temple, *ἀποδεικνύναι* (Il. 1:171). *Pointing out* the sepulchres, *ἀποδεικνύντες*, as proofs of their rights in the land (Thuc. 1:26). This compound also means to appoint, thus setting a man forth to public view under this newly-acquired name.

151. *Θνήσκειν*, to die; *ἀποθνήσκειν*, to die away from one's fellows, and his work; *ἐκθήσκειν*, to expire, to die by breathing out. These characteristics may be found where other prepositions than *ἀπό* or *ἐκ* are used with words expressive of death; but some other point, different from any of these, may be prominent in the speaker's mind, and require to be accented in the language; so we have *καταθνήσκειν*, *ἐπιθνήσκειν*, and others, compounds; in cases where these words are used, the person dying *breathes out his last*; and *is separated from his fellows*; but some other point is emphatic in the thought, and controls the form of the word.

152. 'Αποκτείνειν—of which ἀποθνήσκειν is often used as the passive—may mean the separation of foes, the bereavement of survivors in the loss of friends, or the solution of the conflict between the guilty and the law which condemns them. In the words of Andromache (Il. 6 : 414), “I have no father, no dear mother,” ἦτοι γαρ πατέρ' ἀμὸν ἀπέκτανε δῖος Αχιλλεύς, *for my father the mighty Achilles slew*; the picture is that of her bereavement; but, two lines after, the same external act is mentioned again; but it is not now ἀπέκτανεν, but κατέκτανεν—and with good reason, for the point of view has changed; she is now thinking—not of her bereavement, but of the scene at the moment of the killing. Achilles had conquered her father, and might have spared him, if he would; but, with the choice before him, he relentlessly killed him. No one can read these lines intelligently, and not see that to exchange the prepositions here would spoil the picture.

153. 'Αποτελέιν, ἐκτελέιν.—The noun τέλος means *the perfection, completion* of a thing—the highest permanent result it can attain; the action through which a thing is brought to this perfection is expressed by the verb τελέειν. A man completes his purpose when he carries it out in action—and every purpose thus carried out invites the use of the verb τελέειν; but not till he has completed a work that stands off, aloof from other things, can he apply to him the verb ἀποτελέειν. This word may be applied

to things bad as well as good; to the ruin of a city, or its deliverance, where the end was proposed beforehand; to small acts as well as great, if ending in something that may stand by itself—as the payment of vows, the building of a house, the plowing of a field. Hdt. 5:92, 7, Whatever Cypselus had left incomplete, Periander *completed*, *ἀπετέλεε*. Hdt. 2:65, When they have made vows, they *fulfill them*, *ἀποτελέουσι*.

The distinction of a thing suggested by *ἀπὸ*—as if it were set apart from other things—may spring from its very nature; its greatness may define it, as the building of a city wall, the liberation of a people. The discovery of America is, for the imagination, taken quite out from the series that make up the biography of Columbus, and set by itself, defined by its own greatness—an epoch in the world's history; and we predicate *ἀποτελέν* of the man who achieved it. Kind handling *makes* colts *gentle*, *ἀποτελέν*; puts them in a class (Xen. Equest.). Wise administration *makes* a city *prosperous*, *ἀποτελέν* (Plato).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In Liddell and Scott's Lexicon the phrase *τὴν πόλιν ἀποτελέν* *εὐδαιμονία* is translated “*to make the state quite happy*.” This is mere groping. The preposition *ἀπὸ* here simply recognizes that *happy states* are set off in thought in a class by themselves. A substantive, limited by an adjective, is, to thought, just as valid a designation of class as the substantive alone—only the class is a narrower one. To regard *ἀπὸ* as giving intensive force to *εὐδαιμονία* in this phrase, is to miss a plain and important point, and to confuse the student; it disregards the obvious meaning of the preposition, and attributes to it a meaning not found elsewhere.

154. Now, what is ἐκτελεῖν? It is to achieve a thing out of the spontaneous promptings of the actor's own spirit or life; not by command, nor by promise, or outward obligation. Il. 9:493, The Gods were granting (*ἐξετέλειον*) to me no son, *ἐκ* suggests that their will was sovereign. Od. 3:275, Aegisthus, *seeing that he had accomplished*, ἐκτελέσας, a great deed, that is, his great crime, from his own wicked mind. Why not say ἀποτελέσας? Because the act was in fulfillment of no law, or obligation, or acknowledged end. It had its form and measure solely in the spirit of the doer.

Il. 2:286, The Achaians are not fulfilling, *οὐκ ἐκτελέουσιν*, the promise which they made. The words are a taunt against them for not making good their boastful promise. They were under no obligation, except to themselves, to make it good. Had there been such obligation, their failure would have been expressed by *οὐκ ἀποτελέουσιν*. See Hdt. 2:65, The people of the various cities *pay their vows*, *εὐχὰς ἀποτελέουσιν*. The *vow*, *εὐχὴ*, made a public claim on them, which they could not evade. The fulfillment put their act into a known class of actions; it discharged their obligation, and set them free (*ἀπὸ*) from their bond.

155. In *ἐκφεύγειν*, *ἐκ* emphasizes the initial point; while *ἀπὸ* in *ἀποφεύγειν* points to the end, when the fugitive gets safe away. Anab. 1:49, *ἀποφευγότες*, *having fled for safety*. Hdt. 1:25, Croesus made a

thank-offering for *his recovery from sickness*, ἐκφυγὴν τὴν νοῦσον; ἐκ temporary, of course; there is no ἀποφυγὴ from disease.

The guard has an interest for his prisoner, μὴ ἐκφύγῃ; the prisoner has an interest for himself somewhat wider, ὡς ἀποφύγῃ.

156. To lead *ἱγεῖσθαι*.—We may say of a military company which marches at the head of a procession, *ἱγεῖται*. But the leader may do more than march in front; he may control and direct; may determine whether or not there shall be a procession; or in what direction and how far it shall go. Just so far as he does this his action is expressed by *ἐξηγεῖσθαι*. The leading is arbitrary, it has no law or limit but in the mind of the leader; hence this word is naturally used to express military command (Il. 2:806; Hdt. 1:151). But suppose we change a little the picture of the procession, and say, as if reading from a newspaper report: It was determined to close the celebration by services at the monument, one mile distant; and Company C led the procession. Here the simple verb *ἱγεῖσθαι* will not be used; it would express truth, but not the truth wanted here. A new feature has been added to the picture, and this demands recognition. Nor will *ἐξηγεῖσθαι* answer our turn; it expresses too much, and at the same time not enough. It would imply that Company C controlled the movement, which it never would do in such a case; and, further, it does not recognize the fact that

the movement has a limit and measure quite independent of the actor—namely, the monument. To recognize this objective point, the preposition ἀπὸ is needed, and the word is ἀφηγεῖσθαι.

157. These words also mean *to narrate, set forth*. Hdt. 2 : 115, Alexander *gave a true account of his voyage*, τὸ πλόον ἀπηγήσατο; but when he was asked about Helen he was confused, and did not speak the truth; whereupon those who had sailed with him confuted his statements, *telling out the whole story*, ἐξηγεύμενοι πάντα λόγον—ἐξ refers to the concealment—what was hidden becomes revealed. Note the same discrimination in these two compounds in Hdt. 2 : 121, 1, in the story of the cunningly-built treasure-house. The dying father calling up his two sons *set forth to them*, τούτοισι ἀπηγήσατο, how he had always taken good care that they should live in plenty, then *revealing to them*, τούτοισι ἐξηγησάμενοι, all about the movable stone in the wall; his good care of them all men knew—therefore ἀφηγ-; the contrivance of a movable stone was a secret known to him alone—therefore ἐξηγ-. See also Mem. 4 : 7, 6, Anaxagoras took pride in the thought that he could *explain*, ἐξηγεῖσθαι, the mechanism of the heavens—as things known to himself alone.

158. Ἀποφαίνειν, *to show, declare* something that already exists, as one's settled *opinion*, γνώμην (Hdt. 1 : 40), one's *property*, οὐσίαν; ἐκφαίνειν, *to reveal* what was hidden, as truth concealed before (Hdt. 1 :

117); also *γνώμην*, if it means a hidden purpose (Hdt. 5:36).

The judge *declares the law* to the jury, *ἀποφαίνει τὸν νόμον*; the jury *make known* their verdict, *ἐκφαίνει*—kept secret till by the order of the court they reveal it. The judge is responsible to a higher court, the jury are responsible only to their own sense of right. See Cyri. Inst. 1:2, *οἱ δὲ γεράτεροι ἀκόνσαντες ἐκκρίνονται*; and the elders, *having heard the case, give their decision*; the elders formed the highest court—there was no review, nor appeal.

159. *'Eπὶ, on*, and *ἀπὸ, off*, seem far enough apart when used alone; but in composition the compound words are drawn together sometimes so near as to invite comparison. *'Αποδιδόναι, ἐπιδιδόναι*; *ἀποτελεῖν, ἐπιτέλεῖν*, and others. *'Αποδιδόναι, to pay*, it discharges an indebtedness, and leaves the parties *free, ἀπὸ, of each other*.

160. On *ἐπιδιδόναι* the Lex. says: “To give besides.” This is wrong; it is aside from the natural suggestion of the preposition, and demonstrably wrong judged by the examples referred to. Il. 23:559, *ἐι με κελεύεις ὄικοθεν ἄλλο Εὔμῆλῳ ἐπιδοῦναι . . . τελέσσω*. *If thou requirest me to give to Eumelus some other thing out of my house, that will I do.* Here, from the story, there is no place for the idea of *besides*; besides what? Not the mare, for that was reserved to be quarreled over afterward by Antilochus and Menelaus. It was a case of compromise.

He was to give to Eumelus not something *besides* the mare, but instead of the mare. He did give something else; Eumelus accepted the substitute, and was satisfied. The mare was left, without a word more said, to be disposed of between Antilochus and Menelaus. The admirable translation by Lang, Leaf, and Myers, has followed the Lexicon, and therein missed a point. What then does ἐπιδοῦναι mean, if ἐπὶ does not suggest the idea *besides*, in addition to? It means *to give for your satisfaction, on the basis of your claims*. Eumelus had claims. This is not said in the text, but it is in every reader's mind; ἐπὶ refers to those claims, and thus keeps the pulse of thought alive.

161. The same force of ἐπὶ is again seen in ἐπαιτήσεις, v. 593, same book; if for your claims you should demand, εἰ ἐπαιτήσεις. . . . This word, and its mistranslation in the Lexicon, has already been remarked upon in a note in Sec. 96. It is respectfully submitted that ἐπὶ never means strictly *besides, in addition to*; that to translate it so is always a concession to English phraseology (see Sec. 91).

162. Ἀποτελεῖν, to complete a thing, so that it is thought of by itself (see Sec. 136); thus, in the matter of a religious vow, one indispensable step is to make the vow; at this stage it is incomplete—it hangs on him who made it. When the man fulfills his vow, so that he is free from it (*ἀπὸ*), his act is expressed by ἀποτελεῖν. Ἐπιτελεῖν, to fulfill an order or com-

mand; to complete not a whole thing, but a command from a superior. The result is not a completed thing, but the satisfaction of the person commanding.

Hdt. 1:115, All the other boys *did according to my orders*, τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα ἐπετέλεον. Thuc. 1:70, The Athenians are quick *to put in execution*, ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργω, whatever they purpose.

163. Ἀπαιτεῖν, to demand back what has been taken from one, to demand pay (Anab. 1:2, 11). The soldiers *demanded their pay*, ἀπήτουν τὸν μισθόν. The answer to this demand is expressed by ἀποδιδόναι. Ἐπαιτεῖν (Lex.), “to ask besides”—wrong, as we have seen. It means *to ask on* (ἐπὶ) the ground or basis of something that justifies the asking; also (Lex. again), “to beg as a mendicant” (Soph. O. C. 1364). Here the ingenuous student, meditating on this word of three syllables, may be tempted to ask: Where does the “mendicant” come in; and what does ἐπὶ honestly mean? Ἐπὶ refers to something not spoken, but sure to be in the hearer’s mind, if he is awake, and thus keeps the thought alive. In the line from Soph. ἐπὶ means (to thought) *on the basis of his rags*. To make us think of the asker’s beggarly guise is the exact office of ἐπὶ here, and the whole of it. It is just because the speaker had that beggar’s guise in his imagination that he put in ἐπὶ—hoping that with that help we should get it into our imaginations.

164. It may be asked: Is it quite necessary to dwell so long and minutely on small words? Per-

haps we might reply: It is not quite necessary to study Greek at all, but if we do study it, it is but fair that we take pains and patience enough to understand it. If we cannot translate well into English all that the Greek contains, let us admire what we cannot imitate; and rejoice that we have in our hands a recorded language in many respects so superior to our own; in many respects, not at all superior.<sup>1</sup>

165. Mem. 2:1, If you wish to be beloved *by friends*, ὑπὸ φίλων; if you wish to be honored *by any city*, ὑπό τινος πόλεως; and if you aim to get rich *from flocks*, ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων. That *under* which any thing is acts on that thing by gravitation; friends, in loving, act as naturally as stones fall; so a city, in bestowing honor; but flocks, in making their owner rich, do not act—he is made rich from them (ἀπὸ), not by them (ὑπό).

---

<sup>1</sup> As a single instance, the discriminations marked by *shall* and *will*, with their tenses, have disciplined and served the thought of English-speaking people, in regions where the Greek mind never entered.

---

## CHAPTER XIV.

*ἐις AND ἐν.*166. *'Eis, ἐς, into, ἐν, in.*

These two prepositions (originally one—*ἐν*) carry to a wide extent the same suggestion as *in* in the Latin, in its two meanings of motion *into*, and position *in*. *'Eis* always governs the Accusative, *ἐν* always the Dative. The opposite notion is expressed by *ἐκ*. These contrasted notions—*in* and *out*, *into* and *out of*—are linked together, each to its opposite, by a necessity of our thought. We may as well try to think of North without a South, of action without reaction, as try to think one of these notions without the other. Each is significant only in the light of the other; each is valid to thought because the other is there ready to verify it if need be. In these dynamics contrast is not less fruitful of suggestion than analogy, and is nearer at hand. One thought is ever busy along the line that divides two border lands; and written language is the note-book of the survey. Every line we draw that includes something, does at the same exclude everything else. Every assertion made, in thought or words, is a denial of its opposite.

167. The Preposition *ἐις, into*, may be used before the names of all things that are bounded in space. It suggests the crossing of this boundary from without, carrying, by necessity, the idea of motion before

the crossing, and, generally, of room for motion after crossing. The boundary may not be actual, but at the moment it must be real in our thought. *We look into space*; space has no boundaries; but we think a boundary, and so justify ourselves in using the phrase.

All things have their boundaries; time is bounded, life is bounded—so are our powers, and opportunities, our hopes and fears; everything, in short, may be thought of under this limitation; and, wherever this is done, the name of the thing, with *eis* before it, forms a rational phrase in the language—and the student will usually have the satisfaction of seeing it.

168. But let us not go too far. Let us not make our analysis and deduction our taskmasters rather than our helpers; and, when we cannot see our way, let us accept the limitation of our ability, and make the toil of memory supply the lack of insight. An old coin, worn smooth by ages of use, may be made, by heating, to give back its original figures, invisible when it is cold. But we cannot always restore an old Greek phrase, and make it give back its exact impress when it was first struck in the mind's mint.

We know, indeed, or may know, if we will think, why *καθ' ἐν* means *one* by *one*; and that *ἀνὰ*, with *ἐν* standing after it, means nothing at all. They are not in the dictionary because they serve no possible human thought. In trying to think it, we find that the end is provided for, and declared at the start—which

shows that *ἀνὰ* is impertinent and out of place. But through what different lines of thought the military phrases *ἐἰς τέσσαρας*, and *ἐπὶ τέσσαρας*, come to mean the same thing, *four deep*, is not so clear; and the result will not perhaps reward the labor of inquiring.

169. The notion most naturally accompanying that of *ἐἰς* (into), is that of room to move in after the entrance is made (this is not declared, nor is it always true, but the thought is natural, partly as a continuance of the motion of entrance); but with *ἐν*, on the contrary, there is no suggestion of motion, and the naturally accompanying notion is that of confinement and fixedness. These accompanying notions will have their part to play in helping to the meanings of the word. *'Ἐπὶ τινὶ ἔιναι*, and *ἐν τινὶ ἔιναι*, each denotes dependence; but the latter a dependence more entire and absolute—as the connection in space denoted by *ἐν* is closer and more fixed than that suggested by *ἐπὶ*. Cyrus the younger *was dependent on his elder brother*, *ἥντι τῷ ἀδελφῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ*; this was a human relation, temporal and external; but for what is more intimate, the divine with the human (see New Testament, John 17:23), *I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one*, *ἐγὼ ἐν ἀντοῖς, καὶ σὺ ἐν ἐμοὶ, ἵνα ὁσι τετελεσμένοι ἐἰς ἐν*.

170. The inroad into a country by an army is expressed by the noun *ἐισβολή*; *ἐν* with the same verbal root gives the noun *ἐμβολεύς*, *a plug or stopper*. These examples show with what tenacity the primary

suggestion of the prepositions in space clings to the compounds and their derivatives—the first of the above examples suggesting room for motion after entering. The second denotes a position fixed and immovable.

With this discrimination in mind, we find a reason for differences in the Greek which we cannot well express in an English translation. We find, in describing an army arrayed for battle, *ἐν τῷ εὐωνύμῳ*, *on the left*, and *ἐπὶ τὸν εὐωνύμον*, *on the left*; and perhaps we cannot improve the translation. We must not on that account suppose the two forms are interchangeable. Let us take a narrative where both phrases occur (Anab. 1 : 8), *ἐν δὲ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ Αἰραιός τε καὶ τὸ ἄλλο βαρβαρικόν*, *and on the left were Ariaeus and the other barbarian forces*. Again, *and there were horsemen on the left of the enemy*, *καὶ ἥσταν ἵππεῖς ἐπὶ τὸν εὐωνύμον τῶν πολεμίων*. Observe, these horsemen on the extreme left were a movable body—they might be sent here or there as the turns of the battle should require; but Ariaeus and his barbarian force were an integral part of the line of battle—fixed there, for his removal would have changed the whole plan of the battle. On *ἐπὶ* see 55, on *ἐν* see 169.

171. We have seen, in comparing *ἐις* and *ἐν*, that *ἐις*, suggestive directly of motion, is suggestive, secondarily of room, of freedom to move without restraint or obstacle; *ἐν*, on the contrary, denoting position

merely, makes us think of something as confined, held fast—possibly in contact or in conflict with that which confines it.

172. In studying the following compounds of *ēis* and *ēv*, we shall find distinctions of meaning which they owe to these primary suggestions.

*'Εμβάλλειν, εἰσβάλλειν.*—Hdt. 1:17, *He sent in an invading army, ἐσέβαλε στρατιήν.* After entering they had room to march round and ravage—which they did.

The other Greeks *began to back water, ἀνεκρούοντο* (note in passing the force of *ἀνά*); but an Athenian captain starting forth *attacked a ship, νηὶ ἐμβάλλει* (Hdt. 8:84). Here was impact, arrest of motion, conflict.

173. The object of *εἰσβάλλειν* is something that can act after it is in, and *ēis* helps fit the word to the situation. To throw poison *into the wells, ἐς τὰ φρέατα*, is *εἰσβάλλειν*, for the poison diffuses itself and acts after it is in (Thuc. 2:48); but to throw grain *into the manger, εἰς τὴν φάτνην*, is *ἐμβάλλειν*—the grain does not act after it is in. The objects of *ἐμβάλλειν* are lifeless things, or creatures in a passive relation; *ἐμβάλλειν τινὰ πόντῳ*, to throw one *into the sea*, to perish. *'Εμβολή*, as a nautical term, is the driving the beak of a ship against the side of the enemy's ship, where she can make no resistance; but an attack, prow to prow, is *προσβολή*, for the ship attacked can respond to the attack.

174. 'Εμβιβάζειν, εἰσβιβάζειν, to put on board; but ἐμβ-, where the object of the verb is inert, or passive—placed on board simply to be carried; εἰσβ-, where the object of the verb is sent on board to act—as seamen, to man the ship; soldiers, to fight; officers, to command those on board; ἐν suggesting confinement, and εἰς a sphere for action. Anab. 5:3, 1, *They put on board, ἐνεβίβασαν, the sick, and those over forty years of age, and children and women, and the baggage; and sending on board, εἰσβιβάσαντες, Philesius and Sophænetus directed them to take charge of these, τούτων ἐκέλευνον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.*

175. Some compounds with ἐν and ἐκ are apparently so nearly alike in meaning—while yet they are distinctly different—that a comparison of them is called for at this place. Ἔνδηλος and ἐκδηλος. The latter, ἐκδηλος, means *clearly perceived*, but not known by name—distinct in form, color, or action, from what is around it; ἔνδηλος means *clearly known through perception*; it is more than clearly perceived, it is known by name. A dark speck is clearly seen in the sky; it is not known at once what it is; it is ἐκδηλος. After a little study the observer becomes sure what it is, and can give it a name; then it is ἔνδηλος. It has, to the observer's mind, found its home *in* a class, ἐν, and has taken its name; before this it was only something coming *out of*, ἐκ, the blank air to sight, without a name.

176. Il. 5:2, To Diomedes Athene gave might

and courage, that he might be *conspicuous*, ἔκδηλος, among all the Argives. It was designed that he should draw all eyes from others to himself, by his manifest superiority to them in action. This is a situation that calls for ἔνδηλος. Now, what situation would call for ἔνδηλος? Diomedes himself may serve our turn, with a little preparation; let him come forth on the plain amid the other Argives, and the Trojans far off see him coming; he draws all eyes to himself, such might and courage does he show—they do not know who he is—he is ἔκδηλος; but after a little, from his horses, his armor, or something seen more clearly as he comes near, they see who he is—then he is ἔνδηλος.

I look out of my window and see a poppy so brilliant and so peculiar that it draws my eye away from every other poppy; it is ἔκδηλος, and to me it is only that, for I do not know its specific name; when I shall learn its name through its specific marks, it will be ἔνδηλος.

Soph. Antis. 405, ἀρ' ἔνδηλα καὶ σαφῆ λέγω; *Do I speak it clear and plain;* ἔνδηλα, so that you not only hear my voice distinct among other sounds—which would be ἔκδηλα—but you know what I mean.

177. Thuc. 4:132, *To give some clear token of steadfastness on the Athenian side,* ἔνδηλόν τι ποιέιν τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις βεβαιότητος πέρι. Observe, the first word makes a call at the start for something definite in the conclusion; the last words answer this call;

ἐκδηλος would scatter the thought, and leave the last words without any business in the phrase.

178. A light appears in the evening in the eastern horizon ; it may be a rising star, it may be an artificial light ; it is ἐκφανής, and no more, as long as that doubt remains. After a little, something which the observer sees makes it certain which of the two possible things it is ; then it becomes ἐμφανής, for it has a name. 'Ev and ἐκ serve our thought just as clearly here as they serve our senses when, on seeing something shining in a colorless heap, we take it *out* of the heap, and finding it to be a jewel, put it *in* a box.

179. Τὰ ἐκφανῆ, figures in *alto-rilievo* (Plato Conviv.), that is, figures clearly seen because standing *out*, ἐκ, from the surface of the stone. Could the word ἐμφανῆ be used on these figures ? Very properly, as soon as they are interpreted—not before ; the ἐν looking forward to the meaning ; ἐκ looking back to the plane surface *out from* which the figures sprung.

180. Let the stone bearing these figures have been found among ruins, and so corroded by time and chance that it cannot be told at once what the figures mean, or what creatures they represent. They are still ἐκφανῆ, as on the day they were cut—ἐκφανῆ and no more. Now, let some gifted genius discover what the figures are, and what the whole means, and they are ἐμφανῆ.

Il. 4 : 468, “Where his side was uncovered of his buckler as he bowed him down”; *uncovered*, ἐξέφανθη.

181. Plat. Theact. 206, d., ‘Ο λόγος τὴν διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖ διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ρημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, *discourse makes plain our thought by means of vocal sounds with words and phrases.* Sounds of an unknown language can be no more than ἐκφανεῖς to him who hears.

For a comparison of ἐκδεικνύναι with ἀποδ (see Sec. 150).

182. *Ἐκδεικνύναι*, *to show to the senses*, so that the object is perceived that was not perceived before; the act communicates no knowledge, it only serves the senses. *Show* his children to me, ἐκδ- (Oed. Col. 1021). The sole object of the showing is that the speaker may *see* them; *ἐνδεικνύναι*, to show to the mind something more than is seen, as the name, character, or action. Il. 19 : 83, Πηλεΐδῃ ἐγὼν ἐνδειξομαι; *I will show myself to Pelides*; will show my better mind, that he may know me, hitherto he has misunderstood me. “Do you see the man whom I *point out*?” I see him. “*I will show* you his name and title.” The first verb is ἐκδ-, the second is ἐνδ-; *ἐν* puts the object in a category to the person addressed, in which it was not before. Cyri. Inst. 1 : 6, You will be able to use more persuasive words in just the degree that you can *show* yourself, *ἐνδείκνυσθαι*, able to do them good, or do them harm; the preposition

*ēv* places the object in the class of able ones—able to do good or to do harm.

183. The meanings of these two compounds seem nearly the same—to *undertake, take in hand*; but there is a difference not to be overlooked. This difference is suggested by the prepositions. *To take a thing in hand, ēγχειρεῖν*, implies that the thing so taken can be grasped and handled—is under control.<sup>1</sup> The hand is the *superior*, the thing the *inferior*, that may be moved by it, and may be held in its grasp. With *ēπιχειρεῖν* the picture is different; here it is the hand that is pictured as movable, and the thing on which it is put is thought of as stationary; whether it is really movable or not is just the question to be determined in the act expressed by *ēπιχειρεῖν*. It is for just this kind of human experience, where living force comes against obstacles whose power of resistance, or character in other respects, is not yet determined, that calls for such a verb as *ēπιχειρεῖν* to come in and play its part.

184. We will now examine some examples, and see if they confirm the deductions from the original meanings of the prepositions.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Lexicon strangely says *ēγχειρεῖν, to put one's hand in a thing.* This mistakes the figure. The thing is taken *in hand*—*into the hand*—in order to manage and control it, and not the hand put into the thing. This last, whether it be fire, or earth, or water, or a trap, into which one puts his hand, is not the way to affect the thing, but to affect the hand itself.

Xen. Ages. 1:1, It is not easy to make a worthy record of his praise, but yet *it must be undertaken*,  $\epsilon\gamma\chi\epsilon\iota\tau\eta\tau\epsilon\omega$ . The proposed work was in the writer's line—no one was more competent, therefore he could do it—the work was *in his hand*. Plato Apol. Soc., *I must attempt*, Athenians, in the little time I have, to remove the bad opinion you have had of me so long; *must endeavor*,  $\epsilon\pi\iota\chi\epsilon\iota\tau\eta\tau\epsilon\omega$ ; his hand was upon something that it might be beyond his strength to remove. Mem. 2:3, To win over my friend to care for my affairs when I should be away from home, I would endeavor to take an interest in his affairs when he should be absent; *would endeavor to take an interest*,  $\epsilon\gamma\chi\epsilon\iota\tau\omega\eta\eta\epsilon\pi\mu\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\omega$ ; this he could certainly do, hence  $\epsilon\nu$  is the right preposition—it makes the word suit the fact. Thuc. 2:3, They resolved that *the attempt should be made*,  $\epsilon\pi\iota\chi\epsilon\iota\tau\eta\tau\epsilon\alpha$ ; it might not succeed, therefore  $\epsilon\pi\iota$ . In general we may say  $\epsilon\gamma\chi\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\omega$   $\epsilon\nu$  is concerned in individual matters;  $\epsilon\pi\iota\chi\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\omega$  with wider and more important interests. This is in conformity with the primary suggestions of  $\epsilon\nu$  and  $\epsilon\pi\iota$  respectively; and the instances found in reading confirm the distinction. Plat. Prol. 310, C., *'E\nu\chi\epsilon\iota\tau\eta\sigma\alpha \pi\nu\pi\alpha\sigma\epsilon \iota\epsilon\nu\omega\iota*, *I tried to come to thee*—a thing naturally within the actor's power; any defeat or hindrance would come not from the nature of the case, but from some accidental cause; hence  $\epsilon\gamma\chi$ .

Hdt. 2:158, Necos was the first who tried,  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\tau\eta\sigma\epsilon$ , for a canal leading into the Red sea; which

Darius the Persian afterwards dug through, *διώρυξεν*. This was a large undertaking, carrying in its nature the possibility of failure; hence *ἐπιχ-*.

185. *Tυγχάνειν*, *to hit*, but as hitting is in a degree a matter of chance, the words come to mean *to happen* as by chance; *ἐπιτυγχάνειν*, *to fall upon*, *meet with*—the relation suggested by *ἐπὶ* is transient, not necessarily making a change in either of the things brought together; with *ἐντυγχάνειν* the relation is closer; to strike into a thing is more than to strike upon it. The crocodile *coming upon*, *ἐντυχών*, the bated hook swallows it down. Hdt. 2:70. Cyrus used often to send to his friends half emptied jars of wine, when he had some of the best, saying that had not now for a long time come across, *ἐπιτύχοι*, sweeter wine than this. Anab. 1:9, 25, The crocodile must needs swallow the bated hook; with Cyrus drinking up the wine, or even taking possession of it, was a matter for his discretion; therefore *ἐντυγχάνειν*—*ἐπιτυγχάνειν*.

When digging *I came upon*, *ἐπέτυχον*, a coffin seven cubits long (Hdt. 1:68). The act led to no change in the coffin or the finder. The chariots had scythes underneath, pointing toward the ground, so as to cut in two *whatever they might come across*, *ὅτῳ* *ἐντυγχάνοιεν*.

## CHAPTER XV.

*περὶ* AND *ὑπὲρ*.

186. *Περὶ*, *around*, *about*, *concerning*; *ὑπὲρ*, *over*, *above*, *for*, *in behalf of*.

These prepositions alike express some form of superiority—the first in overcoming distance, the second in overcoming gravitation.

They alike take after them an object in the Genitive, suggestive usually of a causal relation in the object of the preposition; as *ἐπειγόμενοι περὶ νίκης*, *pressing on for victory* (Il. 23:437); the desire for victory called forth the effort; *ἐκκυβιστᾶν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξιφῶν*, *to leap over the swords*—the danger of the feat stimulated to the endeavor (Xen. Conviv. 2:11).

187. These two prepositions alike take an object in the Accusative; Achilles pursued him *around the city*, *περὶ ἄστυ* (Il. 22:173). To go round the city was not the pursuer's aim. Il. 5:16, The spear-point passed *over the shoulder*, *ὑπὲρ ὥμον*; it was not the aim to have the spear pass over the shoulder. We may say then, that to go around a lake *to survey it*, would require that the object of *περὶ* be in the Genitive; to go around it as the necessary way of getting forward in one's journey would put the object in the Accusative; to throw a stone *over a tree* by successful effort would put the object of *ὑπὲρ* in the Genitive;

a bird flying *over a tree* would put the object in the Accusative.

188. We here come to a distinction ; *περὶ* may take an object in the Dative case, *ὑπέρ* never ; and this difference arises from the original difference in these prepositions as designations of space. The thing which is *around* another may be so attached to it as to have a fixed position, and this invites the use of the Dative ; as a ring *around the finger*, *περὶ δακτύλῳ*, a bracelet *around the wrist*, *περὶ χειρὶ*, the coat of mail *about the body*, *περὶ στιθεσσιν*. In these cases the whole of the thing surrounded furnishes a surface of attachment.

189. With *ὑπέρ*, however, the case is different. The situation *over*, *above*, presents to the imagination no point of attachment ; it is thought of as the momentary result of passing from one side to the other ; there is no halting, therefore no fixedness, therefore no opportunity for the Dative. If that which is *over* is thought of as resting on, and so as fixed, *ὑπέρ* is discharged, yielding its place to *ἐπί*. The reason, therefore, that *ὑπέρ* is not followed by the Dative case is that ordinary human experience does not present the situation that calls for that collocation.

190. The study of examples containing these prepositions reveals also another distinction, traceable to the original meanings of these prepositions as designations of space. To be *around* a thing is a situation which many may hold at the same time, as soldiers

drawn up *around a city*; to deliberate *about public affairs*; such expressions invite the use of  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ ; but to fight for one's hearth and home, as if one were standing *over* them to defend them, invites the use of  $\dot{\nu}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho$ ; so too, when one acts in behalf of another, making that other's ease his own. Demos. adv. Phil. 1, The war was begun *with the purpose to chastise Philip*,  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\acute{o}\nu\tau\acute{i}m\omega\rho\acute{i}\sigma\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\Phi\acute{l}i\pi\pi\acute{o}\nu$ ; the end of it is an endeavor *to save ourselves from his hands*,  $\dot{\nu}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\tau\acute{o}\nu\mu\acute{\eta}\pi\alpha\theta\acute{e}\nu\acute{a}\nu\tau\acute{o}\acute{\nu}\kappa\acute{a}\kappa\acute{\omega}\acute{s}$ . The first was a work in which any who pleased might engage; the last was fitting for the Athenians alone—hence  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ ,  $\dot{\nu}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho$ . To speak *about our affairs*,  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\acute{o}\nu\pi\acute{r}\alpha\gamma\mu\acute{a}\tau\acute{o}\nu$ ; a thing which any citizen might do, each one bringing his contribution to the discussion.

To offer sacrifice *for the city*, ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως (Mem. 2:2, 13), an act in behalf of others, restricted to those who were first approved as worthy to perform it.

This is the truth concerning the affair,  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\tau\omega\pi\alpha\tau\sigma$  (Hdt. 1:117), this is the one thing that is true of the many that may be said.

191. They are not making war for glory,  $\pi\epsilon\rho\delta\delta\acute{\epsilon}\eta\varsigma$ , nor *for a part of their own territory*,  $\dot{\nu}\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\acute{e}r\acute{p}ous\chi\acute{w}\rho\acute{p}as$  (Demos. Olyn. 1); fighting for glory was an open question; fighting in defense of their own land was not; it was standing over their own hearth; no discussion here could be in place. Cyri. Instit. 3:3, They will not cease *talking about us*,

διαλεγόμενοι περὶ ἡμῶν. Since you are silent I will speak *for you and for ourselves*, ὑπὲρ σῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν; in behalf of, as standing *over* to protect or defend.

Anab. 7:4, 10, Would you even be willing to die *for this one*, ὑπὲρ τούτου. You must *fight with me for him*, περὶ τὸνδέ μοι διαμάχεσθαι, for I will not give him up. In the first phrase the actor is of necessity one; in the second, it is necessarily more than one—the object of the preposition is not thought as belonging to either of the actors; therefore ὑπὲρ could not be used.

192. *How is it that I hear this of thee?* τί τὸντο ἀκούω περὶ σῶν (Luke 16:2). The accusations were brought to the master respecting his steward; but (Il. 6:524) that *on your account I hear shameful reproaches from the Trojans*, ὅθ' ὑπὲρ σέθεν ἀισχέ ἀκούω πρὸς Τρώων. Hector was the head of the house; therefore the shameful things, *ἀισχεῖα*, were uttered against Hector himself for not controlling his cowardly younger brother. It is an appeal not to Paris's bravery and patriotism, but to his family pride, and regard to his brother; *πρὸς Τρώων*, not by hearsay from the Trojans, but face to face, as they stood before him, and uttered their reproaches.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The translation by Lang, Leaf, and Myers, is as follows: "That I hear shameful words concerning thee in the Trojans' mouths, who for thy sake endure much toil." The one offered above is quite different in the picture it presents, and seems commended by several con-

## CHAPTER XVI.

*περὶ AND ὑπὲρ IN COMPOSITION.*

193. In some compounds with *περὶ*, and in many with *ὑπὲρ*, the preposition simply intensifies the meaning of the simple word; *καλός*, *beautiful*; *περικαλλής*, *very beautiful*; *μέγας*, *great*; *ὑπέρμεγας*, *immensely great*. These are called Adverbial uses; because the noun—object of the prepositions—is not named. It may however be restored; *περικαλλής*, *beautiful beyond (περὶ) others*; *ὑπέρμεγας*, *great above (ὑπὲρ) others*.

In most compounds of *περὶ* and *ὑπὲρ*, the meaning is too plain to invite or justify the citation of examples.

194. An apparent contradiction is found in the meanings of *περιορᾶν* and *περίοιδα*—words usually

---

siderations; it preserves the natural and strict use of *ὑπὲρ*, while “concerning thee” is the translation of *περὶ*, not of *ὑπὲρ*; it is in consonance with the kindly temper of Hector toward his younger brother; it harmonizes with the patriarchal feeling, making Hector—the head of the family—responsible for all its members; it spares the self-love of Paris, since it does not present Hector as telling him the bad things the Trojans were saying about him (Hector takes all this upon himself); it is more winning, making the appeal not to Paris’s love of country, but to his love of family; it presents a picture all pulsating with life—the chieftain weighted with public cares, yet warm in his family affections, and mediating between his family and his people. For the meaning of *πρᾶς* with the Gen., see Sec. 84.

classed together as having the same signification. The word is sometimes used with the meaning to look around and not see—to disregard, take no note of—as if the sight went round the object so as to avoid it; in other cases the preposition is used intensively, as if the seer saw more than another would see in a like case. Hdt. 1:89, If, therefore, thou shalt permit, *περιῆδης*, this plundering. Il. 10:247, Since he *excels* in taking note, *ἐπεὶ περίοιδε νοῆσαι*. Od. 17:317, *For on the track he was keen beyond others, ἵχνεστι γὰρ περιήδη*. Hdt. 3:65, I charge you *not to permit*, *μὴ περιῆδεν*, the sovereignty to come round again to the Medes. Od. 3:244, Since *he is knowing beyond others*, *περλοιδε ἄλλων*.

195. Our English words *look* and *see* with the preposition *over* play the same double game with us. We should think certainly, from Etymology, that the business of an overseer was to make oversight—the very things he ought not to do. So, too, a man, in looking over an account ought not to overlook a single item in it.

In either language such verbal contradictions may remind us how meager the resources of language are compared with the ever-varying shapes and turns of thought which it has to serve.

196. Περιμένειν (Hdt. 7:58), They had been ordered to *wait for* his coming, *περιμένειν*; the time of his coming was uncertain, and what they were to do afterward was uncertain; compare *ἀναμένειν* and *κατα-*

μένειν. Hdt. 4:89, *περιμένειν*, to wait for something uncertain, as to the time of the arrival, or the result of it; not as stated in the Lexicon, like simple μένω.

197. It may be well to bring *περιμένειν* and *ἀναμένειν* into a stricter comparison by examining a passage in which they both occur (Anab. 5:1, 4 and 5).

The Greeks, having made their way through the mountains to Trapezus, and rested there, are deliberating how to complete their return home. They wish to go by sea, if possible. Chirisophus speaks: “Anaxibius is a friend of mine, and is now admiral. If you will send me, I think I shall obtain ships and transports sufficient to carry you home. Now do you, if you wish to return by sea, *remain here* (*περιμένετε*) till I shall return, and that will not be long.” Hearing this the soldiers rejoiced, and voted that he sail as quick as possible. After so much had been settled Xenophon addresses them: “Chirisophus is sent to obtain ships, and we *are going to wait* for his return (*ἀναμενοῦμεν*). I will now tell you what I think we ought to be doing while we wait.” Observe, the situation is changed when Xenophon speaks. They have resolved to go by sea, and instructed Chirisophus to make all haste. In every mind the thought is that their course home is settled, and that they shall soon be on their way. The situation calls for *ἀναμένειν*, just as *περιμένειν* was fitted for the waiting when everything was in doubt.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## ARE PREPOSITIONS INTERCHANGEABLE?

198. CAN prepositions be interchanged without a change of meaning? A respectable author<sup>1</sup> answers this question in the affirmative. Let us examine the examples adduced in proof. The prepositions given as interchangeable are *ἀνά*, *ἐν*, *περὶ*, also *ἐπὶ* and *ἐις*. Hdt. 6:86, 'Ανὰ πάσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐν δὲ καὶ περὶ Ἰωνίην τῆς σῆς δικαιοσύνης ἦν λόγος πολλός. *Through all the rest of Greece, and particularly in and about Ionia, there was much talk of thy honesty.* Observe, the speaker was an Ionian; he was therefore well acquainted with matters *in and about* that small country; but when he speaks of *all the rest of Greece*, he of course means as far as he knew—either by travel or through the reports of others. This mental qualification lies in the nature of the case. He could not know all the rest of Greece as he knew his own little country Ionia. We have just the situation that invites the use of *ἀνά*. The picture is complete; the other prepositions—*ἐν*, *περὶ*—trip like nimble servitors each to his place. Nothing can be interchanged, or even changed.

199. Again, from Demos.: Τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ὁδὸν καὶ τῆς εἰς Πελοπόννησον κύριος γέγονεν, *He has*

<sup>1</sup> Jelf., vol. ii, p. 317, Oxf.

become master of the road to Attica, and of that into Peloponnesus. We might, indeed, say: *eis τὴν Ἀττικὴν*, for the country had boundaries, and space within those boundaries; but this was not the picture in the speaker's mind. It was a little tract, with one great prize to invite the aggressor, and Philip was its implacable foe. Now, what preposition is called for, when the speaker would say that Philip is master of the road to Attica? Demosthenes was not such a lazy public functionary as to shape his phrase with the preposition *eis*. His mind kindled with the picture of Philip's hostility to Athens, and so he employs *ἐπὶ*. Peloponnesus, on the other hand, had a territory more than ten times as large as Attica, contained seven states, of diverse policies and aims, and was entered by a long, narrow isthmus—a kind of neck to a capacious bottle. Here everything invites the use of *eis*; as for *ἐπὶ* there was no combination among the seven states forming such a political unit as would admit its use.

200. It may seem that in the English phrase to fall *on* the knees, which is sometimes expressed in Greek by *ἐπὶ* and sometimes by *eis*, these prepositions are interchangeable. But this is not quite clear. When one falls *on* his knees in submission or supplication, the preposition is *ἐπὶ*; when he stumbles and falls *on* his knees, it is *eis*. This last situation calls for instant action for relief, or recovery; and we have seen that *eis* suits this situation, and *ἐπὶ* does

not, for the stumbler does not fall on his knees to do something there; his instant call is to get out of the position. The petitioner is on his knees to do something while remaining there—a situation that calls for ἐπί.

201. To say that Prepositions cannot ever be interchanged would be a very rash statement; but before adducing examples in proof of a possible interchange the critic should see well that he understands the Greek, not through an English translation of it, but by imagining the situation that called for the expression, and in that way feels its force. There is no other path; every sentence has a breathing life of its own; and not until one feels its pulse can he criticise it.

---

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### ἀμφί, ON BOTH SIDES OF, AROUND, ABOUT.

202. THIS preposition has a claim to stand beside *περί*, both for its general resemblance, and for its specific difference. Originally it means *on both sides of*; and is called for in speech about living creatures, which have right and left sides, right and left feet, eyes, and so forth. This original meaning is so near to *περί* that in many cases it seems to stand for it; *οἱ περὶ τὸν Πελσανδρὸν* (Thuc. 8:65); *οἱ ἀμφὶ Ξέρξεα*

(Hdt. 8:25); of numbers, *οἱ ἀμφὶ τὰς δώδεκα μυριάδας* (Cyri. Inst. 1:2, 15); *περὶ ἐβδομήκοντα* (Thuc. 1:54). In other instances the distinction between *ἀμφὶ* and *περὶ* is plain; *οἶκος ἀμφίθυρος*, a house with a door on both sides, that is, in front and rear (Soph. Ph. 159); such a word as *περίθυρος* has no use, and therefore no place in the language; *ἀμφίθαλής*, of children, happy in having *both* parents alive (Il. 22:496). It is plain that, if a definite number is thought of as a point reached by counting, a number somewhere near that, more or less, would invite the use of *ἀμφὶ*, and not *περὶ*, to express it, for the act of counting is naturally thought of as proceeding in a line, as when one counts balls on a rod, or beads on a string. Any variation from a number so thought of must be either less or more along that line. This is the picture presented in *οἱ ἀμφὶ τὰς δώδεκα μυριάδας*, quoted above. But *περὶ* is also used in expressions of number, as with *ἐβδομήκοντα*, just above; and possibly *περὶ* is preferred to *ἀμφὶ* here as suiting better the picture in the writer's imagination; for Thucydides was thinking of the seventy ships, more or less, sunken in the sea-fight; the wide waste of water, and the scattered and sinking ships presented a picture where *περὶ* was not out of place, as it would be in thinking of number in a line, or on a string. However this may be, *ἀμφὶ* suits the mental picture, as *περὶ* would not, in noting the time (*ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν*) when the messenger arrived at full speed to announce the approach of the

enemy. Time is thought of as a line. So, too, ἀμφὶ strictly suits the mental picture in Il. 3 : 70, Set ye me and Menelaus to fight *for Helen*, ἀμφὶ Ἐλένῃ. There were but two claimants, and one way or the opposite, as if along the same line, the prize must go.

In many cases our search does not disclose a distinction in use between ἀμφὶ and περὶ. But the original designations in space are not the less distinct; περὶ is the servitor of the dimensions, length, and breadth, ἀμφὶ of only one, the line.

---

## CHAPTER XIX.

### πρό, BEFORE, IN FRONT OF.

203. Πρό, *before*, as walls, forts, and defenders are *before* the city; to go forth, πρό, is to go as champion, or defender; the point of view is the place from which he goes; and the relation is, usually, that of acting in behalf of another, taking his part, meeting danger for him. Il. 10 : 286, ὅτε πρό Ἀχαιῶν ἄγγελος ἦει, *when he went as messenger in behalf of the Achaeans.*

Of Hector we read (Il. 24 : 215), He stood *forth* *before* (πρό) the Trojan men and fair women, nor thought of fear nor flight; πρό, forth as champion.

204. Il. 17 : 665, Then from Patroclus went Menelaus, sore loth, for he exceedingly feared lest the

Achaeans in *disheartening fear*, ἀργαλέου πρὸ φόβοιο, should leave him a prey to his foes; *πρό*, as if driven forth by fear.<sup>1</sup>

205. The prepositions *πρὸ* and *ὑπὲρ* have one broad mark in common. They are alike witnesses in speech to the fact that man has in him the power rationally and freely to deny himself for his fellow-man; can toil for him to his own loss, can suffer, endure, and die for him. Cyri. Inst. 8 : 8, 4, διακινδυνεύειν πρὸ βασιλέως, to incur danger in behalf of the king. Hdt. 7 : 134, Would any one be willing to die for Sparta, πρὸ τῆς Σπάρτης ἀποθνήσκειν; also 7 : 172, to perish for your defense, πρὸ ὑμῶν ἀπολέσθαι. Soph. O. T. 10, to speak in behalf of these, πρὸ τῶνδε φωνεῖν.

---

## CHAPTER XX.

### *σὺν* AND *μετά*.

206. *Σὺν*, with, along with; *μετά*, among, in common with.

These two prepositions, when considered together,

<sup>1</sup> The Lexicon seems to accept as authority the Scholiast, who says "flight, Lat. *fuga*, the only sense of *φόβος* in Homer"; but Il. 9 : 2 disproves this dictum; *φύξα φόβου κρυδεντος ἔταρη*, headlong rout, companion of chilling fear; in this passage *fear*, *φόβος*, is the expression for the inward feeling; of this feeling *flight*, *φύξα*, its outward sign, is the attendant, going with it, as the effect goes with its cause.

throw light on each other, both from their likeness and their difference. Od. 9:286, *I with these*,  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\nu$   $\tau\bar{o}\iota\sigma\delta\epsilon$ , escaped destruction. The association here is transient and purely incidental to the act of making their escape. Od. 10:320, Now go to the sty, lie there *with the rest of thy company*,  $\mu\bar{e}\tau'$   $\ddot{\alpha}\bar{\lambda}\lambda\omega\nu$   $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\acute{a}\iota\bar{p}\omega\nu$ . Here the association is the emphatic thing. Anab. 1:9, 2, For first when yet a boy, and receiving his training *with his brother and with the other boys*,  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\nu$   $\tau\bar{\omega}$   $\alpha\bar{d}\bar{e}\bar{l}\bar{\phi}\bar{\omega}$   $\kappa\bar{a}\bar{l}$   $\sigma\bar{\nu}\nu$   $\tau\bar{o}\iota\bar{s}$   $\ddot{\alpha}\bar{\lambda}\lambda\bar{o}\iota\bar{s}$   $\pi\bar{a}\iota\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}$ , he was reckoned far superior to them all. Here the association expressed by  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\nu$  is incidental, subservient to the comparison, which is the main point.

Od. 16:140, He used to eat and drink *with servants*, *μετὰ δμώων*, in the house. Here the association is not incidental; it is the essential point.

207. In every case, indeed, where there is association, there must be participation in something; those who sit together at table must participate in the common fare; those who travel together must participate in the hardships of the way. The use of *μετὰ* or of *σὺν* usually determines whether this participation is the leading idea conveyed.

208. Men not only act *with*,  $\sigma\acute{u}n$ , their fellows, but with their own endowments and qualities (Od. 24:193); a wife *with great virtue*,  $\sigma\acute{u}n\mu\epsilon\gamma\acute{a}l\eta\acute{u}\acute{u}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\acute{u}$ ; with their equipment,  $\sigma\acute{u}n\eta\acute{u}\theta\acute{o}\eta\acute{u}$  (Il. 1:389); with the instrument,  $\sigma\acute{u}n\sigma\acute{k}\eta\pi\tau\varphi\acute{u}$  (Il. 2:42); with their commission that empowers them to act, and with the

results of their action, good or bad. There is nothing necessarily co-ordinate or like, as in the things brought together by *μετά*. Here there may be the widest disparity; men may act *σὺν τῷ θεῷ*, *with God*, under his guidance, with his help. With *μετὰ*, however, the things or persons brought together are so far of a sort that they are capable of participation in something. We have instanced sleep, food, and drink. Il. 24:400, *With the others I cast lots*, *τῶν μέτα παλλόμενος*, that is, participating in the chances and danger, glory of the service (Soph. Phil.), when Achilles was, *μετὰ ζώντων*, *with living men*—shared their lot (Il. 13:700), *μετὰ Βοιωτῶν ἐμάχοντο*, *they were fighting with the Boeotians*—among them, on their side, sharing their chances of the battle. Finally we read in Plat. Phaed. of the soul of the good man purified from passions so as forever after truly *to live with God*, *μετὰ θεῶν διάγονσα*, in the language of the New Testament, to become partaker of the divine nature. We see how widely this differs from the idea expressed by *σὺν τοῖς θεοῖς*, and by what steps we have come to the discrimination.

209. After verbs of motion *μετὰ* means *to go among*, *to go for*, or *after*, so as to secure one's presence; finally, to go after without any added implication. Il. 3:370, "Ελκε μετ' Ἀχαλούς, *he was dragging him in among the Achaeans*. Anab. 1:1, Κῦρον μεταπέμπεται, *he sends for Cyrus*.

210. In composition *μετὰ* often denotes change;

as *μεταβάλλειν*, to throw into a different state, *μετανοεῖν*, to change one's mind. This is not unnatural. With the idea *among* in the mind, action suggests relative change as its necessary condition. The men on a chess-board travel much; but, as it is all among themselves, it is brought about only by a change of relative position.

The compounds with *σὺν* do not invite special consideration.

---

## CHAPTER XXI.

*διὰ, THROUGH, ACROSS.*

211. THE object of this preposition is thought of as an obstacle, to be crossed, passed through, or surmounted, as a gate-way, a river, a forest, a mountain chain, or even a level plain, for distance is of itself an obstacle. *Διὰ* means primarily *through* from side to side, not "from one end to the other," as stated in the Lexicon. The most interesting thing in crossing this obstructive space is the getting through it, and beyond it. The spear inflicted a wound *διὰ θώρακος*, *through the breast-plate*, *διὰ κυνέης*, *through the helmet*; it did not begin to fulfill the warrior's aim till it had past clean through. The passing quite through was a prerequisite, or previous condition for doing its

proper work. Here opens a wide field for the Genitive case.

212. Cyri. Inst. 1:4, The others all had Cyrus *on their tongues*,  $\delta\grave{\iota}\alpha\sigma\tau\omega\mu\alpha\tau\omega\sigma$ . The Greek is more picturesque than this English ; a name does not amount to much till it is spoken—it must come out *through* ( $\delta\grave{\iota}\alpha$ ) the door of the lips. This last phrase of Old English fully equals the Greek, which literally means *through and out of*, the Genitive denoting the point of departure—the point *from which*. Again, when they see each other,  $\delta\grave{\iota}\alpha\chi\rho\omega\nu\omega$ , *after a time*, that is, after a temporary separation, the time of the separation being passed through ; I will come *after a time*,  $\delta\grave{\iota}\alpha\chi\rho\omega\nu$ —the time being passed through. Anab. 1:8, 16, He heard a noise passing *through the ranks*,  $\delta\grave{\iota}\alpha\tau\omega\nu\tau\alpha\xi\epsilon\omega\nu$ . It passed quite through the ranks, otherwise he would not have heard it. The Gen. with  $\delta\grave{\iota}\alpha$  denotes the agent. Hdt. 1:69, Croesus announced this *through messengers*,  $\delta\grave{\iota}'\alpha\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega\nu$ . By analogy with the above, it denotes *means*, definite measure, singly or in succession, of space, number, quantity, all flowing by analogy from the primary meaning of  $\delta\grave{\iota}\alpha$ , *through* ; as  $\text{o}\bar{\nu}\delta\grave{\iota}\alpha\mu\alpha\kappa\rho\omega\nu$ , *in no long time*,  $\delta\grave{\iota}'\delta\acute{\lambda}\iota\gamma\omega\nu$ , *after a short time* ;  $\delta\grave{\iota}'\acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\alpha\omega\tau\omega\nu$ , *after a year*, yearly ; to do an act  $\delta\grave{\iota}'\grave{\alpha}\rho\gamma\eta\omega$ , *through anger*, anger the inciting cause preceding the act ; if it be objected that the anger was not all passed when the external act took place, it can be said in reply, that enough had passed to lead to the outward act, and

that is all that concerns the speaker, or the hearer; hoping that Sicily would be conquered, *δι' αὐτοῦ, through him* as the instrument, or agent (Thuc. 6:15).

Aes. Pro. 281, *ώς μάθητε διὰ τέλους τὸ πᾶν, that you may learn the whole to the very end;* the Greek is picturesque beyond the power of the English; *διὰ τέλους, through the end, to the end and beyond.*

213. Hdt. 9:13, Mardonius refrained from ravaging Attica, *ἐλπίζων διὰ παντὸς τὸν χρόνον ὁμολογήσειν σφέας, hoping all the while that the Athenians would come to an agreement;* the phrase *διὰ παντός, etc., means through all the time,* that is, through all the periods successively of this time of doubt about the Athenians, and the endeavor to win and hold them to the Persian side. Mardonius did not begin to plunder and destroy till all that time was expired. The first act of destroying was after the last moment of waiting and expectation; hence the Genitive case is a necessity, it gives a true copy of what is in the mind.

214. Of the two limits of the thing crossed, the hither and the farther limit, we have treated the farther one as the more emphatic; because the experience at that point is the more important experience. Any one may enter a forest wishing to go through it—may begin to cross a mountain—may go so far, at least, in crossing a river as to get into it. But things that require no effort to do, and which amount to nothing when done, do not furnish much

material for speech. Without dwelling, then, on the nearer limit, it remains to consider the space intervening between the two limits of the thing crossed or passed over. And, first, we observe that this intervening space offers to the imagination no fixed point or place of rest. Therefore, as the Dative is the proper case to mark fixed position in space, there seems to be no chance for the Dative case to come in and play its part after the preposition  $\delta\iota\alpha$ ; and so, in fact, we never find it; the fact agrees with our anticipations, and both conform to the nature of the case. Grammarians did not decide this question, but nature and spontaneous thought settled it before grammarians were born.

215. The single point left, then, for consideration, is *the passage through the intervening space*; what characterized that passage, in itself considered; what happened in and along that passage that appeals to the imagination, and so is worthy of mention? If there was anything of this sort in the speaker's mind, he would show that fact by putting the object of  $\delta\iota\alpha$  in the Accusative case; for that is the case naturally expressive of *distance passed over*. This brings us to  $\delta\iota\alpha$  with the Accusative.

216. In examining  $\delta\iota\alpha$  with the Accusative, we are met at the outset with the statement in the Lex. : “ $\Delta\iota\alpha$  of Place, only in Poets, the same sense as  $\delta\iota\alpha$  w. Gen.” Before accepting so discouraging a statement, let us examine the passages adduced in proof. II.

7:247, ἐξ δὲ διὰ πτύχας ἥλθε δαΐζων χαλκὸς ἀτειρής. *And through six folds went cleaving its way the unyielding spear.* What did it do then? It stopped; but in the seventh fold of hide it stuck, ἐν τῇ δὲ ἐβδομάτῃ ρυνῷ σχέτο; it did not get clean through at all—of course it did not accomplish anything after getting through, which it must have done in order to justify the use of the genitive (see the foregoing examples.) But, though the spear did not go through, it did a great work—it drove its way through the bronze plate, and through six folds of hide. The mighty force of the throw was expended in the space between the front and the back of the shield; and the poet suits the word to the fact by putting the object of διὰ in the Accusative case.

217. Second example (Il. 11:112-119), describing the hind fleeing before the lion who has devoured her fawns, she speeds away in terror, διὰ δρυμὰ πυκνὰ καὶ ὄλην, *through the thick coppice and woods.* The picture shows us what took place within the limits of the forest, not of an escape through and beyond it, for there was no escape. The accusative fits the word to the thought; the genitive would have destroyed the picture. So in Il. 23:122, in felling the trees for Patroclus's funeral pyre, and dragging them, διὰ ρωπίᾳ πυκνὰ, *through the thick underwood;* the interest of the action centers on what is going on within the woods. Od. 9:400, The Cyclops dwelt about him in the caves, δι' ἄκριας ἡνεμοέσσας, *along*

*the windy heights.* The genitive here would give us no picture.

218. Cyri. Inst. 1:6, *By reason of those pious observances of yours, διὰ γέ ἐκείνας τὰς ἐπιμελείας,* you will approach the gods more hopefully when you are going to pray; that is, the consciousness of his pious conduct is like an atmosphere of hope about him as he goes to offer his prayers. Od. 8:520, He conquered *by grace of Athene the great-hearted, διὰ μεγάθυμον Ἀθήνην.* The goddess is thought of as a surrounding, or accompanying presence, “covering his head in the day of battle.” Cyri. Inst. 1:5, Those fond of praise are won by commendation, and *for this reason, διὰ τοῦτο,* they readily undergo all toil and all danger. Their fondness of praise is a permanent quality, or atmosphere, if you please, in which they always move, whereas *διὰ τόντου* would mean *by means of this*—giving the picture of something transient, as means to an end.

219. The idea of two suggested by *διὰ* is not always the *hither* and *farther* side of a thing struck through or pierced, as when a spear pierces through a breast-plate; it may be the right and left portions of something struck through with a cleaving blow—as when one with an axe cuts in two, *διακόπτει*, the bar of a door, or gate (Anab. 7:1, 17). One or the other of these forms of thought may be looked for in words compounded with *διὰ*; *διαγγέλλειν, to announce,* as from man to man; distinguished from *ἀπαγγέλλειν,*

which announces something of known and felt importance; from *παραγγέλλειν*, to announce by authority, while *ἐξαγγέλλειν* is to announce a secret; *προσαγγέλλειν*, to announce in expectation of a response. Lucian Di. De. 9:

POSEIDON. Could I have a short interview with Zeus, Hermes?

HERMES. Quite impossible!

POSEIDON. *But at least announce me to him, ὅμως προσάγγειλον αὐτῷ*; in modern phrase, take up my name, or card, to him. This act of announcement looks for a response, and *πρὸς* attaches itself to the verb to mark that fact.

220. *Αἴρειν*, to take, seize, gain for one's self; *διαιρέιν*, to strike assunder, to separate into two parts. *Κελεύειν*, to urge, incite, command; *διακελεύεσθαι*, to encourage each other, to incite, man by man. *Δέχεσθαι*, to receive, take, accept; *διαδέχεσθαι*, to receive and pass on to another, as men standing in a line may receive and pass along buckets of water to extinguish a fire; as hunters with fresh horses keep up the pursuit of an animal; *ἀναδέχεσθαι*, *καταδέχεσθαι* (see Sec. 30).

221. *Διακρίνειν*, to discriminate between two. Luc. Di. De. 26, *ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀν διακρίναιμι αὐτοὺς*, *I could not discriminate between them*; i. e., between Castor and Pollux. *Διαγινώσκειν*, to tell one from the other; same Dial., *Πῶς διαγινώσκεις, how do you know them apart?* *Διαφεύγειν*, to escape by fleeing through

dangers; the thought often is of a succession of dangers on the right and left, through which the fugitive makes his escape.

222. *Διαχειρεῖν*, to do, or take in hand, one's part where two are acting, as to take an oar to match one who rows on the other side of the boat. Cyrus, Inst. 1, when a boy, would *try to do a man's work*, *διαχειροίη τὰ ἀνδρός*, i. e., on seeing what a man did, he would be emulous to match him, and do the same.

'*Ἐπιχειρεῖν* means something like this, but the difference is clear. *To try* to walk fifty miles in a day—an attempt in which one may fail—is *ἐπιχειρεῖν*; *to try* to keep up with another, walking by his side, is *διαχειρεῖν*.


---

#### NOTE, SEC. 103.

A collection of individual things may be formed by bringing them *beside* each other horizontally—a relation in space suggested by *to*, *near to*, *beside*; Gr. *πρὸς*, Lat. *ad*, in its primary suggestion of horizontal motion. If, however, the collection is thought of as if made by heaping the things *on* each other, the preposition in Gr. would be *ἐπὶ*—each thing resting *on* what was there before as its basis. If now we translate this spatial relation into English by any of the terms *to*, *near to*, *beside*, *in addition to*, the words do not conform strictly to the mental picture; we use a locution drawn from a different form of thought. It may be the most convenient, and the best we can find, but it is not exact. With *πρὸς* each particular of the collection is merely brought into nearness to others; the particulars come into no new relation but this, in the process; and they lose nothing of their

severalty by it. With ἐπὶ the case is different. The particulars of the accumulated mass lose, to the imagination, something of their severalty by the fact that they are made contributary to the formation of a new whole. They are also in a new relation, for each particular of the pile is now either a supporter of others, or is supported by them. Hence the statement that ἐπὶ does not properly carry the meaning *besides, in addition to.*

THE END.



*D. APPLETON & CO.'S  
EDUCATIONAL WORKS.*

---

**GREEK.**

**Hadley's Greek Grammar.** Revised and in part rewritten, by Professor FREDERIC D. ALLEN, *Harvard College.* 12mo. 423 pages.

**Hadley's Greek Grammar.** 12mo. 366 pages.

This *Grammar* not only presents the latest and best results of Greek studies, but also treats the language in the light received from comparative philology. The work is clear in its language, accurate in its definitions, judicious in its arrangement, and sufficiently comprehensive for all purposes, while it is free from cumbrous details. It is simple enough for the beginner and comprehensive enough for the most advanced students.

**Hadley's Elements of Greek.** 12mo. 246 pages.

**Harkness's First Greek Book.** Comprising an Outline of the Forms and Inflections of the Language, a complete Analytical Syntax, and an Introductory Greek Reader. With Notes and Vocabularies. 12mo. 276 pages.

As an introductory book in Greek, one fitted to lead the learner from the alphabet up to a fair knowledge of Attic narrative Greek, the American teacher can find no text-book superior to this. It is grammar, composition, and reading-book, all in one; and, if it be carefully mastered, the student may pass with perfect ease to the "Anabasis" of Xenophon. The book is complete in itself; but, for the convenience of such as prefer to use it in connection with some standard grammar, references are made in the syntactical parts to the *Grammars* of Hadley, Crosby, and Sophocles.

**Arnold's First Greek Book.** On the Plan of the First Latin Book. 12mo. 297 pages.

**Arnold's Introduction to Greek Prose Composition.** 12mo. 237 pages.

**SECOND PART TO THE ABOVE.** 12mo. 248 pages.

**Arnold's Greek Reading-Book.** Containing the Substance of the Practical Introduction to Greek Construing, and a Treatise on the Greek Particles; also, Copious Selections from Greek Authors, with Critical and Explanatory English Notes and a Lexicon. 12mo. 618 pages.

**The First Three Books of Anabasis:** with Explanatory Notes and References to Hadley and Kühner's Greek Grammars, and to Goodwin's Greek Moods and Tenses. A Copious Greek-English Vocabulary, and Kiepert's Map of the Route of the Ten Thousand. By JAMES R. BOISE. 12mo. 268 pages.

**Five Books of Xenophon's Anabasis** : with Notes, Grammatical References, Lexicon, and other Aids to the Learner. By JAMES R. BOISE. 12mo. 430 pages.

**Xenophon's Anabasis** : with Explanatory Notes for the Use of Schools and Colleges in the United States. By JAMES R. BOISE, Ph. D. (Tübingen), LL. D., Professor of Greek in the University of Michigan. 12mo. 393 pages.

The demand for a convenient edition of this great classic, really adapted to the wants of schools, has been met by Professor Boise in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired. Decidedly the best German editions, whether text or commentary be considered, have appeared within the last few years; and of these Mr. Boise has made free use; while, at the same time, he has not lost sight of the fact that the classical schools of this country are behind those of Germany, and that simpler and more elementary explanations are therefore often necessary in a work prepared for American schools. Nothing has been put in the notes for the sake of a mere display of learning, and nothing has been introduced by way of comment except what can be turned to practical use by the reader.

**Greek for Beginners.** By the Rev. JOSEPH B. MAYOR, M. A., Professor of Classical Literature, King's College, London; formerly Head Master of Kensington School. Revised, and edited as a Companion-Book to Hadley's Greek Grammar, by Edward G. COY, M. A., Instructor in Phillips Academy. 12mo. 176 pages.

Mayor's book enjoys a large popularity in England, and has been recently edited and adapted to American use by Mr. Coy, the able instructor of Greek in Phillips Academy, Andover. It is edited to make it a convenient companion to the "Greek Grammar" of Hadley. It has examples for translation both ways, with copious references to Hadley, notes, and two vocabularies. This book, like Harkness's, limits itself to the Attic dialect; and the general scope of the two books is the same.

**Exercises in Greek Composition.** Adapted to the First Book of Xenophon's Anabasis. By JAMES R. BOISE, Professor of Greek in the University of Michigan. 12mo. 185 pages.

These Exercises consist of easy sentences, similar to those in the Anabasis, having the same words and constructions, and are designed by frequent repetition to make the learner familiar with the language of Xenophon. Accordingly, the chapters and sections in both are made to correspond.

**The First Three Books of Homer's Iliad**, according to the Text of Dindorf; with Notes, Critical and Explanatory, and References to Hadley's, Crosby's, and Goodwin's Greek Grammars. By HENRY CLARK JOHNSON, A. M., LL. B. 12mo. 180 pages.

"In preparing this edition, it has been my aim to render the Notes sufficiently elementary to enable the beginner in the Epic Dialect to study with pleasure and profit; and, with this end in view, I have endeavored to point out and explain difficulties arising from the dialect, the meter, and the syntax, and to call attention to the exact shades of meaning denoted by the various words employed by the poet."—*From Preface.*

*EDUCATIONAL WORKS.—(Continued.)*

**Selections from Herodotus**: comprising mainly such Portions as give a Connected History of the East, to the Fall of Babylon and the Death of Cyrus the Great. By HERMAN M. JOHNSON, D. D., Professor of Philosophy and English Literature in Dickinson College. 12mo. 185 pages.

The present selection embraces such parts of Herodotus as give a connected history of Asiatic nations. In preparing his notes, the editor has borne in mind that they are intended for learners in the earlier part of their classical course; he has, therefore, made the explanations in the former part of the work quite full, with frequent references to such grammars as are in the hands of most students.

**The Ionic Dialect of Herodotus.** By HERMAN M. JOHNSON, D. D. 12mo. Paper. 15 pages.

**Sophocles's Oedipus Tyrannus.** With English Notes for the Use of Students in Schools and Colleges. By HOWARD CROSBY, A. M., Professor of the Greek Language and Literature in the New York University. 12mo. 188 pages.

The object had in view in this publication is to furnish to college students the masterpiece of the greatest of Greek tragic poets in a convenient form. No learned criticism on the text was needed or has been attempted. The Tauchnitz edition has been chiefly followed, and such aid is rendered, in the way of notes, as may assist, not render needless, the efforts of the student. Too much help begets indolence; too little, despair; the author has striven to present the happy mean.

The inviting appearance of the text and the merit of the commentary have made this volume a favorite wherever it has been used.

**Silber's Progressive Lessons in Greek**, together with Notes and Frequent References to the Grammars of Sophocles, Hadley, and Crosby; also, a Vocabulary and Epitome of Greek Grammar for the Use of Beginners. 12mo. 79 pages.

**Whiton's First Lessons in Greek**; or, the Beginner's Companion-Book to Hadley's Grammar. 12mo. 120 pages.

**Champlin's Greek Grammar.** 12mo. 208 pages.

**Kühner's Greek Grammar.** Large 12mo. 620 pages.

**Greek Ollendorff.** Being a Progressive Exhibition of the Principles of the Greek Grammar. By ASAHEL C. KENDRICK, Professor of the Greek Language and Literature in the University of Rochester. 12mo. 371 pages.

**Hahn's Greek Testament.** Arranged by JOHN AUGUSTUS TITTMANN, according to the best authorized Version. Completely revised, corrected, and annotated. American edition. Edited by Edward Robinson, S. T. D. 1 vol., 12mo.

*EDUCATIONAL WORKS.—(Continued.)*

---

**Owen's Xenophon's Anabasis.** Revised edition. With a beautiful Map. 12mo. 440 pages.

**Owen's Homer's Iliad.** 12mo. 759 pages.

**Owen's Greek Reader.** Containing Selections from Various Authors. Adapted to Sophocles's, Kühner's, and Crosby's Grammars; with Notes, and a Lexicon. 12mo. 338 pages.

**Owen's Acts of the Apostles.** 12mo. 276 pages.

**Owen's Homer's Odyssey.** 12mo. 516 pages.

**Owen's Thucydides.** 12mo. 683 pages.

**Owen's Xenophon's Cyropædia.** 12mo. 573 pages.

**Robbins's Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates.** 12mo. 421 pages.

**Smead's Antigone of Sophocles.** 12mo. 242 pages.

**Smead's Philippics of Demosthenes.** With Historical Introductions, and Critical and Explanatory Notes. 12mo.

**Tyler's Plato's Apology and Crito.** 12mo. 180 pages.

**Hackett and Tyler's Plutarch on the Delay of the Deity in punishing the Wicked.** 12mo. 171 pages.

---

## HEBREW.

**Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar.** Seventeenth edition. With Corrections and Additions by Dr. E. RÖDIGER. Translated by T. J. Conant, Professor of Hebrew in Rochester Theological Seminary, New York. 8vo. 361 pages.

---

## SYRIAC.

**Uhlemann's Syriac Grammar.** Translated from the German by ENOCH HUTCHINSON. With a Course of Exercises in Syriac Grammar, and a Chrestomathy and Brief Lexicon prepared by the Translator. 8vo. 307 pages.

*D. APPLETON & CO., Publishers,*

NEW YORK, BOSTON, CHICAGO, SAN FRANCISCO.

D. APPLETON & CO.'S  
EDUCATIONAL WORKS.

---

LATIN.

Professor Harkness's Series of Latin Text-Books.

---

**A** **Introductory Latin Book.** Intended as an Elementary Drill Book on the Inflections and Principles of the Language. 12mo 162 pages.

This work gives a distinct outline of the whole grammar, with exercises in translation from each language into the other, suggestions to the learner, notes, and vocabularies, and prepares the way to both the reading and the writing of easy classic Latin.

**A Latin Grammar.** For Schools and Colleges. Edition of 1874. 12mo. 357 pages.

**A Latin Grammar.** For Schools and Colleges. Standard edition of 1881. 12mo. 430 pages.

This is a complete, philosophical, and attractive work. It presents a systematic arrangement of the great facts and laws of the language, exhibiting not only the grammatical forms and constructions, but also those vital principles which underlie, control, and explain them.

The present edition is the result of a thorough and complete revision of that of 1874. To a large extent it is a new and independent work; yet the paradigms, rules of construction, and in general all parts intended for recitation, have been only slightly changed. The aim of the work in its present form is threefold: 1. To be a clear, simple, and convenient Elementary Latin Grammar, giving the essentials for that use in distinctive type and in the form best adapted to the end. 2. To be an adequate and trustworthy Grammar for the advanced student—a complete Grammar of the Latin language, for the use of critical students of every grade of scholarship. 3. To be a practical introduction to the broader fields of philology and modern linguistic research, with references to the latest and best authorities upon the numerous questions which arise in such study.

**The Elements of Latin Grammar.** For Schools. 12mo. 156 pages.

**A New Latin Reader.** With Exercises in Latin Composition, intended as a Companion to the Author's Latin Grammar. With References, Suggestions, Notes, and Vocabularies. 12mo. 227 pages.

The "New Reader" differs from the "Reader" in two respects. The first parts of the two books are wholly different. The new has in this part alternating exercises in translation both ways from one language into the other, with numbered references to the "Grammar" at every step. The second part is substantially the same in both books, except that nine of the Latin sections in the Old are removed, and their places in the New filled with English to be translated into Latin.

[SEE NEXT PAGE.]

**Preparatory Course of Latin Prose Authors.** Large 12mo.  
689 pages.

This work presents, in a single volume, a course of reading in the prose authors sufficiently extended to meet the requirements for admission to any American college. It contains four books of Cæsar's "Commentaries," the "Catilene" of Sallust, and eight of Cicero's orations—the four "In Catilinam," the "Pro Archia Poëta," "De Imperio Pompei," "Pro Marcello," and "Pro Ligario." The editorial aids consist of notes, illustrations, special dictionary, analyses, and a map of Gaul. It is especially convenient as part of the shorter course marked out above, inasmuch as it, the "Grammar," and the "New Reader," only three books, provide all that is required in the course.

**A Complete Latin Course for the First Year,** comprising an Outline of Latin Grammar and Progressive Exercises in Reading and Writing Latin, with Frequent Practice in Reading at Sight. 12mo.  
350 pages. 1883.

This volume contains a series of simple exercises progressively arranged, and designed to lead the way directly to connected discourse, together with numerous exercises and passages intended for practice in *sight-reading* and *composition exercise*, accompanied by frequent suggestions to the learner; also a Grammatical Outline, with paradigms of declension and conjugation, and all needed rules of syntax and statements of grammatical principles, *given in the exact form and language in which they occur in "Harkness's Standard Latin Grammar."* It is designed to serve as a complete introductory book in Latin, no other grammar being required.

It is a thoroughly practical book, and brings out, more clearly than any other introductory Latin book now published, the latest and most approved theories and methods of Latin instruction. It will stand pre-eminent in the peculiarly practical nature of the drill which it will afford upon etymological distinctions and the perplexing idiomatic forms of Latin discourse, as well as the facility with which it will enable the pupil to take up and master the difficulties of Latin syntax. It is in every way worthy to take its place in the unrivaled Latin series of which it will be the introductory book.

The same work will be furnished, when desired, without the Grammatical Outline, under the following title:

**Progressive Exercises in Reading and Writing Latin,** with Frequent Practice in Reading at Sight, intended as a Companion-Book to the author's Latin Grammar. 12mo.

Both editions contain numerous notes and suggestions, and an adequate Latin-English and English-Latin Dictionary.

**The Complete Text of Vergil.** With Notes and the Vergilian Dictionary. By HENRY S. FRIEZE, Professor of Latin in the University of Michigan. 12mo. Cloth.

**The Aeneid of Vergil.** With Notes and Dictionary. By HENRY S. FRIEZE. 12mo. Cloth.

[SEE NEXT PAGE.]

*EDUCATIONAL WORKS.—(Continued.)*

---

**The Aeneid of Vergil.** With Notes. By HENRY S. FRIEZE. 12mo.  
Cloth. 598 pages. Large type.

**The Bucolics and Georgics, and the First Six Books of the Aeneid.** With Notes and Dictionary. By HENRY S. FRIEZE. 12mo.

**A Vergilian Dictionary.** By HENRY S. FRIEZE. 12mo. 229 pages.

The text of Frieze's new editions of Vergil is the result of a careful comparison of the texts of the most eminent among the recent Vergilian critics, especially those of Wagner, Jahn, Forbiger, Radewig, Ribbeck, and Conington. The references in the Notes are to the grammars of Harkness, Madvig, Zumpt, Allen and Greenough, Bartholomew, and Gildersleeve.

The Dictionary contains all words found in the Bucolics, the Georgics, and the Aeneid, including all proper names, preserving all important varieties of orthography, and, therefore, convenient for use with any edition or text of Vergil. It aims to represent completely the Vergilian usage of words, and refers constantly to the text for the illustration of definitions given.

**The Tenth and Twelfth Books of the Institutions of Quintilian.** With Explanatory Notes. By HENRY S. FRIEZE. 12mo. 175 pages.

**M. Tullii Ciceronis Laelius de Amicitia.** With English Notes. By JOHN K. LORD, Associate Professor of Latin, Dartmouth College. 12mo. 111 pages.

The text adopted for this work is that of Baiter and Kayser, the edition of 1860. It has been carefully compared with Holm's revision of Orelli's text, and with those of other editors. Any changes from the standard text have been noticed in the notes.

In preparing the notes, the aim has been to furnish explanations on points of grammar, history, biography, and ancient customs, and, particularly by translation and special remark, to indicate the different and the corresponding idioms of the Latin and the English, and thus, through idiomatic English, to assist to a better understanding of the structure of the Latin.

**Selections from the Poems of Ovid.** With Notes. By J. L. LINCOLN, LL. D., Professor of Latin in Brown University. 12mo. 238 pages.

This edition of Ovid was prepared at the request of many teachers of Latin who regard the poetry of Ovid more suitable for the use of beginners than that of Vergil, an opinion that governs the course pursued in the European schools generally. The text is very carefully annotated, and references made to Harkness's Standard Grammar.

Some selections from the "Amores," the "Fasti," and the "Tristia," have been added to those made from the "Metamorphoses," not only on account of the interesting themes of which they treat, but also for the sake of giving the student an opportunity of becoming acquainted with Latin elegiac verse, of which, in Latin poetry, Ovid is the acknowledged master.

With Notes and Vocabulary.

[SEE NEXT PAGE.]

*EDUCATIONAL WORKS.—(Continued.)*

---

**Tyler's Histories of Tacitus.** With Notes, for Colleges. 12mo. 453 pages.

**Lincoln's Horace.** With English Notes, for the Use of Schools and Colleges. 12mo. 575 pages.

**Lincoln's Livy.** Selections from the First Five Books, together with the Twenty-first and Twenty-second Books entire; with a Plan of Rome, a Map of the Passage of Hannibal, and English Notes for the Use of Schools. By J. L. LINCOLN, Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in Brown University. 12mo. 329 pages.

**Sallust's Jugurtha and Catiline.** With Notes and a Vocabulary. By NOBLE BUTLER and MINARD STURGIS. 12mo. 397 pages.

**Cicero's Select Orations.** With Notes, for the Use of Schools and Colleges. By E. A. JOHNSON, Professor of Latin in the University of New York. 12mo. 459 pages.

**Cicero de Officiis.** With English Notes, mostly translated from Zumpt and Bonnell. By THOMAS A. THACHER, of Yale College. 12mo. 194 pages.


**Beza's Latin New Testament.** 12mo. 291 pages.


**Cæsar's Commentaries on the Gallic War.** With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory; a Lexicon, Geographical and Historical Indexes, a Map of Gaul, etc. By Rev. J. A. SPENCER, D. D. 12mo. 408 pages.


**Quintus Curtius: Life and Exploits of Alexander the Great.** Edited, and illustrated with English Notes, by WILLIAM HENRY CROSBY. 12mo. 385 pages.


*D. APPLETON & CO., Publishers,*

NEW YORK BOSTON CHICAGO SAN FRANCISCO.









**PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE  
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET**

---

---

**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY**

---

---



**006107117017**

